Fighting by the rules: Instructing the armed forces in humanitarian law

1989 ◽  
Vol 29 (269) ◽  
pp. 111-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Françoise J. Hampson

It is commonly accepted that education in human rights may be one of the most effective tools in promoting the observance of those rights. Those whose profession entails the exercise of power over others have an obvious need to know the limits of their power and members of the armed forces represent just such a group. Their acts engage the responsibility of their State under human rights treaties, wherever those acts are committed. Some instruction in human rights law, particularly non-derogable rights, is therefore necessary but the body of rules which imposes the greatest prohibitions and restraints on the conduct of armed forces is humanitarian law. That term is used here as including both “The Hague law”, which imposes limits on the means and methods of warfare, and “Geneva law”, which seeks to protect certain victims of the conflict, such as the wounded and sick in the field, the wounded, sick and shipwrecked at sea, prisoners of war and civilians living under belligerent occupation. The latter body of rules was updated in 1977 by the addition of two Protocols which extended the range of protection by incorporating elements of “The Hague law”. The 1949 Geneva Conventions have been ratified by 166 States and Hague Convention IV, with which we shall principally be dealing, was held by the Nuremberg Tribunal to represent customary international law. To all intents and purposes then, every State is bound by the two bodies of rules. In addition, the 1977 Protocols are binding on those States which have ratified them.

2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (2) ◽  
pp. 239-278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

The centennial of the Hague Convention (No. II; No. IV in the 1907 version) on the Laws and Customs of War on Land and the fiftieth anniversary of the four Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War of August 12, 1949, present an opportunity to reflect on the direction in which the law of war, or international humanitarian law, has been evolving. This essay focuses on the humanization of that law, a process driven to a large extent by human rights and the principles of humanity. As the subject is vast, major issues must inevitably be left out of my discussion, including the impact of the prohibitions on unnecessary suffering and indiscriminate warfare on the regulation of weapons, the proscription of antipersonnel land mines and blinding laser weapons, and the progression of international humanitarian law from largely protecting noncombatants to protecting combatants as well.


1995 ◽  
Vol 89 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Meron

On the eve of the planned U.S. invasion of Haiti, responding to an appeal from the International Committee of the Red Cross to apply international humanitarian law, the United States stated that [i]f it becomes necessary to use force and engage in hostilities, the United States will, upon any engagement of forces, apply all of the provisions of the Geneva Conventions and the customary international law dealing with armed conflict.Further, the United States will accord prisoner of war treatment to any detained member of the Haitian armed forces. Any member of the U.S. armed forces who is detained by Haitian forces must be accorded prisoner of war treatment.


2000 ◽  
Vol 94 (1) ◽  
pp. 78-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodor Mero

Together with the principle prohibiting weapons “of a nature to cause superfluous injury” or “calculated to cause unnecessary suffering,” the Martens clause, in the Preamble to the Hague Conventions on the Laws and Customs of War on Land, is an enduring legacy of those instruments. In the years since its formulation, the Martens clause has been relied upon in die Nurembergjurisprudence, addressed by the International Court of Justice and human rights bodies, and reiterated in many humanitarian law treaties that regulate the means and methods of warfare. It was restated in die 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of Victims of War, the 1977 Additional Protocols to those Conventions, and the Preamble to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons, albeit in slightly different versions. The Martens clause was paraphrased in Resolution XXIII of the Tehran Conference on Human Rights of 1968, and is cited or otherwise referred to in several national military manuals, including those of the United States, die United Kingdom, and Germany. Moreover, attempts have recently been made, including by parties before die International Court of Jusdce, to invoke the clause, in the absence of specific norms of customary and conventional law, to oudaw the use of nuclear weapons.


AJIL Unbound ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 299-304 ◽  
Author(s):  
Banu Bargu

International humanitarian law strictly prohibits the use of human shields and, through a well-known genealogy of supranational efforts that passes through the Hague Convention IV (1907), the Geneva Conventions III and IV (1949), the Additional Protocol I (1977), and, more recently, the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), has sought to prevent this practice. However, both states and nonstate belligerents have deployed human shields in order to gain military advantages—to ward off attacks by placing civilians close to military targets or hiding military targets within areas inhabited by civilians. This is especially the case in asymmetric conflict, where the weaker party can use human shields to protect fighters, weapons, strategic sites, and critical infrastructures, and to delay, deter, and even discourage attackers from direct engagement that might lead to a high number of civilian casualties. On the other hand, the attacking party can allege that the “other” party is using civilians as human shields. Even in the absence of actual evidence, such an allegation has come to constitute a convenient excuse for attackers to justify civilian casualties and to relegate the responsibility for their deaths to the party that endangered them in the first place. In asymmetric conflict, therefore, parties are incentivized to resort to a politics of human shielding.


Author(s):  
Kleffner Jann K ◽  
von Heinegg Wolff Heintschel

This chapter studies the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked. The definition of persons protected under the various treaties for the protection of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked evolved constantly from the adoption of the 1864 Geneva Convention, which only applied to ‘combatants’. The 1906 Geneva Convention subsequently broadened the scope of application to add ‘other persons officially attached to the armed forces’, and the 1929 Geneva Convention similarly referred to ‘officers and soldiers and other persons officially attached to the armed forces’. As far as warfare at sea was concerned, the Hague Convention (III) of 1899 applied to ‘sailors and soldiers who are taken on board’, while the 1907 Hague Convention (X) added to this definition ‘other persons officially attached to fleets or armies’ in analogy to the 1906 Geneva Convention. The chapter then looks at the protection of medical personnel and the rules of international humanitarian law on the dead and missing persons. It also details the development which has led to the adoption of a new protective emblem: the Red Crystal.


2013 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 296-314 ◽  
Author(s):  
Agnieszka Szpak

The aim of the article is to highlight several issues concerning the customary international law status of a number of international humanitarian law (IHL) treaty provisions that arose during the proceedings of the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. Specifically, two key issues will be analyzed, namely the Commission's findings that the Geneva Conventions and some provisions of Additional Protocol I reflected customary international law and that international landmine conventions create only treaty obligations and do not yet reflect customary international law. Also, some more detailed conclusions relating to particular problems, such as the issue of the customary nature of the ICRC’s right to visit prisoners of war and its binding character for non-parties to the Geneva Conventions, will be discussed. The 2005 ICRC Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law and the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia’s jurisprudence will also be included as a point of reference to identify the customary character of certain provisions. The main conclusion is that the Commission has significantly contributed to the emerging consensus regarding the status of certain norms of international humanitarian law as customary norms. Furthermore, it has identified lacunae in the existing standards of humanitarian law and suggested the development of new norms to fill those gaps.


2000 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 619-653 ◽  
Author(s):  
Sonja Boelaert-Suominen

This article discusses the contribution made by the jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal to the articulation of the body of international humanitarian law that applies to all armed conflicts, regardless of whether they are international or internal. The Tadić Jurisdiction Decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber in 1995 set the stage for a substantial “rapprochement” of the regulatory content of war crimes committed in international and internal armed conflict, using Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions as the main vehicle. The first judgements have contributed greatly to the expansion of the body of “Geneva law” applicable to all armed conflicts. More recently, the Tribunal has started to examine cases of armed conflicts per se, in which perpetrators have been charged with violation of the “Hague law”, i.e., the law relating to the conduct of hostilities. The end result of this development will be elaboration of a common core of Geneva law and Hague law applicable to all armed conflicts that have reached the threshold of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.


1992 ◽  
Vol 32 (287) ◽  
pp. 179-182
Author(s):  
Ricardo Camacho Zeas

International humanitarian law is the body of rules (the four 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Additional Protocols of 1977) governing the rights and obligations of the belligerents in war.In signing and later ratifying the Conventions and their Protocols, the States party thereto undertake not only to respect and ensure respect for humanitarian law in all circumstances, but also to disseminate the relevant texts as widely as possible in time of peace as in time of war, among both the armed forces and police and the civilian population. This is stipulated in Articles 47, 48, 127 and 144 of the four Geneva Conventions respectively, which also require States to include the study of humanitarian law in programmes of military instruction. Moreover, States are duty-bound to incorporate the provisions of humanitarian law in their internal legislation.


The book offers a comparative analysis of state practice with regard to the Geneva Conventions. It seeks to answer three questions of critical importance to understanding their role and impact: (1) How have the Geneva Conventions been incorporated into the laws and practices governing armed forces in particular countries? (2) In what ways has the Geneva regime constrained the behavior of states facing situations such as guerrilla warfare and terrorism, where one would expect the Conventions to come under the greatest pressure? (3) What factors have contributed to the successes and failures of the Geneva Conventions to protect human rights in wartime? An overarching theme is to what extent, and under what conditions, does symbolic or “ritual” compliance (for example, incorporation into military manuals and military training) translate into actual compliance on the battlefield? The project draws on insights from and makes contributions to the law and society literature in sociology on compliance within organizations, the constructivist literature in international relations on persuasion and socialization, and legal scholarship on “internalization.” The book includes studies of the Algerian War for independence from France in the 1950s and 1960s; the wars of Yugoslav succession in the 1990s; Russia’s wars against Chechnya; the US wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan; Iranian and Israeli approaches to the laws of war; and the legal obligations of private security firms and peacekeeping forces. The book should be of interest to students and teachers of international relations, human rights, and international law, particularly international humanitarian law.


Author(s):  
Steven Wheatley

International Human Rights Law has emerged as an academic subject in its own right, separate from, but still related to, International Law. This book explains the distinctive nature of the new discipline by examining the influence of the moral concept of human rights on general international law. Rather than make use of moral philosophy or political theory, the work explains the term ‘human rights’ by examining its usage in international law practice, on the understanding that words are given meaning through their use. Relying on complexity theory to make sense of the legal practice in the United Nations, the core human rights treaties, and customary international law, The Idea of International Human Rights Law shows how a moral concept of human rights emerged, and then influenced the international law doctrine and practice on human rights, a fact that explains the fragmentation of international law and the special nature of International Human Rights Law.


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