Speciesism and the Idea of Equality

Philosophy ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 53 (204) ◽  
pp. 247-256 ◽  
Author(s):  
Bonnie Steinbock
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Moral Difference

Most of us believe that we are entitled to treat members of other species in ways which would be considered wrong if inflicted on members of our own species. We kill them for food, keep them confined, use them in painful experiments. The moral philosopher has to ask what relevant difference justifies this difference in treatment. A look at this question will lead us to re-examine the distinctions which we have assumed make a moral difference.

scholarly journals A Kantian Solution to the Trolley Problem

2020 ◽  
pp. 204-228
Author(s):  
Pauline Kleingeld
Keyword(s):  
Trolley Problem ◽  
Standard View ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Moral Difference

This chapter proposes a solution to the Trolley Problem in terms of the Kantian prohibition on using a person ‘merely as a means.’ A solution of this type seems impossible due to the difficulties it is widely thought to encounter in the scenario known as the Loop case. The chapter offers a conception of ‘using merely as a means’ that explains the morally relevant difference between the classic Bystander and Footbridge cases. It then shows, contrary to the standard view, that a bystander who diverts the trolley in the Loop case need not be using someone ‘merely as a means’ in doing so. This makes it possible to show why the Loop scenario does not undermine the explanation of the salient moral difference between the Bystander and Footbridge cases.

Neural and Environmental Modulation of Motivation

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Douglas
Keyword(s):  
Environmental Influence ◽  
Environmental Intervention ◽  
Argument Proceeds ◽  
The Brain ◽  
Moral Difference ◽  
Do So

Interventions that modify a person’s motivations through chemically or physically influencing the brain seem morally objectionable, at least when they are performed nonconsensually. This chapter raises a puzzle for attempts to explain their objectionability. It first seeks to show that the objectionability of such interventions must be explained at least in part by reference to the sort of mental interference that they involve. It then argues that it is difficult to furnish an explanation of this sort. The difficulty is that these interventions seem no more objectionable, in terms of the kind of mental interference that they involve, than certain forms of environmental influence that many would regard as morally innocuous. The argument proceeds by comparing a particular neurointervention with a comparable environmental intervention. The author argues, first, that the two dominant explanations for the objectionability of the neurointervention apply equally to the environmental intervention, and second, that the descriptive difference between the environmental intervention and the neurointervention that most plausibly grounds the putative moral difference in fact fails to do so. The author concludes by presenting a trilemma that falls out of the argument.

Kant, Marginal Cases, and Moral Standing

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard
Keyword(s):  
Life Stage ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Standing ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Identity Problem ◽  
The Subject ◽  
The Dead ◽  
Moral Difference

According to the marginal cases argument, there is no property that might justify making a moral difference between human beings and the other animals that is both uniquely and universally human. It is therefore “speciesist” to treat human beings differently just because we are human beings. While not challenging the conclusion, this chapter argues that the marginal cases argument is metaphysically misguided. It ignores the differences between a life stage and a kind, and between lacking a property and having it in a defective form. The chapter then argues for a view of moral standing that attributes it to the subject of a life conceived as an atemporal being, and shows how this view can resolve some familiar puzzles such as how death can be a loss to the person who has died, how we can wrong the dead, the “procreation asymmetry,” and the “non-identity problem.”

Montaigne on Virtue and Ethics

2015 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ullrich Langer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Culture ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Practical Advice ◽  
Habitual Activity

This article distinguishes three approaches to Montaigne’s Essays from the perspective of ethics: first, a view of the writer as an agreeable friend or companion to us, and his writing as a compilation of charming practical advice on how to get more out of life; second, Montaigne as a systematic moral philosopher, despite his often unsystematic writing, arguing for propositions that he defends more or less well with proofs and examples; third, Montaigne’s Essays as arising out of a moral culture steeped in the virtues that are incarnated in actions and narrative and assume praise and blame and judgment. I follow this third approach, defining virtue as a deliberate and habitual activity, analyzing several chapters that deal explicitly with different virtues and often the difficulty in discerning and judging them (especially temperance, prudence, courage), and then considering the question of whether Montaigne represents himself as a virtuous man.

Bill Mauldin as Moral Philosopher

Ethics ◽  
1953 ◽  
Vol 63 (2) ◽  
pp. 121-130
Author(s):  
Israel Knox
Keyword(s):  
Moral Philosopher

scholarly journals Two-Year Follow-Up of 4-mm-Long Implants Used as Distal Support of Full-Arch FDPs Compared to 10-mm Implants Installed after Sinus Floor Elevation. A Randomized Clinical Trial

2021 ◽  
Vol 18 (7) ◽  
pp. 3846
Author(s):  
Fabio Rossi ◽  
Lorenzo Tuci ◽  
Lorenzo Ferraioli ◽  
Emanuele Ricci ◽  
Andreea Suerica ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Test Group ◽  
Sinus Floor Elevation ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Short Implants ◽  
Patient Reported ◽  
Bone Level ◽  
Sinus Floor Augmentation ◽  
Sinus Floor ◽  
Distal Support ◽  
Augmentation Procedure

Background: In edentulous patients, bone resorption cannot allow the installation of standard implants and it is demanded to use short implants in the residual alveolar bone or longer implants in grafted bone. Aim: To compare the survival and bone level changes of standard plus short 4-mm implants used as distal support of a maxillary full-arch fixed dental prostheses (FDPs) with standard (10-mm) implants placed in association with a bilateral sinus floor augmentation procedure. Material and Methods: Full-arch FDPs supported by six implants were randomly placed in both groups. In the control group, all implants were 10 mm long and 4.1 mm in diameter. The distal implant in both sides of the maxilla was installed after 4 months from bilaterally sinus floor elevation. In the test group (short group), the distal implant in both sides of the maxilla was 4 mm long and 4.1 mm in diameter. No sinus floor elevations were performed in the test group. Clinical assessments and X-rays were taken at prosthesis delivering and after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months. Patient-reported outcome measures (PROMs) were also evaluated before surgery and after 6, 12, and 24 months. Results: The changes over time of the bone level for the short implants were −0.01 ± 0.11 mm, −0.04 ± 0.13 mm, −0.17 ± 0.29 mm, and −0.28 ± 0.37 mm after 6, 12, 18, and 24 months from prosthesis delivering, respectively. For the standard implants, bone changes were −0.21 ± 0.33 mm (p = 0.103), −0.30 ± 0.32 mm (p = 0.023), −0.40 ± 0.37 mm (p = 0.144), and −0.54 ± 0.49 mm (p = 0.128), respectively. A statistically relevant difference was found only at 12 months after loading between the two groups. Conclusions: Similar results on implant survival rate and marginal bone loss were observed for the short and standard implants, placed in association with a bilateral sinus floor augmentation procedure, used as distal support of a maxillary full-arch FDP. A statistically relevant difference was found only at 12 months after loading between the two groups (p = 0.023).

scholarly journals Laparoscopic Sleeve Gastrectomy versus Laparoscopic Banded Sleeve Gastrectomy: First Prospective Pilot Randomized Study

2016 ◽  
Vol 2016 ◽  
pp. 1-5 ◽  
Author(s):  
Valeria Tognoni ◽  
Domenico Benavoli ◽  
Emanuela Bianciardi ◽  
Federico Perrone ◽  
Simona Ippoliti ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Sleeve Gastrectomy ◽  
Laparoscopic Sleeve Gastrectomy ◽  
Operative Time ◽  
Intraoperative Complications ◽  
Randomized Study ◽  
Control Group ◽  
Bodyweight Loss ◽  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Banded Sleeve Gastrectomy ◽  
Time Required

Introduction. The placement of ring or band around the gastric tube might prevent the dilation after Laparoscopic Sleeve Gastrectomy (LSG). We describe the first randomized study comparing LSG and Laparoscopic Banded Sleeve Gastrectomy (LBSG).Material and Method. Fifty obese patients were enrolled in the study between January 2014 and January 2015. We analysed differences in operative time, complication rate, mortality, and BMI between the two groups over a period of 12 months.Results. Twenty-five patients received LSG (group A) and 25 LBSG (group B). The mean preoperative BMI was47.3±6.58 kg/m2and44.95±5.85 kg/m2, respectively, in the two groups. There was no statistical relevant difference in operative time. No intraoperative complications occurred. Mean BMI registered after 3, 6, and 12 months in groups A and B, respectively, were37.86±5.72 kg/m2and37.58±6.21 kg/m2(p=0.869),33.64±6.08 kg/m2and32.03±5.24 kg/m2(p=0.325), and29.72±4.40 kg/m2and27.42±4.47 kg/m2(p=0.186); no statistical relevant difference was registered between the two groups.Conclusion. LBSG is a safe and feasible procedure. The time required for the device positioning did not influence significantly the surgical time. The results of bodyweight loss did not document any statistically significant differences among the two groups, even though LBSG group showed a mean BMI slightly lower than that of the control group.

Small Evils and Live Options

2020 ◽  
Vol 22 (2) ◽  
pp. 307-321
Author(s):  
Spencer Case ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Relevant Difference ◽  
Horrendous Evils ◽  
Decisive Evidence

Many philosophers have thought that aggregates of small, broadly dispersed evils don’t pose the same sort of challenge to theism that horrendous evils like the Nazi Holocaust do. But there are interesting arguments that purport to show that large enough aggregates of small evils are morally and axiologically equivalent to horrendous evils. Herein lies an intriguing and overlooked strategy for defending theism. In short: small evils, or aggregates of such evils, don’t provide decisive evidence against theism; there’s no relevant difference between horrendous evils and aggregates of small evils; hence horrendous evils must not provide decisive evidence against theism, either.

Sense and Reason in Butler's Ethics

Dialogue ◽  
1968 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 180-193
Author(s):  
Peter Fuss
Keyword(s):  
Moral Epistemology ◽  
Moral Authority ◽  
Normative Theory ◽  
Moral Philosopher ◽  
Cognitive Aspect ◽  
Psychological Egoism ◽  
Official Position ◽  
Course Of Action ◽  
Widespread Agreement ◽  
Apparent Inconsistency

In recent years there has been widespread agreement among Bishop Butler's commentators and critics concerning the nature of his “official” position as a moral philosopher. His moral epistemology is a form of moral sensism, its cognitive aspect best described, after Sidgwick, as perceptual intuitionism. His normative theory is strongly deontologistic in character, and as a moral psychologist he is still celebrated as a devastating critic of psychological egoism and hedonism. Understandably enough, there has been a tendency to discount those remarkable passages in Sermons XI and XII in which Butler seems to be defending an almost diametrically opposed position, compounded of a rationalistic epistemology, a hedonistic-utilitarian normative theory, and a form of psychological egoism. Thus G. D. Broad finds flatly inconsistent those passages in which Butler seems to make self-love coordinate with conscience in its moral authority. When Butler asserts that on calm reflection one is unable to justify any course of action contrary to one's own happiness, Broad maintains that in context this statement must be understood not as a presentation of Butler's own view, but as “a hypothetical concession to an imaginary opponent.” Butler, Broad thinks, is merely once again trying to convince people that reasonable self-love and the dictates of conscience do not conflict. Similarly, A. Duncan-Jones argues that the apparent inconsistency in the passage in question is removed once we understand that Butler is only refuting the egoists' contention that self-love and virtuous benevolence are necessarily opposed.

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