A System of Classical Atheism

1973 ◽  
Vol 26 (3) ◽  
pp. 271-294 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. B. Holland

Some years ago, the editor of the Scottish Journal of Theology asked me to review what was, to me, an interesting and important book which amounted to a systematic attack on the existence of God, at any rate on the validity of the traditional theistic proofs of classical and modern systematic theology. In addition, such other bases of belief in God as authority revelation, historical event, and religious experience were treated, with the aim of showing that they cannot substitute for a failed philosophical theism. However, some mental block prevented me from completing the review proper. The root of the matter was that, in my Bachelor of Arts degree at Sydney University, my philosophical course had involved a system of atheism which I have recognised ever since to be more rigorous and cogent than any others, and I am not alone in this feeling. In particular, I felt that Professor Flew was in a stronger position than most philosophers of the prevailing modern British schools, but that this was because he approximated more than most to what I had learnt at Sydney, and that a still further approximation would tighten his case still more. The professor in question, the late John Anderson, was a Clydesider whose family background was the familiar Leftwing agnosticism and whose training was Absolute Idealism; in his later development, he reacted against both these elements, but his agnosticism hardened into a positive atheism.

2002 ◽  
Vol 38 (3) ◽  
pp. 339-353 ◽  
Author(s):  
DAVID SILVER

This paper examines Alvin Plantinga's defence of theistic belief in the light of Paul Draper's formulation of the problem of evil. Draper argues (a) that the facts concerning the distribution of pain and pleasure in the world are better explained by a hypothesis which does not include the existence of God than by a hypothesis which does; and (b) that this provides an epistemic challenge to theists. Plantinga counters that a theist could accept (a) yet still rationally maintain a belief in God. His defence of theism depends on the epistemic value of religious experience. I argue, however, that Plantinga's defence of theism is not successful.


Author(s):  
Simeon Zahl

This chapter argues that a constructive recovery of the category of “experience” in Christian theology is best accomplished through the lens of the theology of the Holy Spirit. Thinking about experience in terms of the work of the Holy Spirit helps specify what we mean when we talk about Christian “experience,” while also avoiding the problems that arise in appeals to more general concepts of “religious experience.” The chapter shows how a pneumatologically informed theology of experience draws attention to a problematic tendency towards abstraction and disembodiment in much modern systematic theology. It then argues that the work of the Spirit is likely to take forms that are “practically recognizable” in the lives of Christians in the world, exhibiting temporal specificity as well as affective and emotional impact, and that pneumatologies that cannot take account of such practically recognizable effects are deficient.


Philosophy ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 82 (3) ◽  
pp. 381-397 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anthony Kenny

AbstractIs belief in God reasonable? Richard Dawkins is right to say that traditional arguments for the existence of God are flawed; but so is his own disproof of the existence of God, and there are gaps in neo-Darwinian explanations of the origin of language, of life, and of the universe. The rational response is neither theism nor atheism but agnosticism. Faith in a creed is no virtue, but mere belief in God may be reasonable even if false.


1985 ◽  
Vol 21 (3) ◽  
pp. 319-329
Author(s):  
Keith J. Cooper

In looking for criteria by which to assess religious conceptual systems, many philosophers have turned for help to scientific methodology. Perhaps this is because they felt philosophers of science were themselves looking in the right epistemological direction, and had a viable way of describing what they saw. Richard Swinburne has provided a strong, sustained treatment of the application of scientific method to religious truth claims, in The Existence of God. He there makes use of what he sees as ‘the close similarities which exist between religious theories and large-scale scientific theories’ in assessing the epistemic status of belief in God. The goal of this paper will be to give enough of Swinburne's position to see what criteria might be plucked therefrom, to subject both the criteria and the underlying methodology to scrutiny, and to assess where one must go from here in appraising the truth-claims of religion.


1977 ◽  
Vol 13 (1) ◽  
pp. 17-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. Schlesinger

The idea that there might be empirical evidence for the existence of God has been largely discredited these days. Even among theists there are many who hold that it is not a fruitful idea and that there is no point in searching for evidence for theistic beliefs. Some who regard themselves as theists go to the extreme of denying that there is any possibility of there being empirical evidence to support a religious world-view since that view implies no factual claim, as it is essentially a commitment to a given set of values and a way of life and not to the existence of any physically real entity. Others are willing to assert that theism implies the belief in some special facts but that these are so far removed from the mundane experiences upon which physical science is based, that the latter could not possibly support such a belief. Yet others merely say that there is no need at all for confirmatory evidence of the kind employed in science since their beliefs are grounded in something much firmer and more immediate, like religious experience.


1986 ◽  
Vol 22 (1) ◽  
pp. 79-93 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Martin

In The Existence of God Richard Swinburne argues that certain religious experiences support the hypothesis that God exists. Indeed, the argument from religious experience is of crucial importance in Swinburne's philosophical theology. For, according to Swinburne, without the argument from religious experience the combined weight of the other arguments he considers, e.g. the teleological, the cosmological, or the argument from miracles, does not render the theistic hypothesis very probable. However, the argument from religious experience combined with these other arguments makes theism more probable than its rivals.


Horizons ◽  
1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 262-282
Author(s):  
Anthony M. Matteo

AbstractAt least since the Enlightenment, religious thinkers in the West have sought to meet the “evidentialist” challenge, that is, to demonstrate that there is sufficient evidence to warrant a rational affirmation of the existence of God. Alvin Plantinga holds that this challenge is rooted in a foundationalist approach to epistemology which is now intellectually bankrupt. He argues that the current critique of foundationalism clears the way for a fruitful reappropriation of the Reformed (Calvinist) tradition's assertion of the “basic” nature of belief in God and its concomitant relegation of the arguments of natural theology to marginal status. After critically assessing Plantinga's proposal—especially its dependence on a nonfoundationalist theory of knowledge—this essay shifts to an analysis of the transcendental Thomist understanding of the rational underpinnings of the theist's affirmation of God's existence, with particular emphasis on the thought of Joseph Maréchal. It is argued that the latter position is better equipped to fend off possible nontheistic counterarguments—even in our current nonfoundationalist atmosphere—and, in fact, can serve as a necessary complement to Calvin's claim of a natural tendency in human beings to believe in God.


2011 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 41-49
Author(s):  
Reinhold Bernhardt

The article explores a line of Christological argumentation which sets out the notion of Christ’s divinity in a way which does not end up with an exclusivist attitude towards other religions. I regard the Chalcedonian ‘vere Deus’ not as an ontological attribute but as the denotation of a profound relationship with God. ‘Relationship’ means unity and difference in one. That unity-in-difference between Christ and God is mirrored by the unity-in-difference between the divine content of the Christ-revelation and the historical Christ-event. God’s universal unconditional love which Jesus preached and presented cannot be restricted to the particular historical event in which it was presented. If it were, then the reference to that specific event would become a condition for the participation in that love—which ends up in a contradiction. In order to avoid that consequence, Christ can and should be seen as ‘representative of God’. The term ‘representation’ appears to be the apt conceptual model for conveying Christ’s theological relevance in a non-exclusive way, for it allows us to distinguish between: the ‘content’ which is represented; the ‘event’ of representation; and the ‘medium’ of the representation. That distinction opens up the possibility of acknowledging representations of God’s salvific power which are not mediated by Jesus of Nazareth. Reinhold Bernhardt is Professor for Systematic Theology / Dogmatics, University of Basel (Switzerland). Website: http://theolrel.unibas.ch/kopfzeile/personen/profil/profil/person/bernhardt/


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