Feeling of knowing and phenomenal consciousness

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 271-272
Author(s):  
Tiziana Zalla ◽  
Adriano P. Palma
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Feeling Of Knowing ◽  
Mental Experience

AbstractIn Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content (such as an item of information) without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.

Daydreams and the True Self

2016 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
pp. 128-149 ◽  
Author(s):  
Honey Williams ◽  
Matthew Vess
Keyword(s):  
Attentional Control ◽  
Well Being ◽  
Fear Of Failure ◽  
External Influence ◽  
Personality Measures ◽  
Critical Component ◽  
True Self ◽  
Feeling Of Knowing ◽  
Mental Experience ◽  
Insight Into

The feeling of knowing and expressing one’s true self (i.e., authenticity) is a critical component of well-being. This research examined how patterns of inner mental experience, or daydreaming styles, relate to differences in authenticity. In two online studies, participants completed a series of personality measures, including measures of daydreaming styles and authenticity. Study 1 ( N = 201) and Study 2 ( N = 203) generally supported our hypotheses. Positive constructive daydreaming predicted greater feelings of authentic living and lower feelings of true self-alienation, and guilty/fear-of-failure daydreaming predicted lower levels of authentic living and greater feelings of both true self-alienation and acceptance of external influence. Moreover, we found that poor attentional control was a consistent positive predictor of true self-alienation and a weak predictor of acceptance of external influence. These findings offer novel insight into how daydreaming relates to people’s subjective sense of knowing and being who they truly are.

Effect of Aging and Generation of Words on Feeling of Knowing Accuracy

2007 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Taconnat ◽  
Mathilde Sacher ◽  
Charlotte Froger ◽  
Celine Souchay ◽  
Severine Fay ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Feeling Of Knowing

Recollection and Familiarity Affect Episodic Feeling-of-Knowing: Evidence Using an Online Remember-Know Procedure

2014 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michel Isingrini ◽  
Mathilde Sacher ◽  
Florian Gougeon ◽  
Laurence Taconnat
Keyword(s):  
Feeling Of Knowing

Phenomenal Experience

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Levine
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Phenomenal Experience ◽  
Making Sense

This paper presents a sketch of a theory of phenomenal consciousness, one that builds on the notion of a “way of appearing,” and draws out various consequences and problems for the view. I unabashedly endorse a version of the Cartesian Theater, while assessing the prospects for making such a view work. As I treat phenomenal consciousness as a relation between a subject and what it is she is conscious of, I face a difficulty in making sense of hallucination, since the object of awareness is missing. I distinguish my position from direct realists who endorse disjunctivism, and end on a somewhat speculative note.

Perceptual awareness or phenomenal consciousness?A dilemma

2021 ◽  
Vol 36 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Christopher F. Masciari ◽  
Peter Carruthers
Keyword(s):  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Perceptual Awareness

scholarly journals Channeling: A Non-pathological Possession and Dissociative Identity Experience or Something Else?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Luciano Pederzoli ◽  
Patrizio Tressoldi ◽  
Helané Wahbeh
Keyword(s):  
Diagnostic Criteria ◽  
Scientific Investigation ◽  
Dsm 5 ◽  
Mental Experience

AbstractChanneling experiences are often compared with Dissociative Trance/Possession Disorders and Dissociative Identity Disorders and more recent diagnostic criteria presented in the DSM 5 and ICD-11. From this comparison, it emerges quite clearly that, for most cases, channeling can either be considered an exceptional non-ordinary mental experience or a non-pathological Dissociative Trance/Possession experience. If this characterization is valid, the next step is to understand the origin of channeling experiences. Are they an expression of channeler’s unconscious or voluntary mental mechanisms, or real connections with “other discarnate entities”? Given their peculiar characteristics, channeling experiences offer a unique opportunity for a scientific investigation and in particular, the origin of the information received by the channelers.

scholarly journals Can Autonomous Agents Without Phenomenal Consciousness Be Morally Responsible?

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
László Bernáth
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Autonomous Agents ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Popular View

AbstractIt is an increasingly popular view among philosophers that moral responsibility can, in principle, be attributed to unconscious autonomous agents. This trend is already remarkable in itself, but it is even more interesting that most proponents of this view provide more or less the same argument to support their position. I argue that as it stands, the Extension Argument, as I call it, is not sufficient to establish the thesis that unconscious autonomous agents can be morally responsible. I attempt to show that the Extension Argument should overcome especially strong ethical considerations; moreover, its epistemological grounds are not too solid, partly because the justifications of its premises are in conflict.

scholarly journals Bridging Ride and Play Comfort

Information ◽  
2021 ◽  
Vol 12 (3) ◽  
pp. 119
Author(s):  
Zeliang Zhang ◽  
Kang Xiaohan ◽  
Mohd Nor Akmal Khalid ◽  
Hiroyuki Iida
Keyword(s):  
Physical Performance ◽  
Ride Comfort ◽  
Roller Coaster ◽  
Mental Experience ◽  
The Law ◽  
Target Environment ◽  
Rider Comfort ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
Suitable Environment ◽  
The Way

The notion of comfort with respect to rides, such as roller coasters, is typically addressed from the perspective of a physical ride, where the convenience of transportation is redefined to minimize risk and maximize thrill. As a popular form of entertainment, roller coasters sit at the nexus of rides and games, providing a suitable environment to measure both mental and physical experiences of rider comfort. In this paper, the way risk and comfort affect such experiences is investigated, and the connection between play comfort and ride comfort is explored. A roller coaster ride simulation is adopted as the target environment for this research, which combines the feeling of being thrill and comfort simultaneously. At the same time, this paper also expands research on roller coaster rides while bridging the rides and games via the analogy of the law of physics, a concept currently known as motion in mind. This study’s contribution involves a roller coaster ride model, which provides an extended understanding of the relationship between physical performance and the mental experience relative to the concept of motion in mind while establishing critical criteria for a comfortable experience of both the ride and play.

scholarly journals Extending the extended consciousness debate: perception, imagination, and the common kind assumption

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
James Deery
Keyword(s):  
Perceptual Experience ◽  
Phenomenal Consciousness ◽  
Psychological Theory ◽  
Predictive Processing ◽  
Mental Event ◽  
The World ◽  
Predictive Approach ◽  
The Common ◽  
The Relationship ◽  
The Brain

AbstractFor some, the states and processes involved in the realisation of phenomenal consciousness are not confined to within the organismic boundaries of the experiencing subject. Instead, the sub-personal basis of perceptual experience can, and does, extend beyond the brain and body to implicate environmental elements through one’s interaction with the world. These claims are met by proponents of predictive processing, who propose that perception and imagination should be understood as a product of the same internal mechanisms. On this view, as visually imagining is not considered to be world-involving, it is assumed that world-involvement must not be essential for perception, and thus internalism about the sub-personal basis is true. However, the argument for internalism from the unity of perception and imagination relies for its strength on a questionable conception of the relationship between the two experiential states. I argue that proponents of the predictive approach are guilty of harbouring an implicit commitment to the common kind assumption which does not follow trivially from their framework. That is, the assumption that perception and imagination are of the same fundamental kind of mental event. I will argue that there are plausible alternative ways of conceiving of this relationship without drawing internalist metaphysical conclusions from their psychological theory. Thus, the internalist owes the debate clarification of this relationship and further argumentation to secure their position.

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