The Effect of Monitoring on CEO Compensation in a Matching Equilibrium

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (3) ◽  
pp. 1297-1339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pierre Chaigneau ◽  
Nicolas Sahuguet
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Firm Value ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Business Conditions ◽  
Ceo Selection ◽  
Low Ability

We consider a model of chief executive officer (CEO) selection, dismissal, and retention. Firms with larger blockholder ownership monitor more; they get more information about CEO ability, which facilitates the dismissal of low-ability CEOs. These firms are matched with CEOs whose ability is more uncertain. For retention purposes, the compensation of these CEOs is more sensitive to firm value and relatively less sensitive to business conditions. Moreover, these CEOs receive lower salaries when CEO skills are sufficiently transferable. A diffusion of best monitoring practices increases competition for CEOs and raises CEO pay in all firms, including those with unchanged monitoring ability.

scholarly journals "Say on pay" regulation and chief executive officer pay: Evidence from Australia

2015 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 28-39 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mahdi Faghani ◽  
Reza Monem ◽  
Chew Ng
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Descriptive Analysis ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Say On Pay ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Performance Based Pay

We investigate the consequences of Australia’s ‘say on pay’ regulation on the chief executive officer (CEO) compensation using recent data. We find that, for the ‘first-strike’ firms that avoided a ‘second strike’ (the treatment firms), a reduction in CEO total remuneration is positively associated with a lower level of shareholder dissent votes on the following remuneration report. We also find that, unlike control firms, the treatment firms increased the proportion of CEO’s performance-based pay in the year following the ‘first strike’ and such an increase is negatively related to a change in shareholders’ dissent level. Further, detailed descriptive analysis suggests that the ‘first-strike’ firms made relatively more frequent and larger pay reductions by reducing the level of pay in one or more components of the CEO pay

scholarly journals CEO Monitoring and Board Effectiveness: Resolving the CEO Compensation Issue

2018 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 123-134
Author(s):  
Chiraz Ben Ali ◽  
Frédéric Teulon
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Board Governance ◽  
Board Effectiveness ◽  
Past Performance ◽  
Compensation Committee ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

This study examines the impact of board governance mechanisms on the pay of Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) using a sample of major French listed companies for the 2009–2011 period. The results show that CEO pay is negatively associated with the presence of a family CEO and positively associated with board size, busy directors, board meetings, and compensation committee independence. We provide further evidence that CEO compensation increases with firm size, and both present and past performance. Our study casts doubt on the effectiveness of formal board attributes in constraining CEO compensation.

scholarly journals CEO Compensation and Firm Performance: The Role of ESG Transparency

2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 278
Author(s):  
Chetna Rath ◽  
Florentina Kurniasari ◽  
Malabika Deo
Keyword(s):  
Firm Performance ◽  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Negative Relationship ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Impact

Chief executive officers (CEOs) of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) firms are known to take lesser pay and engage themselves in corporate social responsibility activities to achieve the dual objective of the enhancement of firm’s performance as well as benefit for stakeholders in the long run. This study examines the role of ESG transparency in strengthening the impact of firm performance on total CEO pay in ESG firms. A panel of 67 firms for the period of 2014–2019 has been analyzed using the two-step system GMM model, with NSE Nifty 100 ESG Index as the data sample and ESG scores from Bloomberg database as a proxy for transparency. Findings reveal that environmental and governance disclosure scores have the potential to intensify the negative relationship between firm performance and CEO compensation, while social disclosure scores do not. In addition, various firm-specific, board-specific, and CEO-specific attributes have also been considered controls affecting remuneration. This paper contributes to the literature by exploring the effect of exhibiting ESG transparency and its nexus with CEO pay as well as firm performance.

CEO Compensation in Japan: Why So Different from the United States?

2018 ◽  
Vol 53 (5) ◽  
pp. 2261-2292
Author(s):  
Luyao Pan ◽  
Xianming Zhou
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Direct Evidence ◽  
Level Structure ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
The United States ◽  
Incentive Contracts ◽  
Matched Sample ◽  
Director Compensation ◽  
Ceo Pay

In Mar. 2010, Japan’s financial regulator implemented the country’s first legislation concerning the disclosure of director compensation for named individuals. Using the first publicly available data for Japanese executives, we document direct evidence on the level, structure, and mechanisms of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in Japan and perform a matched-sample comparison between Japan and the United States. In contrast to the findings of recent studies showing that international differentials in CEO pay have largely disappeared since the mid-2000s, our results show strikingly large differences between the Japanese and American systems that are difficult to explain by differences in conventional incentive contracts.

scholarly journals The relationship between chief executive officer compensation and the size and industry of South African state-owned enterprises

2019 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mariette Coetzee ◽  
Magda L. Bezuidenhout
Keyword(s):  
Chief Executive Officers ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
African State ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Annual Reports ◽  
Performance Contracts ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Managerial Implications ◽  
Executive Officers ◽  
The Relationship

Orientation: Concerns about exorbitant executive compensation are making headlines, because executives receive lucrative packages despite state-owned enterprises (SOEs) performing poorly. It appears as if chief executive officers (CEOs) are not being held accountable for the performance of the SOEs.Research purpose: The purpose of the study was to determine whether the size and the industry of an SOE had an impact on CEO compensation packages.Motivation for the study: A greater understanding of the relationship between CEO remuneration and the size and type of industry of SOEs would assist with the standardisation of CEO remuneration and linking CEO pay to SOE performance.Research approach/design and method: A multiple regression analysis on a pooled dataset of 162 panel observations was conducted over a 9-year period. Financial data of 18 SOEs were extracted from the McGregor BFA database and the annual reports of SOEs.Main findings: The findings show that the size of an SOE does not influence the total compensation of CEOs. However, larger SOEs pay larger bonuses due to these SOEs being in a stronger financial position to offer lucrative bonuses. CEO’s remuneration was aligned within certain industries.Practical/managerial implications: The findings emphasise the need to link CEO compensation with SOE performance. Standardisation in setting CEO compensation and implementing performance contracts should be considered.Contribution/value-add: The study confirms that CEO pay is not linked to performance and not justified when considering SOE size or industry.

scholarly journals Solving the Chief Executive Officer Selection Problem Using the Fuzzy Decision Support System

2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Božo Vukoje ◽  
Vjekoslav Bobar
Keyword(s):  
Decision Making ◽  
Decision Support ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Support System ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Fuzzy Decision ◽  
Qualitative And Quantitative ◽  
Decision Making Problem ◽  
Ceo Selection ◽  
Fuzzy Decision Support System

Chief Executive Officer (CEO) selection as a subset of personnel selection asks for different characteristic compared to a selection of other personnel. The reason for this is the polymorphic nature of the CEO role. The complexity and importance of the selection problem, call for analytical methods rather than decisions based on intuition. The multi-criteria nature and the presence of both qualitative and quantitative factors make the entire selection more complex. As such, the CEO selection is a multi-criteria decision making problem decision making problem, affected by several qualitative and quantitative, often conflicting criteria which are usually uncertain. This paper proposes a CEO selection approach based on the fuzzy decision support system developed by using JAVA technology and extent analysis method. This system is applied in a real-life case study to evaluate the most suitable person for a CEO position in information and communication (ICT) company dealing with the rating of both qualitative and quantitative criteria, and testing appropriate consistency to ensure quality of selection.

Does Independent Advice to the Board Affect CEO Compensation?

2019 ◽  
pp. 1-52 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tor-Erik Bakke ◽  
Hamed Mahmudi
Keyword(s):  
Performance Evaluation ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Ceo Compensation ◽  
Natural Experiment ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Incentive Pay ◽  
Relative Performance Evaluation ◽  
Ceo Contracts ◽  
Independent Consultant

This article investigates the role external advice plays in the board’s determination of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. We show that CEO incentive pay increases with the degree of compensation consultant independence using a quasi-natural experiment provided by the creation of an independent consultant after separation from an affiliated consultant. Specifically, switching to an independent consultant significantly increases the pay–performance sensitivity and relative performance evaluation of CEO contracts. Despite the benefits of independent advice, independent consultants may not be hired due to the influence of powerful CEOs or because boards already possess adequate expertise.

scholarly journals Institutional shareholding as a corporate governance mechanism that drives Chief Executive Officer pay

2020 ◽  
Vol 23 (3) ◽  
pp. 217-233
Author(s):  
María Consuelo Pucheta-Martínez ◽  
Carlos Chiva-Ortells
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Chief Executive Officer ◽  
Chief Executive ◽  
Jel Classification ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Pressure Sensitive ◽  
Variable Pay ◽  
Ceo Pay ◽  
Corporate Governance Mechanism ◽  
The Impact

We explore the effect of institutional directors on Chief Executive Officer (CEO) pay (total, fixed, and variable compensation). We delve particularly into the impact of pressure-sensitive and pressure-resistant institutional directors, who, respectively, represent institutional investors who maintain and investors who do not maintain a business relationship with the firm whose board they serve on. Focusing on CEO total pay, the findings show that institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards behave similarly, affecting CEO total pay in a nonlinear way: as the presence of institutional and pressure-resistant directors on boards increases, the monitoring hypothesis prevails, and subsequently, better corporate governance decreases CEO total pay. However, when their presence on boards exceeds a critical point, the entrenchment hypothesis holds, thereby leading to an increase in CEO total pay. Contrary to our predictions, pressure-sensitive directors do not affect CEO total pay. Regarding the CEO’s compensation structure (fixed and variable), the results suggest that institutional and pressure-resistant directors increase fixed compensation and reduce variable pay, while pressure-sensitive directors affect neither fixed nor variable compensation. This evidence supports the view that institutional directors should be considered as a heterogeneous collective. JEL CLASSIFICATION: G3, G34, M12

Sign in / Sign up

Export Citation Format

Share Document