Effects of Bank Regulation and Lender Location on Loan Spreads

2012 ◽  
Vol 47 (6) ◽  
pp. 1247-1278 ◽  
Author(s):  
Li Hao ◽  
Debarshi K. Nandy ◽  
Gordon S. Roberts

AbstractWe investigate how differences in regulation regarding banking-commerce integration and banking sector concentration influence loan spreads across 29 countries. Theoretical research posits conflicting effects based on agency costs, information asymmetry costs, and market power. Increased integration is associated with lower loan spreads in countries with low concentration, but moving to high levels of integration increases spreads in countries with high concentration. Starting from lower levels, an increase in integration is associated with an increase in informational efficiency that disappears at higher levels of integration. We also show that market concentration affects loan spreads differently under high-, medium-, and low-integration regimes.

2013 ◽  
pp. 94-108 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Vernikov

We assess the effect that the industrial policy of growing state-controlled national champions in Russia had on concentration and competitiveness of the banking system in 2000—2012. A modified method of calculating the indicators of market concentration suggests that the main segments of the market have crossed the threshold of high concentration, whereas the household deposits market has approached a monopoly situation. Supremacy of public banks enhances their market power and enables collecting rent that boosts profitability. We suggest that Russia’s industrial policy in banking might be similar to that of China.


Author(s):  
Resul Aydemir

In this paper, I consider the Turkish Banking Industry, which is dominated by a few large banks. Using a conjectural variation approach, I estimate a structural model to examine the market conduct of the largest banks for the period 1988-2009. Estimation results suggest that the Turkish banks colluded in the loan market during the sample period where the average mark-up is estimated to be in the range of 44% to 86% depending on the empirical specification. This evidence demonstrates a conflict between market concentration and competition in the Turkish banking industry. Thus, regulatory agencies should be cautious against attempts to increase concentration in the banking industry.


2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nikodem Szumilo

Abstract The paper identifies neighbourhood price spillovers in the housing market. Although this concept attracted some theoretical research and is strongly supported by practitioners, it has proven very difficult to show in empirical data. By using the linear-in-means model, which is routinely applied to identify endogenous effects in groups of peers, the study summarizes all threats to identification and demonstrates how they can be addressed by exploiting information asymmetry between buyers of different houses and delays in revealing transaction prices. The results show that a 1% increase in the price of a house increases its neighbour's price by up to 0.3%.


2019 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-67
Author(s):  
Hottua Manalu

This article discusses about corporation action notification on the competition law perspective. Corporation action notification is a notification obligations by the business actor to the Business Competition Supervisory Commision about corporation action in the form of incorporation, fusion, or company share acquition that caused asset value or sales value is ecxceed specific value. This article concluded that notification is an important instrument to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because a corporation action has an influence towards business competition, that can increase market concentration and this can make a product price more higher and business actor’s market power become bigger so that can threatening small business actor. However, the notification nowadays applied in Indonesia is notification to the commission after the corporation action has been done, or as known as post-notification, actually is not effective to prevent monopolistic practices and unfair competition, because of the notification is delivered after the corporation action has been done, so that in case the Commission assess that the corporation action is causing monopolistic practices and unfair competition then the revocation is complicated. Therefore, this article is encouraging notification to be done before corporation action is started, as known as pra-notification, so monopolistic  practices and unfair competition possibility can be detected earlier and can be prevented. Abstrak Artikel ini membahas notifikasi aksi korporasi dalam perspektif hukum persaingan usaha. Notifikasi aksi korporasi adalah kewajiban pemberitahuan oleh pelaku usaha kepada Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha atas aksi korporasi baik dalam bentuk penggabungan, peleburan, maupun pengambilalihan saham perseroan yang berakibat nilai aset dan atau nilai penjualannya melebihi jumlah tertentu. Artikel ini menyimpulkan, notifikasi merupakan instrumen penting dalam mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan aksi korporasi berpengaruh terhadap persaingan usaha, yaitu menyebabkan bertambahnya konsentrasi pasar yang dapat menyebabkan harga produk semakin tinggi dan kekuatan pasar pelaku usaha menjadi semakin besar sehingga dapat mengancam pebisnis kecil. Namun demikian, notifikasi yang saat ini berlaku di Indonesia, yaitu pemberitahuan kepada Komisi setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, atau yang dikenali dengan post-notifikasi, sesungguhnya tidak efektif mencegah praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat, dikarenakan notifikasi disampaikan setelah aksi korporasi selesai dilakukan, sehingga dalam hal Komisi menilai aksi korporasi menyebabkan praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat maka pembatalan jelas mengalami kerumitan. Oleh karenanya, artikel ini mendorong notifikasi dilakukan sebelum aksi korporasi dilakukan, yang disebut dengan pra-notifikasi, agar kemungkinan terjadinya praktik monopoli dan persaingan usaha tidak sehat diketahui sejak dini dan dapat dicegah.


2017 ◽  
Vol 1 (13) ◽  
pp. 33-48
Author(s):  
Myroslava Khutorna

This paper is devoted to the consideration of the preconditions and results of the banking sector of Ukraine transforming, its influence on the sector’s productivity, stability and significance for the real economy. It’s grounded that banking sector of Ukraine has seriously weakened its potential for the economic development stimulation. On the one hand, due to the banking sector clearance from the bad and unscrupulous banks the system has become much more sensitive to the monetary instruments and its state is going to be more predictable and better controlled. But on the other hand, massive banks’ liquidations have caused the worsening of the confidence in financial system and radical increasing of the market concentration the highest degree of which is observed in the householders’ deposit market.


Author(s):  
Sahadev Bhatt

We attempt to explain how market power impacts bank dividend payment behaviors in Nepal by taking the sample from the commercial banking sector employing a panel data regression model. Using the Lerner Index (LI), a non-structural measure of market power or lack of competition, we found that market power inversely but statistically insignificantly affect dividend payment. This finding leads us to conclude that market power-a proxy of more or less competition is not an important and influencing factor to the dividend decisions in commercial banking sectors signifying that competition does not seem helpful in mitigating agency conflicts. It is also concluded that banking dividend payouts are not the result of the punitive influence of product market antagonism. Further, among other firm-specific determinants, bank size and leverage significantly positively whereas asset growth significantly negatively affect the dividend decision. However, profitability is found insignificant determinant of dividend payment. The paper enriches and contributes to the literature on banking dividend payout and helps to identify the key factors that affect banking dividend decision-making.  Keywords : Banks, Market competition, Market power, Lerner Index, Nepal


Author(s):  
Aleksandar Bogojević

Contemporary directions of the market liberalization should lead to a bigger number of market participants and to a bigger degree of competition among them. This again, leads to a more diversified offer and to bigger quality products along with higher level of services with cheaper rates. In order to control the mentioned processes, analysis of market concentration is needed, as well as studying and perfection of the methods that allow measurement of market concentration. The degree of market concentration which on a specific market one or more economic subjects have is defined as ‘’market power’’. Economic efficiency on a specific market largely depends on whether non competitive market structures which produce adverse effects on economic efficiency are existent on that market, which ultimately affects on the overall well – being. Conversance of the degree of concentration of a specific (relevant) market is important so that breaching of the market principles can be timely spotted and so that appropriate measures can be taken. Supervision over the market and the market processes, as well as appliance of specific measuring methods of market concentration have the goal of establishing and maintenance of free market competition in which all of the economic subjects participate under the same conditions.


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