The New International Economic Order: an Overview

1978 ◽  
Vol 16 (4) ◽  
pp. 539-548 ◽  
Author(s):  
H. W. Singer

The term ‘New International Economic Order’ – often referred to as N.I.E.O. – suggests two immediate thoughts: the first is related to ‘New’ and the second emphasises ‘Order’.The New Versus The Old International Economic OrderIf there is to be a new order, then presumably it must be contrasted with an old order, an O.I.E.O., namely the Bretton Woods system which was established at the end of World War II as a result of Anglo-American negotiations, with an absorbing interplay between the intellect of Keynes, subtly representing British interests, coming up against the hard facts of U.S. power and economic supremacy.

1979 ◽  
Vol 4 (4) ◽  
pp. 557-578 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy M. Shaw

The Bretton Woods compact that regulated the post-World War II world economic system till 1973 is dead, while a new one to take its place is yet to take shape. The controversy sparked off by the Third World demand for a new international economic order (NIEO) may be seen as a debate on what should replace Bretton Woods. This essay attempts to disentangle the assumptions, questions, and expectations pertaining to NIEO, especially in relation to the subject of dependence and interdependence. It analyses the affiliations and ideologies, concerns and interests of the advocates of both and evaluates the present stage of NIEO debate. In the end it examines the possibility of a North-South convergence around the nexus of self-reliance (mainly on the part of the South) and self-restraint (mainly on the part of the North) in a sustained effort to prepare for a planned transition, away from Bretton Woods and towards a more equitable and integrated system.


1985 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 53-74 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adebayo Adedeji

One of the major objectives sought by the New International Economic Order is to secure favourable conditions for the transfer of resources to the Third World, and to ensure that they are fully utilised for the development of the countries concerned.1 However, the unprecedented growth of the global economy since World War II has not been equitably distributed between the rich and poor nations. Unfortunately, within this international scenario, the increasing external indebtedness of the latter has had, and still has, wide-ranging domestic implications that have rocked the foundations on which many African economies stand.


2019 ◽  
Vol 139 (2-4) ◽  
pp. 421-436
Author(s):  
Gerhard Wegner

After the First World War, a previously well-functioning economic order collapsed in Europe and the Western countries. Economic nationalism of the interwar period also changed the international economic order dramatically and became one issue of the Colloque Walter Lippmann. After the “half- and three quarters Western democracies” (Tooze 2015) of the period prior to World War I had turned into full democracies, they proved incapable of restoring the liberal pre-war economic order domestically and in international trade. Bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations failed, giving rise to a new debate on the prerequisites of an international economic order. I argue that decades later the European Union found a solution to that issue. Of key importance was the gradual constitutionalization of the European Treaties. I show that the trade liberalization prepared by the courts resembles a concept suggested by Jan Tumlir but defies application to non-EU countries. By transforming fundamental economic freedoms laid down in the European Treaties into subjective rights through jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the process of trade liberalization occurred in a non-politicized mode. The incompleteness and tardiness of creating a Common Market was the inevitable price for this success story. A withdrawal from this constitutionalization of basic economic freedoms, as proposed recently, for example, cannot be recommended. Their arguments are being examined. The reduction of the European Treaties would lead to a re-politicization of trade policy bearing unforeseeable consequences for free competition.


Napredak ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 63-76
Author(s):  
Li Wei

The history of the construction and development of the international economic system can be traced back to the establishment of the Bretton Woods system at the end of World War II. After more than 70 years, the international economic system in different economic fields such as trade, finance and investment, as well as at the global and regional levels, has been continuously built, reformed and evolved, forming a scene of variety of current international economic system. During this period, China`s role in the international economic system has also experienced gradual changes, and has generally undergone a transformation from a bystander to a part trying to fit in, then to a participant, and finally a leader. The evolution of China`s role is not only the cause of the institutional changes in the international economic system, but also the outcome. They are complementary and closely related to each other. In the development of the international economic system, China has gradually moved from the periphery to the center, which is both an opportunity and a challenge for China.


1977 ◽  
Vol 31 (4) ◽  
pp. 607-633 ◽  
Author(s):  
Charles S. Maier

The years immediately after World War II provided American policy makers with a unique opportunity to help shape the international economic order for a generation to come. United States objectives are usually described in terms of enlightened idealism or capitalist expansionism. But much of the way policy makers envisaged international economic reconstruction derived from the ambivalent way in which domestic economic conflict had been resolved before and during the New Deal. In the inconclusive struggle between business champions and the spokesmen for reform, Americans achieved consensus by celebrating a supposedly impartial efficiency and productivity and by condemning allegedly wasteful monopoly. Looking outward during and after World War II, United States representatives condemned Fascism as a form of monopoly power, then later sought to isolate Communist parties and labor unions as adversaries of their priorities of production. American blueprints for international monetary order, policy toward trade unions, and the intervention of occupation authorities in West Germany and Japan sought to transform political issues into problems of output, to adjourn class conflict for a consensus on growth. The American approach was successful because for almost two decades high rates of growth made the politics of productivity apparently pay off. Whether an alternative approach could have achieved more equality remains an important but separate inquiry.


1978 ◽  
Vol 20 (3) ◽  
pp. 265-295 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marros Mamalakis

“A new economic order is essential for world peace,” proclaimed President Carlos Andrés Pérez of Venezuela (1976) on November 16, 1976, at the UN General Assembly in fulfilling “the mandate which Simon Bolivar gave [the Venezuelans] more than 150 years ago” (Pérez, 1976: 28). Responding to this call of destiny and reaffirming Venezuela's claimed Bolivarian tradition of placing “its resources.at the service of its people, at the servi of Latin America, at the service of humanity” (Pérez, 1976: 28f President Pérez (nicknamed Simonsito) sought in and through the New International Economic Order (NIEO) a new Lebensraum, not of destructive territorial expansion, but of increased purchasing power, dignity, equality, and independence for the poor, weak, underprivileged countries (Pérez, 1976: 7, 11). The NIEO, “a moral obligation of all nations,” “is required as a¡ desideratum of peace,” especially since the disintegrating “old international economic order which emerged from the Second World War … was an unjust system of relations based on inequality … designed to benefit those countries which had accumulated the fruits of technical progress” (Pérez, 1976: 9).


2016 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 193-213 ◽  
Author(s):  
Elaine Morley

Independent of each other, though contemporaneous, the Anglo-American occupiers of Germany and the newly founded United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organization employed culture to foster greater intercultural and international understanding in 1945. Both enterprises separately saw culture as offering a means of securing the peace in the long term. This article compares the stated intentions and activities of the Anglo-American occupiers and UNESCO vis-à-vis transforming morals and public opinion in Germany for the better after World War II. It reconceptualizes the mobilization of culture to transform Germany through engaging theories of cultural diplomacy and propaganda. It argues that rather than merely engaging in propaganda in the negative sense, elements of these efforts can also be viewed as propaganda in the earlier, morally neutral sense of the term, despite the fact that clear geopolitical aims lay at the heart of the cultural activities of both the occupiers and UNESCO.


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