The Practice and Case Law of Israel in Matters Related to International Law

1995 ◽  
Vol 29 (3) ◽  
pp. 506-543 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rotem M. Giladi

The Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip (“the Interim Agreement”) represents another stage in the implementation of the framework established in the Declaration of Principles signed between the Government of Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (the “PLO”), commonly known as the “Oslo process”. In essence, the Interim Agreement provides for the establishment of self-government arrangements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, as envisaged in the Declaration of Principles, while explicitly superseding the arrangements which applied in the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area since May 1994. In addition, the Interim Agreement provides for “direct, free and general political elections” to be held in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.The aim of this section is to acquaint lawyers with the general framework of the Agreement, and the primary legal and political issues dealt with by the Interim Agreement, rather than to describe the specifics of each of its many provisions. Where required, reference will be made to the Declaration of Principles and to previous Agreements concluded between the Parties. At times, reference will also be made to the Camp David Framework of 1978.


1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 551-649 ◽  

[Transfer of Israeli authority to the Council (see Annexes I and III); Palestinian elections (see Annex II); structure of the Palestinian Council; size of the Council; the Executive Authority of the Council; other Committees of the Council; all meetings are open to the public except meetings of the Executive Authority and meetings that the Council rules are subject to security or confidentiality concerns; judicial review; powers and responsibilities of the Council]



1997 ◽  
Vol 36 (3) ◽  
pp. 547-550

Pursuant to Article VII of Annex I of the Israeli–Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dated September 28, 1995 (“the Interim Agreement”), which deals with the redeployment of Israeli military forces in the City of Hebron and provides that there will be a Temporary International Presence in Hebron, Israel and the PLO agree as follows:



Author(s):  
Maher Anawati Bitar

Between December 2008 to January 2009, the Israel militaries assaulted the Gaza Strip displacing over 50,000 people. This assault accentuated the already long history of Palestinian forced migration. It created ‘internally stuck persons’ (ISPs) who were no longer able to flee conflict areas to safer grounds. For the ISPs, the Gaza Strip has become a prison which is controlled by outside force. Within the context of open-air prison, the ISPs have become ‘internally displaced persons’ because they are compelled to remain within this circumscribed boundary. IDPs receive less assistance and protection than refugees. This chapter discusses the scope, extent and repercussions of the involuntary migratory movements within the occupied Palestinian territories (oPt) of the West Bank and East Jerusalem. It focuses on the physical barrier created by the Government of Israel (GoI) within the oPt. Although the displacement in Gaza, the East Jerusalem, and the West Bank is often triggered by similar and indirect factors, the latter two areas face a distinct set of triggers. A review of the preliminary displacement patterns have shown that forced displacement is both a result of and a means by which the GoI has expanded its hold of East Jerusalem and the prime areas of the West Bank. This review thus asserts that displacement cannot be simply viewed as a humanitarian crisis or a consequence of conflict or Israel’s security needs.



1982 ◽  
Vol 34 (4) ◽  
pp. 560-573 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. M. Lesch

The contradiction between Israeli and Palestinian goals and Israel's refusal to negotiate with the Palestine Liberation Organization have caused a profound diplomatic impasse. Moreover, the PLO's dependence on Arab hosts has embroiled it in secondary-level conflicts with Arab states. Although the PLO has gained their moral, diplomatic, and financial support, it has posed a threefold challenge: rulers resent the military cost of confronting Israel; Palestinian raids precipitate Israeli retaliatory actions against host territories; and the presence of autonomous Palestinian political and military forces undermines the host regimes' sovereignty and legitimacy. The review essay explores the ramifications of these Palestinian-Israeli and Palestinian-Arab dilemmas, and assesses the likelihood of a compromise settlement by creating a Palestinian state on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.



Jurnal Akta ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 61
Author(s):  
Saleh Raed Shatat ◽  
Ong Argo Victoria

Since 1967, each Israeli government has invested significant resources in establishing and expanding the settlements in the Occupied Territories, both in terms of the area of land they occupy and in terms of population. As a result of this policy, approximately 380,000 Israeli citizens now live on the settlements on the West Bank, including those established in East Jerusalem (this report does not relate to the settlements in the Gaza Strip). During the first decade following the occupation, the Ma'arach governments operated on the basis of the Alon Plan, which advocated the establishment of settlements in areas perceived as having "security importance," and where the Palestinian population was sparse (the Jordan Valley, parts of the Hebron Mountains and Greater Jerusalem). After the Likud came to power in 1977, the government began to establish settlements throughout the West Bank, particularly in areas close to the main Palestinian population centers along the central mountain ridge and in western Samaria. This policy was based on both security and ideological considerations. The political process between Israel and the Palestinians did not impede settlement activities, which continued under the Labor government of Yitzhak Rabin (1992-1996) and all subsequent governments. These governments built thousands of new housing units, claiming that this was necessary to meet the "natural growth" of the existing population. As a result, between 1993 and 2000 the number of settlers on the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem) increased by almost 100 percent.



1989 ◽  
Vol 18 (3) ◽  
pp. 60-75 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin N. Schiff
Keyword(s):  
The West ◽  




Author(s):  
Marco LONGOBARDO

Abstract This paper explores the legality of the land closure imposed upon the Gaza Strip by Israel. After having considered the area under occupation, the paper argues that the legality of the closure must be determined under international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the principle of self-determination of peoples, and the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. In the light of these rules, the arbitrary closure of the Gaza Strip should be considered illegal because it breaches the unity between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and because it violates the freedom of movement of the local population. Moreover, the closure breaches the relevant rules pertaining to the transit of goods in occupied territory. The paper concludes that most of the violations caused by the closure affect peremptory rules which produce obligations erga omnes, so that any state in the international community is entitled to react under the law of state responsibility.



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