The Argument from Non-belief

1993 ◽  
Vol 29 (4) ◽  
pp. 417-432 ◽  
Author(s):  
Theodore M. Drange
Keyword(s):  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil

Attempts have been made to prove God's non-existence. Often this takes the form of an appeal to the so-called Argument from Evil: if God were to exist, then he would not permit as much suffering in the world as there actually is. Hence the fact that there is so much suffering constitutes evidence for God's non-existence. In this essay I propose a variation which I shall call ‘The Argument from Non-belief’. Its basic idea is that if God were to exist, then he would not permit as much non-belief in the world as there actually is. Hence the fact that there is so much non-belief constitutes evidence for God's non-existence.

THE PROBLEM OF WORSHIP

Think ◽  
2010 ◽  
Vol 9 (25) ◽  
pp. 101-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Scott F. Aikin
Keyword(s):  
Central Importance ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil

Theism is a cluster of views. The first of which is that God exists. Others are that God has all the relevant omni-attributes, that He created the world, and that He communicates with and performs miracles on behalf of humans. There is one additional view that is often overlooked. It is that humans are obligated to worship God. Importantly, this issue of worship is of central importance to traditional theism. And it extends into pagan thought that predates Christianity. Take, for example Epicurus' deployment of the argument from evil: If god is willing to prevent evil, then he is not omnipotent. If he is able but unwilling, then he is malevolent. If he is able and willing, from whence comes evil? Is he neither able nor willing? Then why call him god?

Religious experience and the evidential argument from evil

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER
Keyword(s):  
Religious Experience ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Epistemic Value ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Belief In God ◽  
Evidential Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.

The Argument from Evil

1969 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-211 ◽  
Author(s):  
Robert J. Richman
Keyword(s):  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
Traditional Theism ◽  
Traditional Problem ◽  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
First Time

The traditional problem of evil is set forth, by no means for the first time, in Part X of Hume's Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion in these familiar words: ‘Is [God] willing to prevent evil, but not able? then he is impotent. Is he able, but not willing? then he is malevolent. Is he both able and willing? whence then is evil?’ This formulation of the problem of evil obviously suggests an argument to the effect that the existence of evil in the world demonstrates that God does not exist. The purpose of this paper is to examine this argument, with a view to showing that while it is not a conclusive argument, it is much stronger than some apologists for traditional theism allow.

Progress and the argument from evil

2004 ◽  
Vol 40 (2) ◽  
pp. 181-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN R. L. CLARK
Keyword(s):  
Darwinian Theory ◽  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
The Way

The argument from evil, though it is the most effective rhetorical argument against orthodox theism, fails to demonstrate its conclusion, since we are unavoidably ignorant whether there is more evil than could possibly be justified. That same ignorance infects any claims to discern a divine purpose in nature, as well as recent attempts at a broadly Irenaean theodicy. Evolution is not, on neo-Darwinian theory, intellectually, morally, or spiritually progressive in the way that some religious thinkers have supposed. To suppose so, indeed, is to misidentify the evils we should fear. But though we should neither conceal the evils of the world nor offer any consequentialist justification of them, we may still reasonably maintain an orthodox theism. Evil is not created so that otherwise unattainable goods may come, but is an unavoidable byproduct of creation which it is – or may be – God's purpose to redeem.

scholarly journals James Sterba’s New Argument from Evil

Religions ◽  
2020 ◽  
Vol 12 (1) ◽  
pp. 21
Author(s):  
William Hasker
Keyword(s):  
Main Argument ◽  
The World ◽  
Secure Foundation ◽  
Argument From Evil

This article addresses the main argument in James Sterba’s book, an argument which claims that the existence of a good God is logically incompatible with the evil in the world. I claim to show that his main premise, MEPRI, is implausible and is not a secure foundation for such an argument.

Is the Argument from Evil Decisive?

1983 ◽  
Vol 19 (3) ◽  
pp. 407-410
Author(s):  
David Gordon
Keyword(s):  
Existence Of God ◽  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil

Dale Lugenbehl, in ‘Can the Argument from Evil Be Decisive After All?’ provides a powerful defence of the argument from evil against several theistic objections to it. In my opinion, however, he has failed to prove his case. The question of the consistency of the amount of evil existing in the world with the existence of God remains, after Lugenbehl's argument, exactly where it was before – in a state of uncertainty.

Can the Argument from Evil be Decisive after all?

1982 ◽  
Vol 18 (1) ◽  
pp. 29-35 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dale Lugenbehl
Keyword(s):  
Free Agency ◽  
Personal Character ◽  
The World ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Do So

The argument from evil is an argument which attempts to prove that God does not exist by arguing that the amount of evil (pain, suffering, injustice) in the world is incompatible with the existence ofan all-powerful, all-knowing, and morally perfect being. Theists have traditionally responded to this argument by saying that God is not morally responsible for failure to prevent evil because he cannot do so consistently with maintaining human free agency, because the evil is necessary to build our personal character and develop our talents, because it is necessary to provide a test of our faith, etc.

The Argument from Evil: Reply to Professor Richman

1980 ◽  
Vol 16 (1) ◽  
pp. 103-113 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Langston
Keyword(s):  
A Priori ◽  
Problem Of Evil ◽  
Sufficient Reason ◽  
Existence Of God ◽  
Natural Religion ◽  
The World ◽  
The Problem Of Evil ◽  
The Face ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Nelson Pike

The problem of evil has traditionally been formulated as a claim about the incompatibility of the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’. Hume, for example, in his Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, part x, claims that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible. In his esssy ‘Hume on Evil’, Nelson Pike argues that it has not been shown that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are incompatible because it has not been shown that God could not have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he could prevent.1 Moreover, according to Pike, the theist who is convinced that God must have a morally sufficient reason for permitting suffering he can prevent will claim that the statements ‘God exists’ and ‘There occur instances of suffering’ are not incompatible. He will claim this even though he cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent. The theist will thus maintain that God exists even given the occurrence of suffering in the world.2 Robert Richman, in his essay ‘The Argument from Evil’, argues that Pike is too generous to the theist. According to Richman, only if the theist can specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits suffering he can prevent will the theist be rationally justified in maintaining that God exists in the face of suffering in the world. Richman supports his position by reformulating the argument from evil in terms of what he calls ‘the logic of our moral judgmentsr’.3 Richman thinks that his formulation of the argument from evil is successful against the theist who cannot specify the morally sufficient reason why God permits evil he can prevent. In this paper, I shall argue that Richman's argument is not successful against the typical theist, i.e. the person who accepts the existence of God on the basis of faith or a priori arguments.4

Divine hiddenness and the demographics of theism

2006 ◽  
Vol 42 (2) ◽  
pp. 177-191 ◽  
Author(s):  
STEPHEN MAITZEN
Keyword(s):  
Uneven Distribution ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Divine Hiddenness ◽  
The World ◽  
Cast Doubt ◽  
Normal Human ◽  
Argument From Evil ◽  
Theistic Belief ◽  
Sensus Divinitatis ◽  
Awareness Of God

According to the much-discussed argument from divine hiddenness, God's existence is disconfirmed by the fact that not everyone believes in God. The argument has provoked an impressive range of theistic replies, but none has overcome – or, I suggest, could overcome – the challenge posed by the uneven distribution of theistic belief around the world, a phenomenon for which naturalistic explanations seem more promising. The ‘demographics of theism’ confound any explanation of why non-belief is always blameworthy or of why God allows blameless non-belief. They also cast doubt on the existence of a sensus divinitatis: the awareness of God that Reformed epistemologists claim is innate in all normal human beings. Finally, the demographics make the argument from divine hiddenness in some ways a better atheological argument than the more familiar argument from evil.

A pragmatist philosophy of psychological science and its implications for replication

2018 ◽  
Vol 41 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ana Gantman ◽  
Robin Gomila ◽  
Joel E. Martinez ◽  
J. Nathan Matias ◽  
Elizabeth Levy Paluck ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
William James ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Psychological Science ◽  
Behavioral Measurement ◽  
The World ◽  
Pragmatist Philosophy

AbstractA pragmatist philosophy of psychological science offers to the direct replication debate concrete recommendations and novel benefits that are not discussed in Zwaan et al. This philosophy guides our work as field experimentalists interested in behavioral measurement. Furthermore, all psychologists can relate to its ultimate aim set out by William James: to study mental processes that provide explanations for why people behave as they do in the world.

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