Finite variable logic, stability and finite models

2001 ◽  
Vol 66 (2) ◽  
pp. 837-858 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Djordjević

We will study complete Ln-theories and their models, where Ln is the set of first order formulas in which at most n distinct variables occur. Here, by a complete Ln-theory we mean a theory such that for every Ln-sentence, it or its negation is implied by the theory. Hence, a complete Ln-theory need not necessarily be complete in the usual sense. Our approach is to transfer concepts and methods from stability theory, such as the order property and counting types, to the context of Ln-theories. So, in one sense, we will develop some rudimentary stability theory for a particular class of (possibly) incomplete theories. To make the ‘stability theoretic’ arguments work, we need to assume that models of the complete Ln-theory T which we consider can be amalgamated in certain ways. If this condition is satisfied and T has infinite models then there will exist models of T which are sufficiently saturated with respect to Ln. This allows us to use some counting types arguments from stability theory. If, moreover, we impose some finiteness conditions on the number of Ln-types and the length of Ln-definable orders then a sufficiently saturated model of T will be ω-categorical and ω-stable. Using the theory of ω-categorical and ω-stable structures we derive that T has arbitrarily large finite models.A different approach to combining stability theory with finite model theory is made by Hyttinen in [9] and [10].

2004 ◽  
Vol 69 (2) ◽  
pp. 329-339 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marko Djordjević

We will mainly be concerned with a result which refutes a stronger variant of a conjecture of Macpherson about finitely axiomatizable ω-categorical theories. Then we prove a result which implies that the ω-categorical stable pseudoplanes of Hrushovski do not have the finite submodel property.Let's call a consistent first-order sentence without finite models an axiom of infinity. Can we somehow describe the axioms of infinity? Two standard examples are:ϕ1: A first-order sentence which expresses that a binary relation < on a nonempty universe is transitive and irreflexive and that for every x there is y such that x < y.ϕ2: A first-order sentence which expresses that there is a unique x such that, (0) for every y, s(y) ≠ x (where s is a unary function symbol),and, for every x, if x does not satisfy (0) then there is a unique y such that s(y) = x.Every complete theory T such that ϕ1 ϵ T has the strict order property (as defined in [10]), since the formula x < y will have the strict order property for T. Let's say that if Ψ is an axiom of infinity and every complete theory T with Ψ ϵ T has the strict order property, then Ψ has the strict order property.Every complete theory T such that ϕ2 ϵ T is not ω-categorical. This is the case because a complete theory T without finite models is ω-categorical if and only if, for every 0 < n < ω, there are only finitely many formulas in the variables x1,…,xn, up to equivalence, in any model of T.


1976 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
pp. 50-58 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ronald Fagin

Let be a finite set of (nonlogical) predicate symbols. By an -structure, we mean a relational structure appropriate for . Let be the set of all -structures with universe {1, …, n}. For each first-order -sentence σ (with equality), let μn(σ) be the fraction of members of for which σ is true. We show that μn(σ) always converges to 0 or 1 as n → ∞, and that the rate of convergence is geometrically fast. In fact, if T is a certain complete, consistent set of first-order -sentences introduced by H. Gaifman [6], then we show that, for each first-order -sentence σ, μn(σ) →n 1 iff T ⊩ ω. A surprising corollary is that each finite subset of T has a finite model. Following H. Scholz [8], we define the spectrum of a sentence σ to be the set of cardinalities of finite models of σ. Another corollary is that for each first-order -sentence a, either σ or ˜σ has a cofinite spectrum (in fact, either σ or ˜σ is “nearly always“ true).Let be a subset of which contains for each in exactly one structure isomorphic to . For each first-order -sentence σ, let νn(σ) be the fraction of members of which a is true. By making use of an asymptotic estimate [3] of the cardinality of and by our previously mentioned results, we show that vn(σ) converges as n → ∞, and that limn νn(σ) = limn μn(σ).If contains at least one predicate symbol which is not unary, then the rate of convergence is geometrically fast.


1986 ◽  
Vol 51 (3) ◽  
pp. 755-769 ◽  
Author(s):  
T. G. Kucera

In this paper I show how to develop stability theory within the context of the topological logic first introduced by McKee [Mc 76], Garavaglia [G 78] and Ziegler [Z 76]. I then study some specific applications to topological modules; in particular I prove two quantifier élimination theorems, one a generalization of a result of Garavaglia.In the first section I present a summary of basic results on topological model theory, mostly taken from the book of Flum and Ziegler [FZ 80]. This is done primarily to fix notation, but I also introduce the notion of an Lt-elementary substructure. The important point with this concept, as with many others, appears to be to allow only individuals to appear as parameters, not open sets.In the second section I begin the study of stability theory for Lt. I first develop a translation of the topological language Lt into an ordinary first-order language L*. The first main theorem is (2.3), which shows that the translation is faithful to the model-theoretic content of Lt, and provides the necessary tools for studying Lt theories in the context of ordinary first-order logic. The translation allows me to consider individual stability theory for Lt: the stability-theoretic study of those types of Lt in which only individual variables occur freely and in which only individuals occur as parameters. I originally developed this stability theory entirely within Lt; the fact that the theorems and their proofs were virtually identical to those in ordinary first order logic suggested the reduction from Lt to L*.


2002 ◽  
Vol 67 (1) ◽  
pp. 61-68
Author(s):  
Bradd Hart ◽  
Ehud Hrushovski ◽  
Michael C. Laskowski

By a classifiable theory we shall mean a theory which is superstable, without the dimensional order property, which has prime models over pairs. In order to define what we mean by unique decomposition, we remind the reader of several definitions and results. We adopt the usual conventions of stability theory and work inside a large saturated model of a fixed classifiable theory T; for instance, if we write M ⊆ N for models of T, M and N we are thinking of these models as elementary submodels of this fixed saturated models; so, in particular, M is an elementary submodel of N. Although the results will not depend on it, we will assume that T is countable to ease notation.We do adopt one piece of notation which is not completely standard: if T is classifiable, M0 ⊆ Mi for i = 1, 2 are models of T and M1 is independent from M2 over M0 then we write M1M2 for the prime model over M1 ∪ M2.


Author(s):  
Shawn Hedman

This final chapter unites ideas from both model theory and complexity theory. Finite model theory is the part of model theory that disregards infinite structures. Examples of finite structures naturally arise in computer science in the form of databases, models of computations, and graphs. Instead of satisfiability and validity, finite model theory considers the following finite versions of these properties. • A first-order sentence is finitely satisfiable if it has a finite model. • A first-order sentence is finitely valid if every finite structure is a model. Finite model theory developed separately from the “classical” model theory of previous chapters. Distinct methods and logics are used to analyze finite structures. In Section 10.1, we consider various finite-variable logics that serve as useful languages for finite model theory. We define variations of the pebble games introduced in Section 9.2 to analyze the expressive power of these logics. Pebble games are one of the few tools from classical model theory that is useful for investigating finite structures. In Section 10.2, it is shown that many of the theorems from Chapter 4 are no longer true when restricted to finite models. There is no analog for the Completeness and Compactness theorems in finite model theory. Moreover, we prove Trakhtenbrot’s theorem which states that the set of finitely valid first-order sentences is not recursively enumerable. Descriptive complexity is the subject of 10.3. This subject describes the complexity classes discussed in Chapter 7 in terms of the logics introduced in Chapter 9. We prove Fagin’s theorem relating the class NP to existentional second-order logic. We prove the Cook–Levin theorem as a consequence of Fagin’s Theorem. This theorem states that the Satisfiability Problem for Propositional Logic is NP-complete. We conclude this chapter (and this book) with a section describing the close connection between logic and the P = NP problem. In this section, we discuss appropriate logics for the study of finite models. First-order logic, since it describes each finite model up to isomorphism, is too strong. For this reason, we must weaken the logic. It may seem counter-intuitive that we should gain knowledge by weakening our language.


1981 ◽  
Vol 33 (6) ◽  
pp. 1380-1419 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kenneth W. Smith

This paper is a contribution to applied stability theory. Our purpose is to investigate the complexity of lattices by determining the stability of their first order theories.Stability measures the complexity of a theory T by counting the number of different “kinds” of elements in models of T. The notion of ω-stability was introduced by Morley [26] in 1965 and generalized by Shelah [31] in 1969. Shelah classified all first order theories according to their stability properties.Stability and -categoricity are closely related (see [26] and [1]). In fact, the notions of stable, superstable and ω-stable can be regarded as successive approximations of -categorical. -categoricity is a very strong property while stability, superstability and ω-stability facilitate the classification of more “complex” theories.


2000 ◽  
Vol 65 (1) ◽  
pp. 293-309 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bradd Hart ◽  
Byunghan Kim ◽  
Anand Pillay

In this paper we discuss several generalization of theorems from stability theory to simple theories. Cherlin and Hrushovski, in [2] develop a substitute for canonical bases in finite rank, ω-categorical supersimple theories. Motivated by methods there, we prove the existence of canonical bases (in a suitable sense) for types in any simple theory. This is done in Section 2. In general these canonical bases will (as far as we know) exist only as “hyperimaginaries”, namely objects of the form a/E where a is a possibly infinite tuple and E a type-definable equivalence relation. (In the supersimple, ω-categorical case, these reduce to ordinary imaginaries.) So in Section 1 we develop the general theory of hyperimaginaries and show how first order model theory (including the theory of forking) generalises to hyperimaginaries. We go on, in Section 3 to show the existence and ubiquity of regular types in supersimple theories, ω-categorical simple structures and modularity is discussed in Section 4. It is also shown here how the general machinery of simplicity simplifies some of the general theory of smoothly approximable (or Lie-coordinatizable) structures from [2].Throughout this paper we will work in a large, saturated model M of a complete theory T. All types, sets and sequences will have size smaller than the size of M. We will assume that the reader is familiar with the basics of forking in simple theories as laid out in [4] and [6]. For basic stability-theoretic results concerning regular types, orthogonality etc., see [1] or [9].


Author(s):  
Uriah Kriegel

Brentano’s theory of judgment serves as a springboard for his conception of reality, indeed for his ontology. It does so, indirectly, by inspiring a very specific metaontology. To a first approximation, ontology is concerned with what exists, metaontology with what it means to say that something exists. So understood, metaontology has been dominated by three views: (i) existence as a substantive first-order property that some things have and some do not, (ii) existence as a formal first-order property that everything has, and (iii) existence as a second-order property of existents’ distinctive properties. Brentano offers a fourth and completely different approach to existence talk, however, one which falls naturally out of his theory of judgment. The purpose of this chapter is to present and motivate Brentano’s approach.


2008 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-282 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jelena Zvezdanovic ◽  
Dejan Markovic

The stability of chlorophylls toward UV irradiation was studied by Vis spectrophotometry in extracts containing mixtures of photosynthetic pigments in acetone and n-hexane. The chlorophylls underwent destruction (bleaching) obeying first-order kinetics. The bleaching was governed by three major factors: the energy input of the UV photons, the concentration of the chlorophylls and the polarity of the solvent, implying different molecular organizations of the chlorophylls in the two solvents.


2010 ◽  
Author(s):  
A. Guran ◽  
L. Lebedev ◽  
Michail D. Todorov ◽  
Christo I. Christov

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