Investor Protection and the Long-Run Performance of Activism

2018 ◽  
Vol 54 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-100 ◽  
Author(s):  
Pouyan Foroughi ◽  
Namho Kang ◽  
Gideon Ozik ◽  
Ronnie Sadka
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Agency Costs ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Target Selection ◽  
Organizational Characteristics ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Protection Structures

Using a parsimonious measure of investor protection constructed from fund organizational characteristics, this paper documents that companies targeted by activists with better investor protection structures outperform those targeted by those with poor investor protection structures by roughly 10% per year. The outperformance is observed only for active targets for which Schedule 13Ds are filed, not for passive Schedule 13G investments, indicating that the effect is not explained by a superior target-selection ability. The evidence suggests that funds with better investor protection achieve increased profitability and valuation ratio of their targets by reducing agency costs, improving corporate governance, and collaborating with other large institutional investors.

scholarly journals Corporate Governance and Stock Price informativeness: Evidence from an Emerging Market

2020 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 593-605
Author(s):  
Muhammad Shahid Rasheed ◽  
Shahzad Kouser
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Stock Price ◽  
Emerging Market ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Cash Flows ◽  
Governance Mechanism ◽  
Price Informativeness ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Stock Price Informativeness

Emerging markets usually have weaker legal and governance environment. The weaker enforcement of investor protection laws leads to a poor information environment. Using data of all the listed non-financial firms from Pakistan stock exchange (PSX), we document the relationship between corporate governance variables and stock price informativeness. The results from two-stage least squares (2SLS) reveal that controlling shareholders in the form of block holding plays an effective role in improving informativeness. Due to the presence of these block ownership, the institutional investors remain largely short term investors and act passively. This behavior of institutional investors encourages managers to extract more cash flows leading to higher synchronicity. These findings suggest market regulators develop such a corporate governance mechanism that not only ensures investor protection but also advise firms to reduce information asymmetry by better disclosure and transparency. More specifically, in the Pakistani context, traditional corporate governance mechanisms through board room regulations may not improve informativeness, and regulators need to regulate the ownership regulations, including family ownership and controlling shareholders.

scholarly journals Investor Types and Company Performance through Private Placements Basing on State-Owned and -Controlled Listed Companies

2019 ◽  
Vol 14 (11) ◽  
pp. 250
Author(s):  
Li Jiaojiao ◽  
Qu Zenglong
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Listed Company ◽  
Listed Companies ◽  
The State ◽  
Announcement Effect ◽  
Short Term ◽  
Private Placement ◽  
Long Run ◽  
Private Placements

Theoretical and empirical analyses of listed companies owned and controlled by the state making private placement transactions during 2006 and 2013 were carried out to measure the short-term announcement effect of strategic and financial investors’ subscription for new shares in listed companies owned and controlled by the state on corporate governance and long-run performance of these listed companies. It was found that private placements had a positive influence on the performance of a state-owned and -controlled listed company as they brought new institutional investors to the company; strategic investors who subscribed for new shares in a state-owned and -controlled listed company have appeared to cause an announcement effect greater than financial investors; state-owned and -controlled listed companies that attracted strategic investors with private placements showed a higher level of corporate governance and better long-run performance in comparison to those launching private placements to financial investors only. This study reveals the differences between strategic and financial investors in their influences on short-term announcement effect, corporate governance, and long-run performance of a state-owned and -controlled listed company when they enter into private placement transactions with the company. These findings provide new perspectives on the economic consequences arising from the involvement of external institutional investors in private placements of state-owned and -controlled listed companies, which, to a certain extent, facilitate the decision-making process in private placement transactions and promote the mixed-ownership reform.

Disciplinary power in corporate governance: A Foucauldian analysis of the emergence and development of proxy advisors

2021 ◽  
pp. 103237322098623
Author(s):  
Damien Lambert
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Historical Analysis ◽  
General Meeting ◽  
Global Scale ◽  
Disciplinary Power ◽  
Record Keeping ◽  
Corporate Executives ◽  
Proxy Advisors ◽  
Foucauldian Analysis

Prior research in corporate governance has extensively investigated the mechanisms through which a variety of actors (financial analysts, investment managers, shareholder activists) monitor and discipline corporate executives. However, one recently emerged actor has received little attention so far: the proxy advisory firm. Mobilising Foucault’s concept of disciplinary power, this study uses historical analysis to examine the role of proxy advisors in corporate governance. This article shows that proxy advisors actively contributed to developing and implementing disciplinary mechanisms. This involves (1) hierarchical observations of corporations and their executives on a global scale. These observations are made available to institutional investors on proxy advisors’ voting platforms which have Panopticon-like features; (2) normalisation of judgements through the provision of generic voting policies, generic voting recommendations and corporate governance ratings prepared by proxy advisors and delivered to many institutional investors; (3) ritualised examination of the performance of corporations and of their executives during the annual general meeting, including record-keeping of all past voting results.

Investor protection, corporate governance and private information-based trading

2021 ◽  
Vol ahead-of-print (ahead-of-print) ◽  
Author(s):  
Chun-Teck Lye ◽  
Chee-Wooi Hooy
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Emerging Markets ◽  
Private Information ◽  
Market Competition ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Civil Law ◽  
Securities Market ◽  
Market Manipulation ◽  
Content Type ◽  
Securities Laws

Purpose This study aims to examine the effects of investor protection (PROT), internal and external corporate governance (CG) on private information-based trading (PIBT). Design/methodology/approach This study uses a sample of 3,438 firms from 42 countries for the period 2002–2015 to examine the effects of the broad and specific measures of PROT, internal CG and external CG (product market competition and block ownership [BOWN]) on a more accurate measure of PIBT using regression analysis. Findings The results show that PROT and BOWN are effective in reducing PIBT. However, the specific measure of PROT (strength of PROT) is not significant in emerging markets and civil law countries. The internal CG is also significant but has a positive effect on PIBT. Research limitations/implications The results suggest that PROT law matters in the efforts to prevent PIBT. Policymakers and securities market regulators, particularly in emerging markets and civil law countries, should focus more on refining existing securities laws and enacting detailed securities rules that explicitly prevent specific market manipulation and PIBT. Originality/value This study provides evidence for the importance of specific and detailed securities rules in different market and legal environments. Furthermore, this study uses the segregated private information-based speculative trading component to accurately measure the PIBT.

ANALISIS PENGARUH TATA KELOLA PERUSAHAAN YANG BAIK TERHADAP RASIO PEMBAYARAN DIVIDEN

2007 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Eko Budi Santoso
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Investor Protection ◽  
Dividend Payout ◽  
Controlling Shareholders ◽  
Concentrated Ownership ◽  
Good Corporate Governance ◽  
Crucial Problem

Investor protection in highty concentrated ownership as in Indonesia is a crucial problem. Expropriation tends to be high in lower investor protection because controlling shareholders can implement policies that benefit themselves at the expense of outside investors. In a high expropriation, outside investors will choose dividends rather than retained earnings.This paper examines good corporate governance as a solution.for a good investor protection in Indonesia. Using a sample of 245 firms for observdion period of 2001-200j, the results slows that stronger investor ptotection related with lower dividend payout ratio.Kqtwords : Good Corporate Governance, Dividend Payout Ratio,Investor Protection, Concentrated Ownership.

Transnational Corporate Governance: The State of the Art and Twenty-First-Century Challenges

2021 ◽  
pp. 614-646
Author(s):  
Dionysia Katelouzou ◽  
Peer Zumbansen
Keyword(s):  
Corporate Governance ◽  
Institutional Investors ◽  
Shareholder Wealth ◽  
Performance Measure ◽  
The State ◽  
First Century ◽  
Access To Health Services ◽  
Wide Range ◽  
Shareholder Wealth Maximization ◽  
Twenty First Century

This chapter explores corporate governance as a transnational regulatory field. Mirroring the rise in importance of the idea of shareholder wealth maximization as a firm’s definitive performance measure, corporate governance became a hotly contested field of competing visions of firms’ institutional and normative infrastructure in search of creating the most advantageous conditions to attract capital in volatile markets. This shift occurred at the same time that regulatory transformations in Western postindustrial societies since the early 1980s had begun to significantly shift public service provision and state-organized frameworks for old-age security guarantees and access to health services. Today’s corporate governance laboratory is a transnational force field, fought over by a host of different state and nonstate actors and also by private actors such as institutional investors. Meanwhile, following the financial crises in 2001, 2008 and 2020 and the simultaneously growing pressure on corporations from human rights, gender equality, and environmental groups, the corporate governance debate again is shifting. This time, a diversity of issues are being discussed under the corporate governance rubric, indicating a more comprehensive engagement with the firm’s purpose and functions and its societal obligations and responsibilities. Given the crucial role of firms as the residual claimants of a wide-ranging retreat of the state from its role in guaranteeing and providing a wide range of social functions, corporate governance is a mirror for the transformation of public and private power, and it has to address the twenty-first-century challenges, including global value chains and the proliferation of institutional investors, unfolding on a planetary scale.

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