Cyclical Market Power

2002 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-145
Author(s):  
Amitai Aviram
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Product Market ◽  
Common Method ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Market Conditions ◽  
Definition Of

Market power is not ubiquitous; it is limited to certain products, in certain areas, and to certain times. Understanding the limits of the market power possessed by a firm in a given case is essential to the correct assessment of the firm's behavior and its antitrust implications.The most common method used to identify the scope as well as the strength of a firm's market power is through the definition of relevant markets, calculation of market share and identification of relevant market conditions (e.g., barriers to entry). Correct assessment of suspected market power should relate to all the limits on that power. For that reason, when exploring the possibility that a certain firm possesses market power, a product market definition is of limited use without the support of the relevant geographic market definition.This is also true of temporal restraints on market power. Some firms may be expected to possess market power (within certain product and geographical bounds) continuously, until a substantial and unexpected change in the industry diminishes their market power or changes its boundaries.

3. Market Power, Market Definition, and Barriers to Entry

2019 ◽  
pp. 97-136
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Sunk Costs ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Eu Law ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Structural Barriers ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Eu Competition Law ◽  
Barrier To Entry ◽  
Definition Of

Market power is a central concept in EU competition law. This chapter considers what is meant by market power and how it is assessed in EU law using market definition and barriers to entry analysis. It discusses how markets are defined in EU law by looking at demand substitution, supply substitution, and potential competition. It explains that markets may have both a product and a geographic dimension. The chapter examines the Commission Notice on the definition of the relevant market, the decisional practice of the Commission, and the case law of the EU Courts on market definition, and it discusses what tests may be employed in the definition of markets, particularly the SSNIP test. The chapter then considers how the power of a firm on a market is affected by barriers to entry. It discusses the definition of a barrier to entry and considers barriers to entry such as sunk costs, structural barriers, and strategic barriers,

6. Article 102 TFEU: Introduction and Dominant Position

2019 ◽  
pp. 277-358
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin ◽  
Niamh Dunne
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Substantial Part ◽  
Barriers To Entry ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu

Article 102 TFEU deals with the unilateral conduct of undertakings with substantial market power. It thus prohibits one or more undertakings which hold a dominant position in the internal market or a substantial part of it abusing that position insofar as it may affect inter-Member State trade. This chapter discusses the role of Article 102 and the controversy attending its application, and introduces the elements which must be established before the prohibition applies. The Commission’s review of Article 102 and the publication of its Guidance Paper on enforcement priorities, and the relationship between Article 102 and Article 101, are also considered. The chapter then explores in detail one of the principal limbs of the Article 102 prohibition, namely the concept of an undertaking holding a ‘dominant position’ in a relevant market. The definition of a dominant position in the case law of the Court is discussed, alongside its relation to the concept of substantial market power, including the Commission’s treatment in the Guidance Paper. The chapter then considers how dominance is established, addressing, inter aliai, the definition of the relevant market for the purposes of Article 102; the role of market share in establishing dominance; barriers to entry and other factors indicating dominance; and dominant positions in the digital economy. Article 102

Part II Vertical Agreements Under Regulation 330/2010, 5 Article 3: Market Share Threshold

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wijckmans Frank ◽  
Tuytschaever Filip
Keyword(s):  
Market Share ◽  
Practical Application ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Over Time

This chapter discusses the market share limits that determine the applicability of Regulation 330/2010. Each of the supplier and the buyer must in principle remain below an individual limit of 30 per cent. In order to assess the market share limits, the chapter addresses the following steps of the analysis: (i) ninth step: definition of the relevant market; and (ii) tenth step: calculation of the market shares. It concludes by addressing the concrete and practical application of the market share limits in accordance with Regulation 330/2010 and offers easy-to-read overview tables illustrating the effect of changes in the market share levels over time.

1. Competition policy and economics

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-48
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Market Shares ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial. Section 4 considers the goals of competition law. Section 5 introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law, while reminding the reader that market shares are only ever a proxy for market power and can never be determinative of market power in themselves.

scholarly journals Data and market definition of Internet-based businesses

2019 ◽  
Vol 20 (1) ◽  
pp. 54-85
Author(s):  
Liang Li
Keyword(s):  
Important Influence ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
The Internet ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Online Data ◽  
Competition Analysis ◽  
End Products ◽  
Data Market ◽  
Alternative Approaches ◽  
Definition Of

Market definition is the first step of competition analysis. In practice, relevant markets are mostly defined for the end products and services and it is also the same for current cases concerning Internet-based businesses (IBBs). Data has important influence on the competition of IBBs. However, instead of selling data directly, the IBBs usually use data to produce, improve and innovate products and services. Under such circumstances, there may be no relevant market defined for such data following the conventional market definition methods. This article’s investigation shows that online data play different roles in the competition of IBBs and the conventional competition analysis methods only miss some aspects but not all of them. Alternative approaches including the input market definition and the putative online data market definition proposition fail to solve the problem. What might be of help is to switch focus to improving the relevant market definition methods for products and services which online data are related to and pay more attention to the inner relationship between online data and the Internet-based products and services when identifying which market to define.

1. Competition policy and economics

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Richard Whish ◽  
David Bailey
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Market Share ◽  
Competition Policy ◽  
Competition Law ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Economic Context ◽  
Competition Laws ◽  
Competition Process

This chapter provides an overview of competition law and its economic context. Section 2 describes the practices that competition laws attempt to control in order to protect the competition process. Section 3 examines the theory of competition and gives an introductory account of why the effective enforcement of competition law is thought to be beneficial for consumer welfare. Section 4 considers the expected functions of a system of competition law. Section 5 then introduces two key economic concepts, market definition and market power, that are important to a better understanding of competition policy. The chapter concludes with a table of market share figures that are significant in the application of EU and UK competition law.

6. Article 102 TFEU

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alison Jones ◽  
Brenda Sufrin
Keyword(s):  
Market Power ◽  
Case Law ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Central Importance ◽  
Dominant Position ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Article 102 Tfeu ◽  
Academic Debate

All books in this flagship series contain carefully selected substantial extracts from key cases, legislation, and academic debate, providing able students with a stand-alone resource. Article 102 only applies to undertakings in a dominant position. Thus, whether or not an undertaking holds a ‘dominant position’ is of central importance to Article 102. This chapter discusses the following: the definition of a dominant position; the definition of a dominant position in the case law; establishing dominance; market definition in Article 102 cases; and assessing market power.

Quantitative Price Tests in Antitrust Market Definition with an Application to the Savory Snacks Markets

2014 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-33 ◽  
Author(s):  
Yannis Katsoulacos ◽  
Ioanna Konstantakopoulou ◽  
Eleni Metsiou ◽  
Efthymios Tsionas
Keyword(s):  
Market Structure ◽  
Consumer Welfare ◽  
Market Definition ◽  
Relevant Market ◽  
Monthly Data ◽  
Complete Set ◽  
Definition Of

AbstractIn this paper, we utilize the complete set of quantitative tests at the disposal of economists for delineating antitrust markets. This includes the Small but Significant Increase in Price (SSNIP) test but also a large number of traditional and newer price co-movement tests. We apply these tests to the savory snacks market using Greek bi-monthly data. This market has been subject to many antitrust investigations because of its market structure and its important implications for consumer welfare. However, no dominant view has yet emerged regarding the appropriate definition of the relevant market. Our results indicate that a wide relevant market definition is appropriate.

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