The implications of Koehler's approach for fact finding

1996 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-18
Author(s):  
Craig R. Callen

AbstractKoehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.

2021 ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya

This chapter discusses the concept of coherence and its role in evidential reasoning in law. It examines three main approaches to coherence, namely, structural coherence, narrative coherence, and coherence as constraint satisfaction, and argues that coherence as constraint satisfaction provides an account of the kind of coherence that is relevant to legal fact-finding that is both descriptively adequate and normatively appealing. Next, it addresses some problems concerning the relation between coherence and inference, coherence and virtue, and coherence and truth in the context of legal factfinding. More specifically, it examines three main objections facing a coherentist account of inference, i.e., conservatism, circularity and unfeasibility, and conceptualizes it as an explanatory kind of inference. Then, it articulates a problem that has not been traditionally discussed in the coherentist literature, to wit, the coherence bias, and argues that virtue coherentism has the resources to effectively counteract it. Last, it defends the coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof against three objections that put into question the truth-conduciveness of coherence, namely, the isolation or input objection, the alternative coherent systems objection, and the truth objection. The chapter concludes by suggesting some avenues for further research on coherence, evidence, and legal proof.


1997 ◽  
Vol 30 (1) ◽  
pp. 26-35
Author(s):  
Jeremy Gans

The notion that the issue of the accused's honest belief about consent has little effect on the outcome of most rape trials has gained considerable acceptance amongst some rape law reformers. The acceptance of this claim can be partly traced to the Law Reform Commission of Victoria's study of rape prosecutions in 1991. However, properly considered, the study provides no support for this assertion. This is because of two limitations to the study: the merely cursory analysis of pre-trial decision making and the lack of plausible assessment of the jury's approach to its fact-finding task. Properly understood, the study's findings suggest a reform of the trial judge's direction to the jury, a possibility ignored in the Law Reform Commission's report. This paper argues that law reformers should pay more attention to such limitations when considering empirical research into rape prosecutions.


Episteme ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya

ABSTRACTThis paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the coherence bias. The paper then develops an aretaic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility which govern legal fact-finding. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed account of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law for the epistemology of legal proof.


2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Brown

This article defends what it refers to as “inference causation”: a fact-finder’s drawing of a causal link between a defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s suffering in tort claims in the absence of expert scientific evidence. This type of reasoning, affirmed in 1990 by Justice Sopinka in the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Snell v. Farrell, has encountered significant academic criticism. The author defends inference causation by considering evidence theory. First, he shows that inference causation forms a part of law’s veritism—its commitment to the truth—since legal fact-finding’s aim is always to seek out the best obtainable truth, rather than the absolute truth. Second, he critiques the primacy of scientific evidence by showing that both its reasoning process and the nature of its conclusions are different from those of legal fact-finding. Last, the author shows that all fact-finding—particularly all legal fact-finding—is already inferential. Scientific evidence forms but one of many different elements that are analyzed by fact-finders in their inference about which factual account of the disputed events is the best account. Accordingly, where none is available, the same inference of fact is nonetheless possible.


2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Simon

In the Target Article Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, Ron Allen and Michael Pardo set out to make the empirical claim that Relative Plausibility provides the best account of juridical proof. While I tend to agree with this conclusion, the article suffers from notable weaknesses. Allen and Pardo do not define a unit of analysis, they offer no testable hypotheses, and they present no data–all of which render the empirical claim befuddling. The empirical claim cannot be salvaged by the recruitment of the Story Model. For all its brilliance, the Story Model provides too narrow a foundation to sustain a general model of legal fact-finding. Allen and Pardo’s reliance on holistic processing stands on sounder scientific grounds, but the casual referencing cannot amount to empirical proof. More importantly, Allen and Pardo refrain from reckoning with the implications of holism, and thus ignore both the promise and perils of the cognitive process they espouse. The experimental paradigm of Coherence Based Reasoning reveals a number of such implications. Notably, holism cannot deliver the objectivity and accuracy that Allen and Pardo seem to ascribe to it. Moreover, holistic processing entails a distortion of the evidence, which could lead to dismissing evidence that would otherwise raise a valid doubt, and inflate a hesitant fact-finder’s confidence up to a firm conviction in the defendant’s guilt. Holism also entails vast interconnectivity among the evidence items, which can trigger non-normative inferences and enable extra-evidential information to alter the fact-finder’s perception of correctly-admitted evidence.


2016 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 181
Author(s):  
Pedro Humberto Haddad Bernat

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