Energy R&D: in tepid pursuit of collective goods

1979 ◽  
Vol 33 (2) ◽  
pp. 149-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
Davis B. Bobrow ◽  
Robert T. Kudrle
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Liquid Fuel ◽  
Liquid Fuels ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
The Public ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Before And After ◽  
History Of ◽  
Political Economy Approach

Continued dependence on expensive imported liquid fuels puts stress on the relations among and the domestic performance of the members of OECD. Coordinated energy R&D could in principle lessen those stresses and also benefit other liquid fuel consumers. A political economy approach can help explain the tepid pursuit of this possibility in two ways. First, it can clarify the reasons for the weak collective action energy R&D record of the members of the OECD both before and after the oil events of 1973. Second, it can demonstrate and identify the nature of the undersupply of the public good of energy knowledge. The history of this area illustrates several general obstacles to the provision of public goods in realistically complex political situations. These include the uncertain and distant nature of commitments to actually deliver collective goods in the absense of self-enforcing agreements, unwillingness to jeopardize possible future private advantages, and the tendencies to link provision of particular public goods to cooperation by other parties with the provider on a host of other matters. In effect, the attempts of particular statesmen to tie energy R&D cooperation to other issues reinforce tendencies to view the choices not as ones about the level of provision of public goods, but rather as ones about national shares of private goods—economic, military, and political.

The Challenges in Dealing with Organized Crime and its Consequences in Modern Societies in Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia – the Balkan Peninsula

2015 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 161
Author(s):  
Bashkim Selmani ◽  
Bekim Maksuti
Keyword(s):  
Organized Crime ◽  
Balkan Peninsula ◽  
Human Mind ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
The Public ◽  
Before And After ◽  
History Of ◽  
European Standards ◽  
Organized Crime Groups ◽  
Further Development

The profound changes within the Albanian society, including Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia, before and after they proclaimed independence (in exception of Albania), with the establishment of the parliamentary system resulted in mass spread social negative consequences such as crime, drugs, prostitution, child beggars on the street etc. As a result of these occurred circumstances emerged a substantial need for changes within the legal system in order to meet and achieve the European standards or behaviors and the need for adoption of many laws imported from abroad, but without actually reading the factual situation of the psycho-economic position of the citizens and the consequences of the peoples’ occupations without proper compensation, as a remedy for the victims of war or peace in these countries. The sad truth is that the perpetrators not only weren’t sanctioned, but these regions remained an untouched haven for further development of criminal activities, be it from the public state officials through property privatization or in the private field. The organized crime groups, almost in all cases, are perceived by the human mind as “Mafia” and it is a fact that this cannot be denied easily. The widely spread term “Mafia” is mostly known around the world to define criminal organizations.The Balkan Peninsula is highly involved in these illegal groups of organized crime whose practice of criminal activities is largely extended through the Balkan countries such as Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Serbia, Bosnia, Croatia, Montenegro, etc. Many factors contributed to these strategic countries to be part of these types of activities. In general, some of the countries have been affected more specifically, but in all of the abovementioned countries organized crime has affected all areas of life, leaving a black mark in the history of these states.

Ethnic trust, minority status, and public goods in post-conflict societies

2021 ◽  
pp. 002234332098421
Author(s):  
Sam Whitt
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Public Good ◽  
Intergroup Contact ◽  
Minority Group ◽  
Civil Liberties ◽  
Minority Status ◽  
The Public ◽  
Attitudes And Behaviors ◽  
Post Conflict ◽  
History Of

This study considers how ethnic trust and minority status can impact the ability of ethnic groups to pursue cooperative public goods, focusing on groups with a history of conflict and lingering hostility. A public good experiment between ethnic Albanians and Serbs in postwar Kosovo reveals that subjects contribute far more to a mutually beneficial public good when they are part of an experimentally induced coethnic majority. However, when in the minority, subjects not only underinvest, but many actively divest entirely, privatizing the public good. Majority/minority status also has wide-ranging implications for how individuals relate to real-world public goods and the institutions of government that provide them. Compared to majority Albanians, survey data indicate how minority Serbs in Kosovo express greater safety and security concerns, feel more politically, socially, and economically excluded, are more dissatisfied with civil liberties and human rights protections, and are less likely to participate politically or pay taxes to support public goods. Conflict-related victimization and distrust of out-groups are strong predictors of these minority group attitudes and behaviors. This suggests a mechanism for how conflict amplifies out-group distrust, increasing parochial bias in public good commitments, especially among minorities who are wary of exploitation at the hands of an out-group majority. To restore trust, this study finds that institutional trust and intergroup contact are important to bridging ethnic divides that inhibit public good cooperation.

Accountability, the Public, and Public Schools

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sarah M. Stitzlein
Keyword(s):  
Public Schools ◽  
Public Goods ◽  
Progressive Era ◽  
John Dewey ◽  
The Public ◽  
Citizen Support ◽  
History Of ◽  
Shared Benefit ◽  
Key Aspects ◽  
Important Basis

I begin by laying out the shifting context of public schools and the citizens and democracy they serve. I ground my discussion in a theory of participatory democracy influenced by the ideas of Progressive Era philosopher of education John Dewey and contemporary political theorist Benjamin Barber. I provide that theory as both a foil to analyze contemporary changes in democracy and a guide for how we might respond to and, at times, resist them. I then trace the history of educational accountability to illuminate key aspects of the current accountability crisis. Finally, I define the public and public goods, an important basis for my call to revitalize citizen support for public schools insofar as these concepts show us how schools not only serve as a shared benefit, but also are established and protected as such through our shared efforts.

THE ECONOMIST AND THE ECONOMIST’S AUDIENCE

2019 ◽  
Vol 41 (03) ◽  
pp. 335-341
Author(s):  
Steven G. Medema
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Adam Smith ◽  
Classical System ◽  
Public Realm ◽  
Harriet Martineau ◽  
The Public ◽  
History Of Economics ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Public Sphere ◽  
The Masses

The history of economics, properly read, is very much a history of economics in the public sphere. Sir William Petty developed his most important insights in the process of providing advice on taxation to the monarch. Adam Smith wrote with a view to influencing the habits of thought of both the educated layman and policy makers. Jane Marcet and Harriet Martineau brought early classical political economy to the masses. David Ricardo formulated foundational elements of the nineteenth-century classical system writing policy pamphlets and then entered Parliament with a view to putting policy making on a solid economic footing. Karl Marx’s intended audience was anything but the practitioners of the emerging science of political economy. Alfred Marshall buried his technical analysis in appendices to maximize the exposure of his work. John Maynard Keynes’s influence can be ascribed, without too much injustice, as much to his effectiveness outside the walls of Cambridge as within them and to the use by others of his ideas in that same public realm. Yet, despite this lengthy history of economists’ engagements with various publics, including those pulling the levers of policy, those writing on the history of economics have focused far more intently on the history of theory and the implications for the construction of a body of thought known as “economic analysis” than on the interplay among economists, economic ideas, and the public realm. It is as if the economic conversation went on solely within the space of academic departments of economics, even though those spaces are very recent creations.

scholarly journals Konsep Uang: Ekonomi Islam VS Ekonomi Konvensional

2015 ◽  
Vol 15 (1) ◽  
pp. 70-75
Author(s):  
Santi Endriani
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
The Public ◽  
Cambridge School

In Islamic economics, the concept of money is very clear that money is a medium of exchange in muamalah, instead of capital (commodities). That money is objected that are approved by the public as an intermediary tool to hold the exchange or trade. Differences concept of money in Islamic and conventional economics are on the money that is not identical to the capital, the money is public goods, capital is private goods, money is a flow concept, and capital is a stock concept in the concept of money in Islam. While the conventional concept of money in the currency identified with capital money (capital) are private goods. Money (capital) is a flow concept for Fisher, and money (capital) is a stock concept for Cambridge School.

scholarly journals Beyond programmatic versus patrimonial politics: contested conceptions of legitimate distribution in Nigeria

2019 ◽  
Vol 57 (3) ◽  
pp. 415-436
Author(s):  
Portia Roelofs
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Large Scale ◽  
A Priori ◽  
African Politics ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
South West ◽  
Political Struggles ◽  
The World ◽  
History Of ◽  
The Rich

AbstractThis article argues against the long-standing instinct to read African politics in terms of programmatic versus patrimonial politics. Unlike the assumptions of much of the current quantitative literature, there are substantive political struggles that go beyond ‘public goods good, private goods bad’. Scholarly framings serve to obscure the essentially contested nature of what counts as legitimate distribution. This article uses the recent political history of the Lagos Model in south-west Nigeria to show that the idea of patrimonial versus programmatic politics does not stand outside of politics but is in itself a politically constructed distinction. In adopting it a priori as scholars we commit ourselves to seeing the world through the eyes of a specific, often elite, constituency that makes up only part of the rich landscape of normative political contestation in Nigeria. Finally, the example of a large-scale empowerment scheme in Oyo State shows the complexity of politicians’ attempts to render distribution legitimate to different audiences at once.

Bargaining in Legislatures over Particularistic and Collective Goods

2007 ◽  
Vol 101 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-92 ◽  
Author(s):  
CRAIG VOLDEN ◽  
ALAN E. WISEMAN
Keyword(s):  
Public Goods ◽  
Special Interest ◽  
Unified Model ◽  
Bargaining Model ◽  
Policy Reforms ◽  
Private Goods ◽  
Collective Goods ◽  
Private And Public

We develop a bargaining model in which a legislature divides a budget among particularistic and collective goods. By incorporating both private and public goods in a unified model, we uncover nonmonotonic relationships between legislative preferences for collective spending and the amount of the budget actually allocated to collective goods. Put simply, policy proposers can exploit coalition partners' strong preferences for public goods to actually provide fewer public goods in equilibrium while directing more private goods to themselves. These results explain why policy reforms to limit special interest spending often fail. This unified model also sheds new light on when legislatures prefer open or closed amendment rules and when coalitions take different sizes and shapes.

The Political Economy of Jihad and the War on Terror

2007 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 317-332
Author(s):  
Joe Wallis
Keyword(s):  
Political Economy ◽  
Cognitive Dissonance ◽  
Public Interest ◽  
War On Terror ◽  
Target Population ◽  
Political Interest ◽  
The Political ◽  
The Public ◽  
International Response ◽  
History Of

This paper treats the “war on terror” as a battle to engage the hopes of a target population. bounded by shared “conspiracist” beliefs. These are seen as countering the cognitive dissonance arising from a history of perceived humiliation. A small militant minority within this target population will have a tendency to perpetrate acts of terror both as an expression of their “apocalyptic hopes” and to evoke such hopes among their potential or latent members within the target population. In reacting to these acts through a preventive “war on terror” that is unrestricted in time and space, the superpower is setting itself the ambitious goal of extinguishing these hopes. Questions must therefore arise as to whether the pursuit of this option rather than “a more focused, restrained international response” can be explained in terms of a dispassionate assessment of the public interest being over-ridden by the passions provoked by a sense of superpower humiliation or by private considerations of political interest.

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