Probabilities on finite models

1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Fagin

Let be a finite set of (nonlogical) predicate symbols. By an -structure, we mean a relational structure appropriate for . Let be the set of all -structures with universe {1, …, n}. For each first-order -sentence σ (with equality), let μn(σ) be the fraction of members of for which σ is true. We show that μn(σ) always converges to 0 or 1 as n → ∞, and that the rate of convergence is geometrically fast. In fact, if T is a certain complete, consistent set of first-order -sentences introduced by H. Gaifman [6], then we show that, for each first-order -sentence σ, μn(σ) →n 1 iff T ⊩ ω. A surprising corollary is that each finite subset of T has a finite model. Following H. Scholz [8], we define the spectrum of a sentence σ to be the set of cardinalities of finite models of σ. Another corollary is that for each first-order -sentence a, either σ or ˜σ has a cofinite spectrum (in fact, either σ or ˜σ is “nearly always“ true).Let be a subset of which contains for each in exactly one structure isomorphic to . For each first-order -sentence σ, let νn(σ) be the fraction of members of which a is true. By making use of an asymptotic estimate [3] of the cardinality of and by our previously mentioned results, we show that vn(σ) converges as n → ∞, and that limn νn(σ) = limn μn(σ).If contains at least one predicate symbol which is not unary, then the rate of convergence is geometrically fast.

1971 ◽  
Vol 36 (1) ◽  
pp. 129-140 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Fuhrken ◽  
W. Taylor

A relational structure is called weakly atomic-compact if and only if every set Σ of atomic formulas (taken from the first-order language of the similarity type of augmented by a possibly uncountable set of additional variables as “unknowns”) is satisfiable in whenever every finite subset of Σ is so satisfiable. This notion (as well as some related ones which will be mentioned in §4) was introduced by J. Mycielski as a generalization to model theory of I. Kaplansky's notion of an algebraically compact Abelian group (cf. [5], [7], [1], [8]).


1975 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 186-196 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ralph Mckenzie

An algorithm has been described by S. Burris [3] which decides if a finite set of identities, whose function symbols are of rank at most 1, has a finite, nontrivial model. (By “nontrivial” it is meant that the universe of the model has at least two elements.) As a consequence of some results announced in the abstracts [2] and [8], it is clear that if the restriction on the ranks of function symbols is relaxed somewhat, then this finite model problem is no longer solvable by an algorithm, or at least not by a “recursive algorithm” as the term is used today.In this paper we prove a sharp form of this negative result; showing, by the way, that Burris' result is in a sense the best possible result in the positive direction. Our main result is that in a first order language whose only function or relation symbol is a 2-place function symbol (the language of groupoids), the set of identities that have no nontrivial model, is recursively inseparable from the set of identities such that the sentence has a finite model. As a corollary, we have that each of the following problems, restricted to sentences defined in the language of groupoids, is algorithmically unsolvable: (1) to decide if an identity has a finite nontrivial model; (2) to decide if an identity has a nontrivial model; (3) to decide if a universal sentence has a finite model; (4) to decide if a universal sentence has a model. We note that the undecidability of (2) was proved earlier by McNulty [13, Theorem 3.6(i)], improving results obtained by Murskiǐ [14] and by Perkins [17]. The other parts of the corollary seem to be new.


2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 837-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Djordjević

We will study complete Ln-theories and their models, where Ln is the set of first order formulas in which at most n distinct variables occur. Here, by a complete Ln-theory we mean a theory such that for every Ln-sentence, it or its negation is implied by the theory. Hence, a complete Ln-theory need not necessarily be complete in the usual sense. Our approach is to transfer concepts and methods from stability theory, such as the order property and counting types, to the context of Ln-theories. So, in one sense, we will develop some rudimentary stability theory for a particular class of (possibly) incomplete theories. To make the ‘stability theoretic’ arguments work, we need to assume that models of the complete Ln-theory T which we consider can be amalgamated in certain ways. If this condition is satisfied and T has infinite models then there will exist models of T which are sufficiently saturated with respect to Ln. This allows us to use some counting types arguments from stability theory. If, moreover, we impose some finiteness conditions on the number of Ln-types and the length of Ln-definable orders then a sufficiently saturated model of T will be ω-categorical and ω-stable. Using the theory of ω-categorical and ω-stable structures we derive that T has arbitrarily large finite models.A different approach to combining stability theory with finite model theory is made by Hyttinen in [9] and [10].


Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

This final chapter unites ideas from both model theory and complexity theory. Finite model theory is the part of model theory that disregards infinite structures. Examples of finite structures naturally arise in computer science in the form of databases, models of computations, and graphs. Instead of satisfiability and validity, finite model theory considers the following finite versions of these properties. • A first-order sentence is finitely satisfiable if it has a finite model. • A first-order sentence is finitely valid if every finite structure is a model. Finite model theory developed separately from the “classical” model theory of previous chapters. Distinct methods and logics are used to analyze finite structures. In Section 10.1, we consider various finite-variable logics that serve as useful languages for finite model theory. We define variations of the pebble games introduced in Section 9.2 to analyze the expressive power of these logics. Pebble games are one of the few tools from classical model theory that is useful for investigating finite structures. In Section 10.2, it is shown that many of the theorems from Chapter 4 are no longer true when restricted to finite models. There is no analog for the Completeness and Compactness theorems in finite model theory. Moreover, we prove Trakhtenbrot’s theorem which states that the set of finitely valid first-order sentences is not recursively enumerable. Descriptive complexity is the subject of 10.3. This subject describes the complexity classes discussed in Chapter 7 in terms of the logics introduced in Chapter 9. We prove Fagin’s theorem relating the class NP to existentional second-order logic. We prove the Cook–Levin theorem as a consequence of Fagin’s Theorem. This theorem states that the Satisfiability Problem for Propositional Logic is NP-complete. We conclude this chapter (and this book) with a section describing the close connection between logic and the P = NP problem. In this section, we discuss appropriate logics for the study of finite models. First-order logic, since it describes each finite model up to isomorphism, is too strong. For this reason, we must weaken the logic. It may seem counter-intuitive that we should gain knowledge by weakening our language.


1965 ◽  
Vol 30 (3) ◽  
pp. 293-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Abian ◽  
Samuel Lamacchia

In this paper we prove:Theorem 1. Any finite model of the axiom of power-set also satisfies the axioms of extensionality, sum-set and choice.Clearly, it will follow from (2) below that in a finite model the axiom of power-set is satisfied if and only if every set is a power-set. Thus, Theorem 1 follows immediately from Theorem 2 below, where by a theory of sets we mean a first-order theory without identity and with only one binary predicate symbol ∈.Theorem 2. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set and if the axiom of power-set is valid, then the axioms of extensionality, sum-set and choice are valid.The proof of Theorem 2 will follow from the lemmas which we establish below.We mean by x = y that x and y have the same elements. We denote a power-set of x by P(x) when it exists; similarly, we denote a sum-set of x by Ux.Clearly, in every theory of sets we have:(1) (x ⊂ y) ↔ (P(x) ⊂ P(y)),(2) (x = y) ↔ (P(x) = P(y)),(3) (x = y) → ((x ∈ P(z)) → (y ∈ P(z))),(4) ⋃P(x) = x.In view of (2), (3) and the definition of equality, we have:Lemma 1. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set, then equal sets are elements of the same sets.We have also, in view of (4):Lemma 2. If in a theory of sets every set is a power-set, then every set has a sum-set.


2021 ◽  
Vol 82 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Robin Hirsch ◽  
Jaš Šemrl

AbstractThe motivation for using demonic calculus for binary relations stems from the behaviour of demonic turing machines, when modelled relationally. Relational composition (; ) models sequential runs of two programs and demonic refinement ($$\sqsubseteq $$ ⊑ ) arises from the partial order given by modeling demonic choice ($$\sqcup $$ ⊔ ) of programs (see below for the formal relational definitions). We prove that the class $$R(\sqsubseteq , ;)$$ R ( ⊑ , ; ) of abstract $$(\le , \circ )$$ ( ≤ , ∘ ) structures isomorphic to a set of binary relations ordered by demonic refinement with composition cannot be axiomatised by any finite set of first-order $$(\le , \circ )$$ ( ≤ , ∘ ) formulas. We provide a fairly simple, infinite, recursive axiomatisation that defines $$R(\sqsubseteq , ;)$$ R ( ⊑ , ; ) . We prove that a finite representable $$(\le , \circ )$$ ( ≤ , ∘ ) structure has a representation over a finite base. This appears to be the first example of a signature for binary relations with composition where the representation class is non-finitely axiomatisable, but where the finite representation property holds for finite structures.


1980 ◽  
Vol 45 (2) ◽  
pp. 265-283 ◽  
Author(s):  
Matatyahu Rubin ◽  
Saharon Shelah

AbstractTheorem 1. (◊ℵ1,) If B is an infinite Boolean algebra (BA), then there is B1, such that ∣ Aut (B1) ≤∣B1∣ = ℵ1 and 〈B1, Aut (B1)〉 ≡ 〈B, Aut(B)〉.Theorem 2. (◊ℵ1) There is a countably compact logic stronger than first-order logic even on finite models.This partially answers a question of H. Friedman. These theorems appear in §§1 and 2.Theorem 3. (a) (◊ℵ1) If B is an atomic ℵ-saturated infinite BA, Ψ Є Lω1ω and 〈B, Aut (B)〉 ⊨Ψ then there is B1, Such that ∣Aut(B1)∣ ≤ ∣B1∣ =ℵ1, and 〈B1, Aut(B1)〉⊨Ψ. In particular if B is 1-homogeneous so is B1. (b) (a) holds for B = P(ω) even if we assume only CH.


1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 45-49
Author(s):  
Charles E. Hughes

AbstractA new reduction class is presented for the satisfiability problem for well-formed formulas of the first-order predicate calculus. The members of this class are closed prenex formulas of the form ∀x∀yC. The matrix C is in conjunctive normal form and has no disjuncts with more than three literals, in fact all but one conjunct is unary. Furthermore C contains but one predicate symbol, that being unary, and one function symbol which symbol is binary.


2012 ◽  
Vol 77 (3) ◽  
pp. 729-765 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emanuel Kieroński ◽  
Martin Otto

AbstractWe study first-order logic with two variables FO2 and establish a small substructure property. Similar to the small model property for FO2 we obtain an exponential size bound on embedded substructures, relative to a fixed surrounding structure that may be infinite. We apply this technique to analyse the satisfiability problem for FO2 under constraints that require several binary relations to be interpreted as equivalence relations. With a single equivalence relation, FO2 has the finite model property and is complete for non-deterministic exponential time, just as for plain FO2. With two equivalence relations, FO2 does not have the finite model property, but is shown to be decidable via a construction of regular models that admit finite descriptions even though they may necessarily be infinite. For three or more equivalence relations, FO2 is undecidable.


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