Kant, Marginal Cases, and Moral Standing

Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

According to the marginal cases argument, there is no property that might justify making a moral difference between human beings and the other animals that is both uniquely and universally human. It is therefore “speciesist” to treat human beings differently just because we are human beings. While not challenging the conclusion, this chapter argues that the marginal cases argument is metaphysically misguided. It ignores the differences between a life stage and a kind, and between lacking a property and having it in a defective form. The chapter then argues for a view of moral standing that attributes it to the subject of a life conceived as an atemporal being, and shows how this view can resolve some familiar puzzles such as how death can be a loss to the person who has died, how we can wrong the dead, the “procreation asymmetry,” and the “non-identity problem.”

Author(s):  
Christine M. Korsgaard

This book argues that we are obligated to treat all sentient animals as “ends in themselves.” Drawing on a theory of the good derived from Aristotle, it offers an explanation of why animals are the sorts of beings who have a good. Drawing on a revised version of Kant’s argument for the value of humanity, it argues that rationality commits us to claiming the standing of ends in ourselves in two senses. As autonomous beings, we claim to be ends in ourselves when we claim the standing to make laws for ourselves and each other. As beings who have a good, we also claim to be ends in ourselves when we take the things that are good for us to be good absolutely and so worthy of pursuit. The first claim commits us to joining with other autonomous beings in relations of reciprocal moral lawmaking. The second claim commits us to treating the good of every sentient animal as something of absolute importance. The book also argues that human beings are not more important than, superior to, or better off than the other animals. It criticizes the “marginal cases” argument and advances a view of moral standing as attaching to the atemporal subjects of lives. It offers a non-utilitarian account of the relationship between the good and pleasure, and addresses questions about the badness of extinction and about whether we have the right to eat animals, experiment on them, make them work for us, and keep them as pets.


2021 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 66-73
Author(s):  
Agapov Oleg D. ◽  

The joy of being is connected with one’s activities aimed at responding to the challenges of the elemental forces and the boundlessness of being, which are independent of human subjectivity. In the context of rising to the challenges of being, one settles to acquire a certain power of being in themselves and in the world. Thus, the joy of being is tied to achieving the level of the “miraculous fecundity” (E. Levinas), “an internal necessity of one’s life” (F. Vasilyuk), magnanimity (M. Mamardashvili). The ontological duty of any human being is to succeed at being human. The joy of being is closely connected to experiencing one’s involvement in the endless/eternity and realizing one’s subjective temporality/finitude, which attunes him to the absolute seriousness in relation to one’s complete realization in life. Joy is a foundational anthropological phenomenon in the structure of ways of experiencing the human condition. The joy of being as an anthropological practice can appear as a constantly expanding sphere of human subjectivity where the transfiguration of the powers of being occurs under the sign of the Height (Levinas) / the Good. Without the possibility of transfiguration human beings get tired of living, immerse themselves in the dejected state of laziness and the hopelessness of vanity. The joy of being is connected to unity, gathering the multiplicity of human life under the aegis of meaning that allows us to see the other and the alien in heteronomous being, and understand the nature of co-participation and responsibility before the forces of being, and also act in synergy with them.The joy of being stands before a human being as the joy of fatherhood/ motherhood, the joy of being a witness to the world in creative acts (the subject as a means to retreat before the world and let the world shine), the joy of every day that was saved from absurdity, darkness and the impersonal existence of the total. Keywords: joy, higher reality, anthropological practices, “the height”, subject, transcendence, practice of coping


Perception ◽  
1996 ◽  
Vol 25 (1_suppl) ◽  
pp. 15-15
Author(s):  
B Blum ◽  
O Barnes

Perceptual performance schema are consistently prepared by human beings. Minimal ‘experience’ with pertinent stimulus attributes seem necessary. We presume that with new stimuli, a ‘linkage’ is formed with inner representations on the basis of commonly shared stimulus components. To investigate this hypothesis, we used ‘confusion stimuli’, ie degradations of five-corner and six-corner stars. These were presented within each of four paradigms: upright (u), rotated (10°; r), foveal/local viewing (A) or eccentric/global viewing (B), that is uA, uB, rA, and rB paradigms. Random presentation of stimuli prototypes preceded the stimulus so that in comparing the presented stimulus to one and the other prototype, the subject faced a 2AFC task. Series (4 to 6) each of 32 randomised paradigms were run on each of six subjects. The subjects keyed 5 or 6 on identifying one or the other stimulus. On the assumption that exposure time and/or acuity grades impose stimulus intensities, psychometric curves were derived by plotting probability of correct choice against either parameter. The results indicate that in hybrid paradigms such as the present uA and uB, or rA and rB subjects may use shared component strategy: ‘u strategy’ with uA and uB, ‘r strategy’ with rA and rB, shared A and B in generating viewpoint invariance. Similar log-linear psychometric curves and slopes for pairs of paradigms were obtained, and ‘transfer’ of learning presumably also based on shared stimulus properties was observed.


Author(s):  
Simone Zurbuchen

The chapter explores the ambiguity of the notion of dignity in Pufendorf’s natural law theory. On the one hand, dignity (dignatio) denotes the moral status of human beings in virtue of which they have to treat each other as equals. On the other hand, Pufendorf holds dignity and natural equality to be compatible with social inequality, notably with servitude and slavery. Moreover, when he deals with the comparative value and reputation (existimatio) of human beings, he admits that their moral status is conditioned by their readiness to behave as social beings. Human beings can thus lose their basic moral standing and are then considered as common enemies of all.


Author(s):  
Philip Whitehead

Since the Agricultural Revolution 12,000 years ago, human beings have demonstrated an extraordinary capacity to carve up the world between us and them, have and have nots. This cleaving of humanity reflects fertile soil for the production and reproduction of the pejorative, demonised, and relegated other which is the subject of this book. From ancient empires, stepping into the classical age of Greece and Rome, to more recent political tyrannies, the refugee crisis, and the problem with the European Union, this chapter explores and illustrates the long reach of pejorative othering. It doing so it frames the subject to provide critical and urgent insights into a pressing problem.


1979 ◽  
Vol 49 (1) ◽  
pp. 143-148 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jo Whitten May ◽  
J. Gaylord May

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a preference for the color white was present in infants and young children, A color preference test was administered to 160 subjects who ranged in age from 6 mo. to 4.5 yr. Data were obtained from a 120-item test in which 12 different pairs of toys were presented to each subject. The toys in each pair were identical except that one was black and the other was white. The toy the subject selected was considered the subject's preference and the color of that toy was recorded. Statistical analysis did not support existing literature, refuting the published idea that white preference is a general quality in all human beings.


2020 ◽  
Vol 4 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 671-671
Author(s):  
Helen Kivnick

Abstract Gerontology is a field both scientific and practice-based. Aging, the subject of this field, is an experience in which all human beings participate. But scientific pillars of objectivity, quantifiability, control, and external validity have long mitigated against gerontological scholars effectively moving back and forth between professional scholarship and practice, on the one hand, and personal experience, on the other. Qualitative research approaches, informed by the humanities and arts, utilize alternative ways of knowing that, when added to positivistic science, enable us to construct a body of gerontological knowledge that is robust and useful, and that also incorporates wisdom. Aging, wisdom, and integrality—these all matter. Although often mischaracterized, Erikson’s theory of healthy psychosocial development throughout the life-cycle (Erikson, Erikson, & Kivnick, 1986) weaves these constructs together in ways that can meaningfully inform professional and personal experiences of gerontology. This presentation illustrates one aging gerontologist’s engagement with such weaving.


2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (Supplement_1) ◽  
pp. 600-600
Author(s):  
Amy Schuster ◽  
Katherina Terhune ◽  
Tina K Newsham ◽  
M Aaron Guest ◽  
Renee DuMont ◽  
...  

Abstract Drawing as a qualitative method has been employed to elicit views on aging. The subject matter of the drawings, without an explanation from participants, can be misinterpreted. Therefore, in this research, we explored college students’ drawings of the life course and the extent to which the content of these drawings corresponded to their written descriptions. A content analysis was performed on 524 college students’ life course drawings and their descriptions. Participants drew, on average, five life stages. The majority (75%) of the human beings represented were alone in each life stage. Twelve percent of the drawings were non-human representations of the life course (e.g., flower, tree). The majority of the images (85%) included in the drawings were not mentioned in the written descriptions, for example, hair changes (e.g., from long and straight to curly and short for women). Some physical characteristics (e.g., wrinkles [29%], hunched back [22%]) and some contexts (e.g., tombstones [37%], nursing home [100%]) were present in both the drawing and descriptions. Findings highlight which ideas associated with aging participants thought needed an explanation and which they might have seen as intrinsic to aging, warranting no explanation, emphasizing the importance of examining both drawn and written content when using drawing as a method in aging research. A more thorough and precise examination of the beliefs and perceptions of college students, who will serve as future professionals working with older adults, allows for the development of educational and engagement strategies that accurately target commonly held misperceptions regarding aging.


1952 ◽  
Vol 98 (413) ◽  
pp. 579-594 ◽  
Author(s):  
E. H. Hare

The word “oecology “was coined by Hacckel in 1869, and the study of the complex interactions between organisms and their environment led to fruitful results first in botany (at the beginning of the twentieth century) and later in zoology. In 1935 Bews formulated the principles of human ecology, but the precise boundaries of this discipline (as Banks (1905a) calls it, since it cannot be called a science) are still not the subject of any general agreement. Its dictionary definition as “that branch of biology which deals with the relations of human beings to their surroundings, their habits and modes of life,” although simple for the purposes of formulation, is probably too diffuse in practice. On the other hand, Miller (1950), in suggesting that the ecological study of disorders should be confined to their distribution in the purely demographic sense, seems unduly to restrict its application. There is a tendency among American ecologists (who have been the pioneers of this subject) to take a middle course. Park (1936) conceives of human ecology as the study of the community in terms of the competitive forces which mould it, as opposed to the cultural forces which make for social co-operation. Similarly, Faris (1944) distinguishes the ecological order, which arises automatically and unintentionally out of the struggle for survival, from the cultural order, which is based on mutual affection and sentiment.


Ramus ◽  
1978 ◽  
Vol 7 (2) ◽  
pp. 143-175 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. L. Penwill

Plato's so-called ‘middle period’ saw the composition of what are generally agreed to be his finest philosophical dramas, and of these the Symposium is usually singled out for special praise. Yet it is only recently that serious attempts have been made to approach the Symposium as a work of literature rather than a philosophical treatise. Those who employ the work as a source-book for Platonist doctrines rarely venture beyond Socrates' dialectical refutation of Agathon and his report of what Diotima told him (199c-212b); and if they do, it is to point out the logical or perceptual fallacies — i.e. the philosophical deficiencies — of the other five encomia and to find in Alcibiades' contribution a glowing tribute by Plato to that most remarkable of human personalities, the philosopher Socrates. This, however, is not the way to arrive at a real understanding of the Symposium. The author clearly intends the reader to respond to this work not as a philosophical treatise on the subject of Eros but as a work of literature which portrays a group of thinking human beings engaged in appraisal of an issue which is of fundamental importance in their lives. His primary purpose in dramatising this intellectual event is thus not to expound the philosopher's conception of Eros or to expose our minds to auto to kalon (‘the beautiful itself’). Rather the true subject of the work is man the intellectual animal, whose logoi (‘speeches’) demonstrate his capacity for analysing, evaluating and idealising his feelings and aspirations. It depicts ‘philosophy brought down from the sky and located in the cities and homes of men’; we are shown how, and how successfully, philosophy can function as a vital constituent of human life, rather than a barren and essentially irrelevant dispute about the mechanics of the universe.


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