The Use of Deadly Force in Enforcing the Law: Gold in the Light of History

1992 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-354
Author(s):  
Yoram Shachar

More than thirty-two years have passed since Supreme Court Justice Agranat's ruling that, even in the absence of alternative means to effect a lawful arrest, deadly force may be employed only where the arrest is pursuant to the commission of a felony. That ruling, in the case of Gold v. The Attorney General, stands unchallenged to this day. At the time that decision was handed down, Israeli case law provided a dearth of analytic tools for critical review. Thus, Gold was incorporated into Israeli law pristine and unencumbered by the entourage of learned comments that now regularly escorts Supreme Court decisions. It is not my intention to tarnish that purity of Gold by disclosing some undetected flaw in the ruling. Rather, I believe it is time that we take that ruling a step further on the course it set.

2010 ◽  
Vol 35 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-305
Author(s):  
Norel Neagu

AbstractThis article deals with the possibility of changing the approach to appeals in the interest of law in Romania according to the relevant guidelines extracted from the case law of the European Court of Justice. It provides a comparative analysis of Romanian Supreme Court decisions with those of the European Court of Justice with respect to guiding principles versus a strict interpretation of written legislation. The author highlights a modern path for the Romanian Court to follow in light of the requirements of the twenty-first century.


2018 ◽  
Vol 100 (4) ◽  
pp. 66-67
Author(s):  
Julie Underwood

Many of the most significant U.S. Supreme Court decisions have been decided by just one vote, and these cases hold just as much weight as cases with a unanimous verdict. Julie Underwood provides an overview of some landmark 5-4 decisions with massive implications for K-12 schools in the areas of funding, censorship, desegregation, drug testing, and free speech.


1978 ◽  
Vol 33 (4) ◽  
pp. 502
Author(s):  
Thomas L. Blakemore ◽  
Hiroshi Itoh ◽  
Lawrence Ward Beer

2020 ◽  
Vol 7 (3) ◽  
pp. 613-645
Author(s):  
Anjelica Harris

In the words of Supreme Court Justice Elena Kagan, children are different. The issue of how to sentence juvenile offenders has long been controversial. Although psychology acknowledges the connection between incomplete juvenile brain development and increased criminality, the justice system lags behind in how it handles juvenile offenders. A prime example is the case of Bobby Bostic, who at the age of sixteen was charged with eighteen offenses and sentenced to 241 years in prison. This sentence, known as a term-of-years or virtual life sentence, essentially guarantees that no matter what Bobby does or who he proves himself to be as an adult, he will die in prison. Since Bobby’s sentencing in 1997, the Supreme Court has held that sentencing juveniles to death violates the Eighth Amendment and has banned life without parole for juvenile offenders. Despite landmark Supreme Court decisions, a gap in the law continues to exist when it comes to juvenile non-homicide of- fenders who are certified and tried as adults. Thousands of juvenile offenders are now trapped in the legal gap that exists in the distinction, or lack thereof, between life without parole and lengthy term-of-years sentences. This Comment will explore the gap in the law, the various ways the States have chosen to handle this issue, and will propose a possible solution for Texas.


Legal Studies ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 37 (4) ◽  
pp. 647-671
Author(s):  
Man Yip ◽  
James Lee

This paper analyses the jurisprudence on the relevance of the commercial context to principles of the law of equity and trusts. We criticise recent UK Supreme Court decisions in the area (chiefly Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria, FHR European Ventures v Cedar Capital Partners and AIB Group v Mark Redler & Co) and identify a trend of the ‘commercialisation’ of the issues. The cases are placed in comparative context and it is argued that there is an unsatisfactory pattern of judicial reasoning, exhibiting a preference for some degree of unarticulated flexibility in commercial adjudication. But the price of that flexibility is a lack of doctrinal coherence and the development of equitable principles that will apply in, and beyond, the commercial context. We also argue that this trend has important implications for the coming rounds of Supreme Court appointments.


1981 ◽  
Vol 7 (1) ◽  
pp. 180
Author(s):  
Frank K. Upham ◽  
Hiroshi Itoh ◽  
Lawrence Ward Beer

2008 ◽  
Vol 35 (8) ◽  
pp. 1017-1047 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fred Cohen

The duration and conditions of penal confinement (i.e., segregation) in use by our prisons, and regularly upheld by the courts, are so extreme and so harmful that ultimately such confinement should be prohibited as a matter of law and policy. Correctional officials, and the courts, tend to conflate the need to insulate some inmates from each other with the use of a 23/7 regimen of segregation, devoid of social interaction. Inmates suffering with mental illness or who are at risk from such confinement and juveniles are the exceptions, and they have had some success in the courts. This article reviews the relevant history of penal isolation, Supreme Court decisions and other case law, and the evidence of harm caused by extreme penal isolation. It is proposed that the law relating to the acceptable uses of mechanical restraints serve as an analogy for the basic reform in the use of penal isolation.


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