Organization for European Economic Cooperation

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 632-636

Contrary to the first two annual reports of OEEC which had concentrated on an analysis of national programs and common future policy both within the structure of the organization and beyond the end of the program, the third report of OEEC did not draw to any large extent upon individual national programs for the future, nor attempt to describe in detail future problems and action. The report presented an account of the achievements of the western European economy since the inception of the recovery program and of the progress made in stimulating economic cooperation. The problems of the immediate future were discussed in qualitative terms.

1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (3) ◽  
pp. 557-560

The sixteen nations of western Europe participating in the Economic Recovery Program signed on April 16, 1948, a convention formally establishing the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, providing machinery for the handling of European aid, and including a legally binding contract for self-help to supplement and eventually eliminate the need for outside aid. The principal aim of the organization was stated as the speedy establishment of sound economic conditions, without outside assistance, so as to make a full contribution to world economic stability. The sixteen governments and the western zones of Germany pledged their efforts to a maximum exchange of goods, lower tariff barriers, work towards a customs union, achievement and maintenance of financial and monetary stability, and the best use of their manpower.


1949 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 186-189

A report on the work of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, issued in October 1948, summarized progress of the organization so far and the problems which it still faced. Stating that the organization was still on the threshold of European cooperation and that the most difficult problems still remained, the report defined OEEC's task as the achievement, by 1952, of a “satisfactory European economy without extraordinary outside aid.” The work of OEEC since its inception had been hampered by the facts that it was the first international organization of its kind, that it had been so quickly forced into programming aid requirements of participating countries that there had been no time for organizational problems, and that during a fairly long initial period it had not had close contact with the United States Economic Cooperation Administration since neither the administrator nor his special representative in Europe had been appointed. Despite these hindrances, however, OEEC had drawn up programs covering aid requirements of the nineteen member nations for the third and fourth quarters of 1948, the first annual program, a long-term program, and a first progress report on cooperation and economic recovery. OEEC had also undertaken to recommend to ECA actual distribution of aid between participating countries, a task which it was originally assumed would belong to ECA.


1948 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 397-398

On April 2, 1948, the Congress of the United States passed legislation authorizing the appropriation of $6,098,000,000 for foreign aid, of which $5,300,000,000 was allocated for the first twelve months of the European Recovery Program. The bill became effective upon the signature of the President the following day, and early in April Mr. Paul Hoffman, President of the Studebaker Company, was appointed as director of the Economic Cooperation Administration, an independent agency to handle the funds appropriated by the Congress.


1955 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 304-305

Council: The Council of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) met on May 5 and 6, 1954, and agreed on the basis of a compromise settlement of the extreme creditor and debtor problem in the European Payments Union (EPU). The settlement provided that 1) accumulated debts should be paid over a period of time; 2) debtors should in the future limit to a minimum their resort to EPU resources; 3) the rules of payment should remain unaltered; 4) if the German Federal Republic or other creditors increased their surpluses in EPU, they should extend further credit, but receive some compensation from the EPU dollar reserve; and 5) the special position of Germany should be dealt with. According to press reports, the settlement had averted the danger that the United Kingdom and Germany would withdraw from EPU. The Council, which also decided that EPU should be renewed for another year after June 30, 1954, referred the matter of further details of the settlement to the managing board of EPU. Other actions taken by the Council during its May meeting included the following: 1) recommendations to France that it abolish the compensatory taxes on imports which it had introduced along with certain measures of trade liberalization, and increase trade liberalization to 75 percent by November 1, 1954, instead of to the 65 percent which it had promised; 2) recommendations to the steering board that it submit, as soon as possible, “concrete proposals” for the abolition of artificial measures designed to aid exporters; and 3) the establishment of a ministerial group to examine the problems which would arise if a “number of countries” re-established convertibility.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 48-64
Author(s):  
Sıla Kulaksız

The aim of this article is to review the progress made in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Turkey. Turkey and China both are the emerging economies of the world. They have similar ambitions for development. Turkey aims for “Vision 2023 goals” and China follows its “Destination 2049” goals. The BRI can bring them together to build a prosperous common future. However, both countries have different characteristics. This cooperation can be sustained in a more congruent way by exploring the existing opportunities and risks involved. In this context, some relevant questions are raised: how can cooperation between China and Turkey be strengthened? What are the opportunities and risks in this initiative? What are the expectations of these two countries? In this article, Turkey–China economic cooperation under the BRI will be analyzed. Some suggestions will be made for boosting cooperation between them.


1954 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 280-284

Annual Report: The fifth annual report of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, which was released in January 1954, stressed three developments:) the elimination of inflationary trends of recent years;) the improvement of west Europe's balance of payments, both over-all and with the dollar area; and) the continued failure of western European production to expand at a satisfactory rate. After a brief look at the causes and consequences of the first two of these developments, the report turned its attention to the third and concluded that, unless specific proposals were implemented and if world conditions remained generally the same, European production as a whole would increase only slightly, and Europe's exchange reserves were likely to increase. Several factors which led to these conclusions were:) internal demand was not likely to expand without more expansionary policies by governments;) since export earnings of primary producers were not likely to increase, external demand for European production was similarly not likely to increase; and) United States over-all current surplus, exclusive of all military transactions, would be offset by a new military expenditure abroad of $2.5 billion in 1953 and $2.1 billion in the first half of 1954.


1952 ◽  
Vol 6 (3) ◽  
pp. 475-479

The third survey of European Economic Cooperation prepared for the Council of Europe by the Organization for European Economic Cooperation was published in May 1952. The survey was presented as an interim report since, in accordance with decisions of the Council of OEEC in March 1952, a number of studies had been undertaken by OEEC results of which would not be available for several months.


Author(s):  
Alistair Fair

This chapter touches on three main themes: the first is the increasingly collaborative nature of auditorium and stage design; the second is the extent to which auditorium and stage design could be understood in ‘modern’ terms; and the third is the extent to which the relationship between the stage and the auditorium was often the subject of debate. The chapter begins with a discussion of the collaborative nature of stage and auditorium design, before examining the arguments made in favour of open staging, not least by the director Stephen Joseph, who edited several books on the subject. It then considers the impact of these debates on the design of key examples including Chichester Festival Theatre, the Young Vic, the National Theatre, and the Crucible, Sheffield. It ends with a discussion of flexible staging, highlighting the challenges posed by adaptability as well as examples in which it was explored.


Clinical Risk ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 13 (5) ◽  
pp. 187-190 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ben Troke

This is the third article of a three-part review of the development of case law on 'wrongful existence' claims. An initial article examined the increasing prominence of policy considerations in our jurisprudence more generally, often dressed as 'distributive justice', and considered the apparent trend toward preference for autonomy over more traditional views of the sanctity of life in recent years. A second article described the development of case law on 'wrongful existence' in some detail, and looked briefly at the solutions in other jurisdictions. This third article will pick out the key elements of the leading authority (McFarlane, 1999), and ask whether any predictions can be made in this specific field or more widely.


1946 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 242-254 ◽  
Author(s):  
Gerhard Ritter

As early as November 1943, in conversations with German refugees at Istanbul, I encountered again and again the question, asked with amazement: how was it possible in Hitler's Germany for me to publish such independent views on historical-political questions, as I had expressed in my writings and addresses, without suffering political persecution? After I was released from prison by the Russians at the end of April 1945, foreigners frequently asked me the same question. I shall attempt to give an answer, based simply on my own personal experience.In November, 1944, I had been arrested by the Gestapo, not because of any statement I had made in my addresses, university lectures, or writings, but because of my friendship with Dr. Gördeler and my participation in conferences about a political-theological memoir dealing with the future reorganization of German and European politics. The Gestapo officials who arrested me all wore an SD (Security Service) on the sleeves of their uniforms.


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