Criminological Policy of the Russian Federation: the Concept of Judicial Reform and Justice of the Peace

The article presents a legal approach to the problem of the influence of the judicial system segment of Russian criminological policy on the effectiveness of the general prevention of deviant behavior. Within this framework, the authors compare the assumptions of the program documents that described the criminological parameters of justice of the peace during its introduction in the contemporary judicial system, and the results achieved by this introduction. By analyzing the Decree of the Supreme Council of the RSFSR «On the Concept of Judicial Reform in the RSFSR», the authors demonstrate that this document was aimed at legitimizing confederative relationships in the Russian Federation with the design of the judicial system of «cooperative federalism» type. The justice of the peace, whose status and jurisdiction are only schematically outlined in the Concept of Judicial Reform, was to play a decorative role in the political and ideological support of the achievement of a far more ambitious goal. The transformation of Russia into a state of «cooperative federalism» with extreme asymmetry of its subjects would have meant the removal of the opportunity for the justices of the peace to perform the criminological function of courts. The introduction of justices of the peace simultaneously with the adoption of their own codes of material and procedural law in the republics of the RSFSR predetermined the creation of legal systems independent of the federal center in each Russian subject and the blocking of the criminological function of the courts. At the same time, a retrospect reference to the legal tradition of the Russian Empire formed an erroneous understanding of Russian justice of the peace as a unified (since 1864) judicial system, and lead to the development of abstract projects that hindered the implementation of the crime prevention potential of justice of the peace. The result of the criminological policy of the Russian Federation in 1991–1996 was the structuring of the court system of the Russian Federation which was different from the model presented in the Concept of Judicial Reform. The conducted research showed that justice of the peace in Russia duly influences crime prevention.

QUESTIONS OF BUILDING A MODEL OF COOPERATIVE FEDERALISM IN THE CONTEXT OF LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT

The current problems of the lack of clear interaction between the levels of government, which have significantly manifested themselves during the implementation of national projects, have predetermined the need for a new stage of local self-government reform aimed at building a model of a single executive vertical based on cooperative federalism. In the article, the author analyzes two main trends in the development of this model: managerial centralization and cooperation. It is established that centralization has affected many aspects and directions of the implementation of power, but at the same time the problem of cooperation and coordination of actions of individual branches, spheres and levels of management remains. The author considers managerial cooperation from the point of view of the system approach on the basis of the types of system elements and ways of their interaction, which in general forms various directions and forms of cooperative interaction. The article establishes the structure of cooperation by types of system elements according to the law of system development and the corresponding forms of cooperative interactions. The analysis of the current implementation of financial, administrative, political, control and analytical cooperation allows us to identify existing problems and the required measures for the development of cooperative federalism in the aspect of implementing a complementary combination of centralization and cooperation.

India's Goods and Services Tax: A Unique Experiment in Cooperative Federalism and a Constitutional Crisis in Waiting

It has long been argued that federal countries, especially those with strong subnational taxing powers, might face difficulty in implementing a federal value-added tax (VAT) because of coordination issues involved, and therefore might be reluctant to adopt one. This article provides insights on how VAT structures are evolving in federal systems, where different tiers of government have separate (and sometimes overlapping) taxation powers. While the author focuses mainly on India's recently enacted goods and services tax (GST), he also offers a comparative perspective, with reference to the GST/VAT systems in Canada, Brazil, and the European Union, thus adding to the hitherto limited body of scholarly work on VAT coordination in federal jurisdictions. The GST is arguably India's biggest tax reform in several decades. Introduced primarily to create a unified national market and bring an end to tax wars and economic distortions, the tax reform's chief slogan was "GST—one-nation-one-tax-one-market." This article takes a closer look at a unique institutional design feature of the Indian GST—a centre-state body called the GST council. What makes this body unique is that it is envisaged as functioning on the principles of cooperative federalism. But can a concurrent tax system, whose very survival is based on cooperative federalism, guarantee a unified national market? If yes, for how long? The author highlights the role of the GST council in market integration and explains why the council has succeeded on several fronts while failing on others. He also addresses an unresolved constitutional issue that could affect the GST council's ability to function as the fulcrum for cooperative federalism—namely, the question of whether its decisions are binding. The uncertainty surrounding this issue could lead to a constitutional crisis if one or more states decide to opt out. The author discusses four possible ways to deal with this impending crisis.

10. Judicial Powers I

This chapter highlights the ‘centralized’ powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It begins with an analysis of the Court's annulment power. The power of judicial review is the founding pillar of a Union ‘based on the rule of law’. The chapter then moves to the remedial power of the European Court, and the question of when the Union legislative or executive branches will be liable to pay damages for an illegal action. It also investigates the Court's power to adjudicate disputes between parties. In addition to a number of direct actions (direct actions start directly in the European Court), the EU Treaties also envisage an indirect action starting in the national courts: the preliminary reference procedure. This procedure is the central pillar of the Union's cooperative federalism for it combines the central interpretation of Union law by the Court of Justice with the decentralized application of European law by the national courts.

10. Judicial Powers I

This chapter highlights the ‘centralized’ powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union. It begins with an analysis of the Court’s annulment power. The power of judicial review is the founding pillar of a Union ‘based on the rule of law’. The chapter then moves to the remedial power of the European Court, and the question of when the Union legislative or executive branches will be liable to pay damages for an illegal action. It also investigates the Court’s power to adjudicate disputes between parties. In addition to a number of direct actions (direct actions start directly in the European Court), the EU Treaties also envisage an indirect action starting in the national courts: the preliminary reference procedure. This procedure is the central pillar of the Union’s cooperative federalism for it combines the central interpretation of Union law by the Court of Justice with the decentralized application of European law by the national courts.

The Working of Cooperative and Collaborative Federalism in India: Understanding Intergovernmental Relations

A federal constitution is based on at least two levels of governments— federal/union and provincial/state—which are generally constitutionally assigned exclusive as well as concurrent dominions, in addition to the residual powers. Consequently, union–state coordination is indispensable to negotiate and devise joint policies in field of shared jurisdictions. Moreover, such coordination is also essential for exclusive jurisdiction apparently because in the eras of ‘cooperative federalism’ and ‘collaborative federalism’, the federal government frequently utilises its usually bigger revenues to introduce centrally sponsored schemes of development and social policies with approval of state governments. These schemes may be entirely or partially financed by the union and executed by the states. Besides, residual powers or new policy areas that may emerge also need union–state cooperation, even though they are judicially adjudicated to go to any of the two levels of government. In an era of intergovernmental and global interdependence, functional link of governance may require cooperative action by different levels of governments besides the civil society organisations.

India’s demographic dividend or disaster? Mismanaged factors of production—Land, labor, infrastructure, cities

India entered its so-called demographic dividend around 2005—expected to last until 2055. India has already utilized almost a third of the period of its demographic dividend—it saw a period of explosive growth from 2003–2012—but has not been able to sustain that growth. And since 2012, growth has generated less and less employment, as it has turned inward, and so it is not helping the working-age population get usefully employed. The labor force participation rate for women has been low and is now falling. What can be done to use India’s underlying factors of production better to generate greater, more inclusive, and sustained prosperity for its citizens? These second-generation reforms are not easy, as they need cooperative federalism and much broader consensus, but without them India’s demographic dividend may become a disaster.

FEDERALISMO COOPERATIVO: REFLEXOS NA SAÚDE PÚBLICA

This paper deals with Cooperative Federalism and its reflexes on public health. Federalism is a form of state that is characterized by the union of autonomous states. The Federal State is, therefore, an alliance or union of States. The formation of the Brazilian Federal State is characterized by the centrifugal movement, that is, part of the one for the parts that are classified as federative entities: Union, States, Federal District and Municipalities. The purpose of this article was to explain the issues related to federalism and competing competences provided for in the Federal Constitution. As a method, it was developed from the perspective of a qualitative approach of bibliographic character based on existing publications and the use of Brazilian legislation. As a result and conclusion, it was observed that in the beginning of the year 2020 and 2021 it brought more than any citizen could imagine in the most expansive and optimistic for a new year. The federal government at other times had and still has acentralizing role. Governors acted, others less so. In short, there was and is a major crisis in federalism, originating from the urgent need for measures to be taken with a view to protecting the health of the administrated. And that was done. Several measures have been taken, but often reaching third party competencies or limiting those competencies. It is hoped that this article may generate guidelines for new discussions and reflections for new studies.

The Australian Energy Transition as a Federalism Challenge: (Un)cooperative Energy Federalism?

The law and regulation of the energy sector in Australia is subject to overlapping responsibilities of both federal and state governments. Crucially for energy transition efforts, neither energy, environment nor climate is mentioned in the Australian Constitution. Australia has a tradition of creative cooperative federalism solutions for responding to problems of national importance. In the energy sector this has resulted in an intricate national framework for energy markets, which relies on mirror legislation passed by participating states, with oversight by state and federal executive governments. Independently of these frameworks, both federal and state governments have passed climate change legislation, which crucially includes renewable energy support mechanisms. At a time when a rapid transition to a decarbonized energy system is essential, legal frameworks struggle to respond in a timely fashion. The political discourse around energy has become increasingly toxic – reflecting a dysfunctional state–federal relationship in energy and climate law. Australia needs to consider whether its cooperative federalism solutions are sufficient to support the energy transition and how climate law at the state and federal levels interacts with energy market legal frameworks.