Promises or Policies? An Experimental Analysis of International Agreements and Audience Reactions

2014 ◽  
Vol 68 (1) ◽  
pp. 235-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Chaudoin

AbstractA key assumption of audience costs theories of crisis bargaining and international cooperation is that audience members have strong preferences for consistency between their leader's commitments and actual policy choices. However, audiences also have strong preferences over the policy choices themselves, regardless of their consistency with past commitments. I conducted a randomized survey experiment to evaluate the magnitude of consistency and policy effects in the context of international agreements over trade policy. Respondents with expressed policy preferences, whether supporting or opposing free trade, have muted reactions to learning that their leader has broken an agreement. Only respondents with no opinion on trade policy are affected by learning that their leader's policy is inconsistent with prior commitments. This suggests that constituents' underlying preferences limit the degree to which audience costs influence policymakers' calculations.

1985 ◽  
Vol 24 (1) ◽  
pp. 39-50
Author(s):  
Gunnar Flфystad

This paper analyses whether the developing countries are pursuing an optimal foreign trade policy, given the theoretical and empirical evidence we have. The paper concludes that constraints in imposing other taxes than tariffs in many developing countries may justify having tariffs as part of an optimal taxation policy.


Author(s):  
Kenneth Mori McElwain ◽  
Shusei Eshima ◽  
Christian G. Winkler

Abstract In many countries, constitutional amendments require the direct approval of voters, but the consequences of fundamental changes to the powers and operations of the state are difficult to anticipate. The referendums literature suggests that citizens weigh their prior beliefs about the merits of proposals against the heuristic provided by the partisanship of the proposer, but the relative salience of these factors across constitutional issue areas remains underexplored. This paper examines the determinants of citizen preferences on 12 diverse constitutional issues, based on a novel survey experiment in Japan. We show that support for amendments is greater when its proposer is described as non-partisan. However, constitutional ideology moderates this effect. Those who prefer idealistic constitutions that elevate national traditions tend to value proposals that expand government powers, compared to those who prefer pragmatic constitutions that constrain government authority. These results highlight the significance of constitutional beliefs that are independent of partisanship.


2012 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin O. Fordham ◽  
Katja B. Kleinberg

AbstractRecent research on the sources of individual attitudes toward trade policy comes to very different conclusions about the role of economic self-interest. The skeptical view suggests that long-standing symbolic predispositions and sociotropic perceptions shape trade policy opinions more than one's own material well-being. We believe this conclusion is premature for two reasons. First, the practice of using one attitude to predict another raises questions about direction of causation that cannot be answered with the data at hand. This problem is most obvious when questions about the expected impact of trade are used to predict opinions about trade policy. Second, the understanding of self-interest employed in most studies of trade policy attitudes is unrealistically narrow. In reality, the close relationship between individual economic interests and the interests of the groups in which individuals are embedded creates indirect pathways through which one's position in the economy can shape individual trade policy preferences. We use the data employed by Mansfield and Mutz to support our argument that a more complete account of trade attitude formation is needed and that in such an account economic interests may yet play an important role.1


2021 ◽  
pp. 002200272199554
Author(s):  
Allan Dafoe ◽  
Remco Zwetsloot ◽  
Matthew Cebul

Reputations for resolve are said to be one of the few things worth fighting for, yet they remain inadequately understood. Discussions of reputation focus almost exclusively on first-order belief change— A stands firm, B updates its beliefs about A’s resolve. Such first-order reputational effects are important, but they are not the whole story. Higher-order beliefs—what A believes about B’s beliefs, and so on—matter a great deal as well. When A comes to believe that B is more resolved, this may decrease A’s resolve, and this in turn may increase B’s resolve, and so on. In other words, resolve is interdependent. We offer a framework for estimating higher-order effects, and find evidence of such reasoning in a survey experiment on quasi-elites. Our findings indicate both that states and leaders can develop potent reputations for resolve, and that higher-order beliefs are often responsible for a large proportion of these effects (40 percent to 70 percent in our experimental setting). We conclude by complementing the survey with qualitative evidence and laying the groundwork for future research.


Author(s):  
Luciano Fanti ◽  
Domenico Buccella

AbstractBy analysing interlocking cross-ownership, this work reconsiders the inefficiency of activist governments that set subsidies for their exporters (Brander and Spencer, J Int Econ 18:83–100). Making use of a third-market Cournot duopoly model, we show that the implementation of strategic trade policy in the form of a tax (subsidy) when goods are differentiated (complements) is Pareto-superior to free trade within precise ranges of firms’ cross-ownership, richly depending on the degree of product competition. These results challenge the conventional ones in which public intervention (1) is always the provision of a subsidy and (2) always leads to a Pareto-inferior (resp. Pareto-superior) equilibrium when products are substitutes (resp. complements).


2016 ◽  
Vol 62 (4) ◽  
pp. 12-22
Author(s):  
Sun Yuhong ◽  
Mu Yifei ◽  
Jun Yang

Abstract On 5 October 2015, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) led by the U.S. was signed. Already, 12 countries1 have joined the agreement, but China has not. Thus, lots of research has focused on the negative effect of the TPP on China’s foreign trade. On the other hand, China is moving forward in its own efforts to establish bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) and free trade zones. In June 2015, China-South Korea and China-Australia signed bilateral FTAs which went into effect in December 2015. Several questions were raised: Since South Korea and Australia are the major trade partners in the Pacific area and the bilateral FTAs will be effective before the TPP, will these FTAs’ positive effects on China’s foreign trade offset some of the negative effects of the TPP? If China and the U.S. adopted a competitive trade policy, which countries would benefit? If China and the U.S. adopted a cooperative trade policy, how would the trade value and economic welfare change? This paper simulates and analyses the mutual effects of China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs and the enlarging TPP using the computable general equilibrium model. The major conclusions drawn suggest that China-South Korea and China-Australia FTAs will significantly offset the TPP’s negative effect on China’s foreign trade. If China is not included, the U.S. economic benefit from the TPP will be limited. The economic welfare for a country like Australia, which joined both the bilateral FTA and the TPP, will be increased the most. In the long run, China joining the TPP would be the most beneficial decision for its national interest. However, if the TPP cannot be approved by the US congress, the U.S.’s economic indicators and export would be decreasing sharply. China’s economy and export will benefit from FTAs.


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