scholarly journals Moral Diversity and Efficient Breach

2019 ◽  
pp. 885
Author(s):  
Matthew Seligman
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Housing Crisis ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
Moral Diversity ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Regulatory Interventions ◽  
Wealth Inequalities

Most people think it is morally wrong to breach a contract. But sophisticated commercial parties, like large corporations, have no objection to breaching contracts and paying the price in damages when doing so is in their self-interest. The literature has ignored the profound legal, economic, and normative implications of that asymmetry between individuals’ and firms’ approaches to breach. To individuals, a contract is a promise that cannot be broken regardless of the financial stakes. For example, millions of homeowners refused to breach their mortgage contracts in the aftermath of the housing crisis even though doing so could have saved them tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars. Their moral beliefs led homeowners to forgo opportunities for efficient breach that firms would have seized, thus exacerbating al-ready swelling wealth inequalities. This Article explains this phenomenon, identifies its consequences and examines strategies to address it. Neither ex post judicial interventions (such as adjusting the remedies for breach) nor traditional ex ante regulatory interventions (such as disclosure requirements) will effectively address the problem. Instead, the most promising approach is a novel solution based on the framework of choice architecture: requiring contracts to include an express term creating an option to exit the contract and pay a fee equivalent to expectation damages. An express exit term elevates an implicit legal option into an explicit contractual option, reframing the moral choice so individuals would perceive exiting the contract as a morally permissible performance of their promise rather than a morally forbidden breaking of it. The presence of that exit term thereby aligns individuals’ perceptions of their moral obligations under the contract with sophisticated firms’ approaches to breach. The Article concludes with new empirical evidence that demonstrates the practical impact of an exit clause. It presents the results of two experimental studies I performed that demonstrate the effectiveness of a mandatory exit clause in reducing the effects of the asymmetry between individuals and firms. Those results show that exit clauses could have substantial practical implications for the regulation of contracts in contexts like consumer and mortgage contracts.

The Motivational Power of Moral Beliefs

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joshua May
Keyword(s):  
Moral Identity ◽  
Motivated Reasoning ◽  
Difficult Case ◽  
Moral Integrity ◽  
Normative Judgment ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Hypocrisy ◽  
Moral Licensing ◽  
Self Interest

Even if we can rise above self-interest, we may just be slaves of our passions. But the motivational power of reason, via moral beliefs, has been understated, even in the difficult case of temptation. Experiments show that often when we succumb, it is due in part to a change in moral (or normative) judgment. We can see this by carefully examining a range of experiments on motivated reasoning, moral licensing, moral hypocrisy, and moral identity. Rationalization, perhaps paradoxically, reveals a deep regard for reason, to act in ways we can justify to ourselves and to others. The result is that we are very often morally motivated or exhibit moral integrity. Even when behaving badly, actions that often seem motivated by self-interest are actually ultimately driven by a concern to do what’s right.

scholarly journals Evaluating Others If They Stand Up for Their Moral Convictions, and Evaluating Ourselves If We Don't Stand Up

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Florien M. Cramwinckel ◽  
Kees van den Bos ◽  
Eric van Dijk
Keyword(s):  
Social Environment ◽  
Sexual Minorities ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Moral Courage ◽  
Negative Consequences ◽  
Equal Rights ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Moral Principles ◽  
Situational Demands ◽  
Moral Convictions

AbstractActing on one’s moral principles is not always easy. Upholding one’s moral beliefs may run counter to one’s social environment or situational demands. It may often cause people to remain silent on their convictions, while at the same time some may show the moral courage to speak out. How do people evaluate those who do stand up, and how does it affect their self-evaluations? In two experimental studies (Ns = 207 and 204), we investigated both types of evaluations. The studies demonstrate that people who failed to uphold their moral beliefs still had positive evaluations of others who showed moral courage. More specifically, pro-gay participants who went along with writing an anti-gay essay denouncing equal rights for sexual minorities had positive evaluations of another person who spoke up and refused this task. The failure to display moral courage had negative consequences for participants’ self-concepts. In Experiment 1, we show that pro-gay participants’ positive self-concepts were lowered after writing an anti-gay essay (vs. a pro-gay essay). In Experiment 2, we reveal that participants' positive self-concepts were lowered only when they were confronted with morally courageous behavior and their own failure to uphold their moral beliefs was visible to the experimenter.

SUBSTANTIVE MORAL THEORY

2007 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-27 ◽  
Author(s):  
Philip Pettit
Keyword(s):  
Philosophy Of Science ◽  
Moral Theory ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Issues ◽  
Moral Thinking ◽  
Scientific Thought ◽  
Moral Thought ◽  
Present Essay ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
The Common

Philosophy can serve two roles in relation to moral thinking: first, to provide a meta-ethical commentary on the nature of moral thought, as the methodology or the philosophy of science provides a commentary on the nature of scientific thought; and second, to build on the common presumptions deployed in people's moral thinking about moral issues, looking for a substantive moral theory that they might support. The present essay addresses the nature of this second role; illustrates it with substantive theories that equate moral obligations respectively with requirements of nature, self-interest, benevolence, reason and justifiability; and outlines a novel competitor in which the focus is shifted to requirements of co-reasoning and respect.

Web Usage Mining

2011 ◽  
pp. 4082-4087
Author(s):  
Stu Westin
Keyword(s):  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Web Usage Mining ◽  
Observational Research ◽  
Web Based ◽  
Web Studies ◽  
Web Usage ◽  
Online Purchase ◽  
Ex Post ◽  
Research Designs ◽  
Vexing Problem

Studies that rely on Web usage mining can be experimental or observational in nature. The focus of such studies is quite varied and may involve such topics as predicting online purchase intentions (Hooker & Finkelman, 2004; Moe, 2003; Montgomery, Li, Srinivsan, & Liechty, 2004), designing recommender systems for e-commerce products and sites (Cho & Kim, 2004; Kim & Cho, 2003), understanding navigation and search behavior (Chiang, Dholakia, & Westin, 2004; Gery & Haddad, 2003; Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, & Lohse, 2004; Li & Zaiane, 2004), or a myriad of other subjects. Regardless of the issue being studied, data collection for Web usage mining studies often proves to be a vexing problem, and ideal research designs are frequently sacrificed in the interest of finding a reasonable data capture or collection mechanism. Despite the difficulties involved, the research community has recognized the value of Web-based experimental research (Saeed, Hwang, & Yi, 2003; Zinkhan, 2005), and has, in fact, called on investigators to exploit “non-intrusive means of collecting usage and exploration data” (Gao, 2003, p. 31) in future Web studies. In this article we discuss some of the methodological complexities that arise when conducting studies that involve Web usage mining. We then describe an innovative, software-based methodology that addresses many of these problems. The methods described here are most applicable to experimental studies, but they can be applied in ex-post observational research settings, as well.

Motivations of the adherent

2019 ◽  
pp. 40-56
Author(s):  
Nicholas Owen
Keyword(s):  
Social Norms ◽  
Social Movement ◽  
Altruistic Behavior ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
The Social ◽  
Self Interest

Chapter 3 explores the three principal motivations that have been proposed to explain altruistic behavior—rational self-interest, moral obligations, and social norms—and asks to what extent they are plausible explanations of the motivations of adherents and how they are distinct from the motivations of the constituents. It shows how the adherents’ disjoint (i.e., asymmetric) motivations differ from the conjoint (i.e., reciprocal) motivations of constituents. It proposes that adherents are motivated by self-owned moral obligations to others and disjoint norms of service. It also explores the associated costs of these motivations for the social movement, showing how these too differ.

People actually are about as bad as social psychologists say, or worse

2004 ◽  
Vol 27 (3) ◽  
pp. 351-352
Author(s):  
Michael P. Maratsos
Keyword(s):  
Real World ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Good Deal ◽  
The Real ◽  
Self Interest

Experimental studies are not representative of how badly people function. We study people under relatively innocuous conditions, where their self-interests are very low. In the real world, where people's self-interests are much higher, people are much worse a good deal of the time (some illustrations are cited). This is often “adaptive” for the perpetrators, but that doesn't make it “good” behavior. That people function so badly in our experiments, where self-interest is relatively minimal, is what is really terrifying.

Anselm on Eudaemonism and the hierarchical structure of moral choice

2005 ◽  
Vol 41 (3) ◽  
pp. 249-268 ◽  
Author(s):  
KATHERIN A. ROGERS
Keyword(s):  
Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Hierarchical Analysis ◽  
Harry Frankfurt ◽  
Moral Choice ◽  
God's Will ◽  
First Order ◽  
Self Interest ◽  
Anselm Of Canterbury ◽  
The Hierarchical Structure ◽  
Natural Inclination

Because Anselm of Canterbury argues that the morally responsible created agent must have the option to choose between justice and benefit, many scholars conclude that he is a proto-Kantian, pitting duty against self-interest and natural inclination. This is mistaken. Anselm proposes a hierarchical schema, prefiguring that of Harry Frankfurt, in which the inclination for justice constitutes a second-order desire that one's first-order desires for benefits should be moderated to conform to God's will. I defend this interpretation through careful textual analysis, then show that Anselm's hierarchical analysis is not subject to some of the criticisms one might raise against Frankfurt's.

scholarly journals Disassociating conformity driven and self-interest driven dishonest behaviors

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nora Huang ◽  
siyang luo
Keyword(s):  
Simulation Modeling ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
External Environment ◽  
Real Life ◽  
Cross Cultural ◽  
The Self ◽  
Agent Based ◽  
Cultural Contexts ◽  
Environmental Predictability ◽  
Self Interest

Dishonest behavior can be driven by both self-interest and social learning towards the external environment. However, whether and how these two processes (conformity-driven and self-interest-driven dishonesty) relate and interact to influence dishonest acts remains unknown. In the current research, we propose a computational model consisting of these two dishonesty processes. The results of the agent-based simulation modeling and experimental studies revealed that self-interest driven-dishonesty propensity determined the extent of dishonesty when one was in pursuit of self-interests, while the effect of dishonesty conformity on dishonesty was dependent on both the self and environmental dishonesty propensity. In addition, self-interest-driven dishonesty propensity was related to individuals’ preference for value allocation, while dishonesty conformity was related to the belief in environmental predictability. In cross-cultural contexts, these two processes of dishonesty exert distinct effects on participants’ tendency to violate the regulation rules of the local government and impacted the development of the local prevalence of pathogens during the COVID-19 epidemic. The results of the current in-depth research validate the processes of conformity-driven and self-interest-driven dishonesty when dishonest behaviors emerged and to uncover how these two processes influenced the progression of a real-life emergent event.

Resistant Exits

2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennet Kirkpatrick
Keyword(s):  
Country Of Origin ◽  
The Other ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Political Obligations ◽  
Political Concern ◽  
Other Hand ◽  
Concern For Others ◽  
Self Interest

This chapter explores a dilemma faced by some political activists operating in constrained political contexts. Should they stay or should they go? In authoritarian contexts, remaining in the country of origin can carry serious risks—including torture, incarceration, and death. Leaving, on the other hand, may be seen as cowardly, self-interested, or an abandonment of political obligations to the cause of opposition. This chapter looks at contemporary political exiles who have negotiated this dilemma in an innovative way by continuing their opposition from abroad. It illuminates resistant exits in a contemporary political contexts and looks more closely at the a complicated set of relationships between self-interest and political concern for others. It argues that it can be difficult to discern a sharp demarcation between acting selfishly and behaving selflessly for these activists. The connection between the two is tangled, one in which self-interested concerns lie atop and underneath more selfless political and moral obligations.

Nielsen, Ethics and God

1978 ◽  
Vol 14 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-216 ◽  
Author(s):  
Osmond G. Ramberan
Keyword(s):  
Moral Judgment ◽  
Good Reason ◽  
Recent Book ◽  
Christian Tradition ◽  
Moral Obligations ◽  
Moral Beliefs ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Moral Insight ◽  
Moral Claims ◽  
The Will

One of the central claims of most religious people (especially those in the Judeo-Christian tradition) is that morality is based upon religion or, more specifically, on a belief in God. A morality which is not God-centred not only cannot provide a genuine basis for moral beliefs but is really and truly groundless. For without a belief in the sovereignty of God, there can be no genuine adequate foundation for moral beliefs. In his recent book, Ethics Without God, Kai Nielsen claims that this view is grossly mistaken. According to Nielsen, morality cannot be based on religion because moral claims cannot be derived from religious (non-moral) cosmological claims such as ‘God is Creator’, or ‘God exists’. ‘God wills X’, ‘God commands X’, do not entail ‘X ought to be done’, or ‘I ought to do X’. It is perfectly in order for someone to say that God wills (commands) X, but is X good? It is also perfectly in order for someone to say that God commands me to do X, but why should I obey God? Surely it cannot be because God is powerful and, if I do not obey his commands, he will punish me. It may be prudent and expedient to obey God because I am afraid of punishment, but this is surely not a morally good reason for obeying him. Moral obligations follow God's commands only if it is assumed that God is morally perfect or that he is good or that his commands are right (p. 5). But I cannot know that God is good without an understanding of what it is for something to be good. To be sure, ‘God is good’, is a truth of language, but in order to understand it we must have a prior understanding of goodness- an understanding which is ‘logically prior to, and independent of, any understanding or acknowledgement of God’ (p. 11). Moreover, Nielsen argues, the religious quest is a quest to find a being that is ‘worthy of worship’, but it is by our own moral insight that we decide that any being, any Z, is ‘worthy of worship’. The decision that there is a Z such that Z is worthy of worship is a moral judgment which is in no way dependent upon the will of God. But more than this, ‘God’, in ‘God is worthy of worship’, is, in most cases, used analytically so that anyone who is brought to say ‘My God’, or ‘My Lord and my God’, is using ‘God’ evaluatively and by implication making a moral judgment - a moral judgment which is logically prior to the will or command of God. This leads Nielsen to conclude:

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