On non-distinctive voicing in Russian

1966 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 189-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Shapiro
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Contemporary Standard ◽  
Concise Description ◽  
At Home

In his illuminating article for the Max Vasmer Festschrift, Jakobson (1956) gave a concise description of the implementation of the voicing feature in Russian obstruents. In addition to stating well-known facts about the pronunciation of contemporary standard Russian, Jakobson brought to the attention of students of Russian phonetics a fact which had been completely overlooked in previous investigations, namely the determinative role of the segment FOLLOWING the morphonemes {v} and {v,} in the distribution of voicing, rather than these sounds themselves. With respect to the feature of voicing, obstruent clusters containing medial {v} or {v,} were demonstrated to be entirely composed of voiced segments or unvoiced segments, depending on the value of the last obstruent in the cluster. Thus it was pointed out that voiceless obstruents were assimilatively voiced not only in Πρосьба [-z, b-] ‘request’, сдача [zd-] ‘submission’, ĸ жене [gž-] ‘to one's wife’, трехДнеВньІЙ [-γd-] ‘3-day’, but also in ОТ ВДоВьІ [-dvd-] ‘from the widow’, с вДовоЙ [zvd-] ‘with the widow’, к вДове [gvd-] ‘to the widow’, оΤ взгляДов [-dvzg-] ‘from the glances’, к взДохам [gvzd-] ‘to the sighs’; not only in зтот гороД [-d | g-] ‘this city, купец бьІЛ [-3|b-] ‘the merchant was (there)’ здесь же [ž-|ž-] ‘but here’, Лечь бьІ [-3|b-] ‘go lie down’, хоть дома [-d,|d-] ‘at least at home’, так зЛо [-g|z-] ‘so maliciously’, запах дьІма [-γ|d-] ‘smell of smoke’, бЛиз берега [-z,|b,-] ‘near the shore’, сквозь доску [-z,|d-] ‘through the board’ but also in как вдова [-g|vd-] [like the widow’, хоть вздохнуЛ [-d, | vzd-] ‘at least he rested’, вот в детстве [-d|vd,-] ‘but in childhood’, чтоб взять, [-b|vz,-] ‘in order to take’, поев вдовоЛь, [v |:d-] ‘having eaten one's fill’, против вдовьІ [-v|:d-] ‘against the widow’, уж в вдовах [-ž|v:d-] ‘already among the widows’, воЛхв же [-γv|ž-] ‘but the sorcerer’, без жертв бьІ [-dv|b-] ‘without sacrifices’, от моЛитв-де [-dv|d,-] ‘supposedly from prayers’, ветвь даже [-d, v,|d-] ‘even the branch’. This treatment of the voicing feature provided the basis of Halle's discussion (1959: 63–5). For some inexplicable reason, the facts brought to light by Jakobson apparently went completely unacknowledged in the Soviet Union (and elsewhere, for that matter, outside the United States) and were not reflected in the works on Russian phonetics which appeared after 1956. Thus, for instance, one notes no revision of the appropriate section in Avanesov (1958); nor in Avanesov & Ožegov (1959).

scholarly journals Ukraine in the Focus of US Foreign Policy Priorities

2020 ◽  
pp. 66-79
Author(s):  
N. Gegelashvili ◽  
◽  
I. Modnikova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Donald Trump ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Us ◽  
The World ◽  
The Russian Federation ◽  
Radical Transformation

The article analyzes the US policy towards Ukraine dating back from the time before the reunification of Crimea with Russia and up to Donald Trump coming to power. The spectrum of Washington’s interests towards this country being of particular strategic interest to the United States are disclosed. It should be noted that since the disintegration of the Soviet Union Washington’s interest in this country on the whole has not been very much different from its stand on all post-Soviet states whose significance was defined by the U,S depending on their location on the world map as well as on the value of their natural resources. However, after the reunification of Crimea with Russia Washington’s stand on this country underwent significant changes, causing a radical transformation of the U,S attitude in their Ukrainian policy. During the presidency of Barack Obama the American policy towards Ukraine was carried out rather sluggishly being basically declarative in its nature. When President D. Trump took his office Washington’s policy towards Ukraine became increasingly more offensive and was characterized by a rather proactive stance not only because Ukraine became the principal arena of confrontation between the United States and the Russian Federation, but also because it became a part of the US domestic political context. Therefore, an outcome of the “battle” for Ukraine is currently very important for the United States in order to prove to the world its role of the main helmsman in the context of a diminishing US capability of maintaining their global superiority.

The Sputnik Challenge

Willy Ley ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jared S. Buss
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Cultural Lag ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter discusses the myriad of Ley’s activities during the late 1950s, when his status as a scientific celebrity and rocket expert peaked. It follows his pre-Sputnik and post-Sputnik tactics. Not only did Ley encourage millions of Americans to believe in American “firsts” in 1955 and 1956, but also he encouraged Americans to express resentment, anger, and shock following the launch of Sputnik I in 1957. In newspaper columns that circulated across the United States, Ley expressed fears of missile gaps and cultural lag with the Soviet Union. While historians have analyzed the role of politicians during the Cold War, they have not recognized the role of Ley as America’s rocket expert, who now shared the stage with Wernher von Braun.

Ending the Korean War: The Role of Domestic Coalition Shifts in Overcoming Obstacles to Peace

2009 ◽  
Vol 34 (1) ◽  
pp. 42-82 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elizabeth A. Stanley
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Korean War ◽  
The United States ◽  
Preference Information ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Bargaining Models ◽  
The Korean War ◽  
Two Sides

Bargaining models of war suggest that war ends after two sides develop an overlapping bargaining space. Domestic mechanisms—domestic governing coalitions, a state's elite foreign policy decisionmaking group, and their role in ending interstate war—are critical in explaining how, when, and why that bargaining space develops. Through preference, information, and entrapment obstacles, wars can become “stuck” and require a change in expectations to produce a war-terminating bargaining space. A major source of such change is a shift in belligerents' governing coalitions. Events in the United States, China, and the Soviet Union during the Korean War illustrate the dynamics of these obstacles and the need for domestic coalition shifts in overcoming them before the conflict could be brought to an end.

scholarly journals The Role of Reunified Germany in Poland’s Accession to NATO and the European Union

Politeja ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (6(75)) ◽  
pp. 51-74
Author(s):  
Józef Fiszer
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
European Union ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
The European Union ◽  
The United Kingdom ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Long Time ◽  
The Eu

The study is devoted to Poland’s accession to NATO and the European Union (EU) and describes Germany’s stance on Poland’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations after 1989, which, despite various assessments, was not explicit and enthusiastic. However, it evolved gradually and was determined by a difficult internal situation after the reunification of Germany and its new geopolitics and geoeconomics. For Germany that reunified on 3 October 1990, an issue of greater importance than Polish accession to NATO and the EU was the presence of Soviet troops on the territory of the former GDR and normalization of relations with neighbors, particularly with France, Poland, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Both France and the United Kingdom, as well as the Soviet Union, and to a lesser extent, the United States initially were afraid of a reunified Germany and opposed Polish membership in Euro-Atlantic structures. At the time, hopes and fears were rife about the future of Europe. A common question was being asked in Paris, London, Moscow, Washington, and Warsaw – would reunified Germany remain a European state, or would Europe become German? Should Germany stay in NATO or leave after the reunification? There were questions also about Moscow’s policy towards reunified Germany and its position on Poland’s accession to Euro-Atlantic structures. Unfortunately, for a long time, it was negative. Today, thirty years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany, we can see that the black scenarios that were outlined in 1989-1990 did not actually come true. Despite the fears, those events opened the way for Poland to “return to Europe” and to gain membership in Euro-Atlantic structures, i.e., NATO and the European Union (EU). The path was not at all simple and it was not easy for Poland to make it through. In the study the author analyses subjective and objective difficulties related to Poland's accession to NATO and the EU and describes the evolution and role of Germany in this process.

Foreign Intelligence and the Historiography of the Cold War

2004 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 21-56 ◽  
Author(s):  
Raymond L. Garthoff
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
Unintended Consequences ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Cold War Era ◽  
Foreign Intelligence ◽  
The Cold War

Foreign intelligence played a number of important roles in the Cold War, but this topic has not received the scholarly attention it deserves. This survey article provides a broad overview of some of the new literature and documentation pertaining to Cold War era intelligence, as well as the key dimensions of the topic. Despite the continued obstacles posed by secrecy and the mixed reliability of sources, the publication of numerous memoirs and the release of a huge volume of fresh archival material in the post— Cold War era have opened new opportunities to study the role of intelligence in Cold War history. Scholars should explore not only the “micro level” of the problem (the impact of intelligence on specific events) but also the “macro level,” looking at the many ways that the Cold War as a whole (its origins, its course, and its outcome) was influenced, perhaps even shaped, by the intelligence agencies of the United States, the Soviet Union, and other key countries. It is also crucial to examine the unintended consequences of intelligence activities. Some interesting examples of “blowback” (effects that boomerang against the country that initiated them) have recently come to light from intelligence operations that the United States undertook against the Soviet Union. Only by understanding the complex nature of the role of intelligence during the Cold War will we be able to come to grips with the historiographic challenge that the topic poses.

The Nuclear Revolution

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Campbell Craig
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Cold War ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Nuclear Weapons ◽  
Atomic Bomb ◽  
The United States ◽  
Arms Races ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
The Cold War

This chapter, which examines the role of nuclear weapons in the Cold War and the role of the Cold War in the nuclear revolution, argues that the development of nuclear weapons significantly affected the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union beyond the nuclear crises and arms races. It investigates the role of the atomic bomb in making impossible the postwar cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union, and evaluates the role of nuclear fear in invalidating the Soviet's Marxism-Leninism ideology. The chapter also considers how the mutual assured destruction pushed the superpowers away from direct military confrontation and into senseless weapon overproduction at home.

Strategies for SALT

1971 ◽  
Vol 23 (2) ◽  
pp. 171-188 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jerome H. Kahan
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
World War Ii ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
The United States ◽  
World War ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Political Relations ◽  
Strategic Balance ◽  
The Military

On November 17, 1969, after a three-year delay, the United States and the Soviet Union initiated Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Involving strategic systems and policies vital to the security of both superpowers, their allies, and the world, these talks have the potential of becoming the most important series of United States-Soviet negotiations since World War II. They can affect not only the military-technical aspects of the strategic balance but United States-Soviet political relations and the future role of nuclear weapons. Given the complexity and sensitivity of the subject, it is not surprising that negotiations are still continuing. Even if an early, limited agreement is reached, SALT meetings can be expected to span a period of many years.

Conclusion

2020 ◽  
pp. 263-284
Author(s):  
Kevin Riehle
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Policy Changes ◽  
Soviet Government ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Perception Of Threat ◽  
The Stability

Several lessons emerge from these defectors’ revelations. First, the motivations of defectors changed based on the circumstances around them, which reflected Soviet policy changes. Those policy changes, such as purges and increased domestic repression, were often at the foundation of defector’s motivations. Second, vetting standards for Soviet personnel assigned to sensitive national security positions fluctuated, depending on the stability in the Soviet government and the level of urgency for hiring new personnel. When the Soviet Union was stable, it had the luxury of enforcing strict standards. When the Soviet Union needed a lot of people fast—such as during purges or wartime—it did not vet them as thoroughly. Finally, the Soviet perception of threat evolved, beginning with Great Britain as the primary threat in the early Soviet era, and joined by Germany after 1933, although Stalin never abandoned hope for an accommodation with Hitler. However, even before Germany was defeated in 1945, Soviet intelligence began targeting its wartime allies. By the late 1940s, when the United States assumed the role of the leader of the democratic world, the label “main enemy” was coined and applied to the United States, which stuck for the rest of the Soviet era.

Ideology and the Investment Regime

2021 ◽  
pp. 130-147
Author(s):  
Erik Voeten
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
Soviet Union ◽  
Dimensional Space ◽  
The United States ◽  
The Soviet Union ◽  
Ideological Space ◽  
Low Dimensional ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Investment Agreements

This chapter investigates how ideological contestation has shaped the institutions that protect foreign investment from expropriation. It explains how a focus on competition in a low-dimensional ideological space helps one make sense of the emergence of the investment regime and adjustments to it. From the U.S. perspective, the investment regime is partially about protecting the specific assets of American investors. Yet this could be achieved through other means. The institutional regime is also about advancing principles favored by the United States over alternative principles advocated by the Soviet Union and other states. This chapter first details ideological conflict during the Cold War. It then uses the framework from Chapter 4 to analyze the role of ideology in determining which countries did and did not sign bilateral investment treaties (BITs) with the United States. Finally, the chapter shows that governments that changed their ideological orientations since originally negotiating BITs are the most likely to renegotiate or end treaties. The rational functional rationales of investment agreements must be understood against the backdrop of fierce ideological competition in a low-dimensional space.

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