Coherence in Legal Evidence

2021 ◽  
pp. 231-248
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya
Keyword(s):  
Constraint Satisfaction ◽  
Evidential Reasoning ◽  
Narrative Coherence ◽  
Coherent Systems ◽  
Legal Evidence ◽  
Structural Coherence ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Legal Fact

This chapter discusses the concept of coherence and its role in evidential reasoning in law. It examines three main approaches to coherence, namely, structural coherence, narrative coherence, and coherence as constraint satisfaction, and argues that coherence as constraint satisfaction provides an account of the kind of coherence that is relevant to legal fact-finding that is both descriptively adequate and normatively appealing. Next, it addresses some problems concerning the relation between coherence and inference, coherence and virtue, and coherence and truth in the context of legal factfinding. More specifically, it examines three main objections facing a coherentist account of inference, i.e., conservatism, circularity and unfeasibility, and conceptualizes it as an explanatory kind of inference. Then, it articulates a problem that has not been traditionally discussed in the coherentist literature, to wit, the coherence bias, and argues that virtue coherentism has the resources to effectively counteract it. Last, it defends the coherentist approach to evidence and legal proof against three objections that put into question the truth-conduciveness of coherence, namely, the isolation or input objection, the alternative coherent systems objection, and the truth objection. The chapter concludes by suggesting some avenues for further research on coherence, evidence, and legal proof.

Justification, Coherence, and Epistemic Responsibility in Legal Fact-Finding

Episteme ◽  
2008 ◽  
Vol 5 (3) ◽  
pp. 306-319 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya
Keyword(s):  
Epistemic Responsibility ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Legal Fact

ABSTRACTThis paper argues for a coherentist theory of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law, according to which a hypothesis about the events being litigated is justified if and only if it is such that an epistemically responsible fact-finder might have accepted it as justified by virtue of its coherence in like circumstances. It claims that this version of coherentism has the resources to address a main problem facing coherence theories of evidence and legal proof, namely, the problem of the coherence bias. The paper then develops an aretaic approach to the standards of epistemic responsibility which govern legal fact-finding. It concludes by exploring some implications of the proposed account of the justification of evidentiary judgments in law for the epistemology of legal proof.

The Possibility of “Inference Causation”: Inferring Cause-in-Fact and the Nature of Legal Fact-Finding

2010 ◽  
Vol 55 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-45 ◽  
Author(s):  
Russell Brown
Keyword(s):  
Supreme Court ◽  
Scientific Evidence ◽  
Evidence Theory ◽  
Causal Link ◽  
Supreme Court Of Canada ◽  
Absolute Truth ◽  
Reasoning Process ◽  
The Supreme Court ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Fact

This article defends what it refers to as “inference causation”: a fact-finder’s drawing of a causal link between a defendant’s actions and a plaintiff’s suffering in tort claims in the absence of expert scientific evidence. This type of reasoning, affirmed in 1990 by Justice Sopinka in the Supreme Court of Canada decision, Snell v. Farrell, has encountered significant academic criticism. The author defends inference causation by considering evidence theory. First, he shows that inference causation forms a part of law’s veritism—its commitment to the truth—since legal fact-finding’s aim is always to seek out the best obtainable truth, rather than the absolute truth. Second, he critiques the primacy of scientific evidence by showing that both its reasoning process and the nature of its conclusions are different from those of legal fact-finding. Last, the author shows that all fact-finding—particularly all legal fact-finding—is already inferential. Scientific evidence forms but one of many different elements that are analyzed by fact-finders in their inference about which factual account of the disputed events is the best account. Accordingly, where none is available, the same inference of fact is nonetheless possible.

The explanationist revolution in evidence law

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 60-67 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amalia Amaya
Keyword(s):  
Alternative Interpretation ◽  
Revolutionary Change ◽  
The Core ◽  
Basic Distinction ◽  
Evidence Law ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Proof ◽  
Probabilistic Criteria

According to Allen and Pardo, the field of evidence law has experienced a revolution -in Kuhn's sense- from probabilism to explanationism, which they identify with the relative plausibility theory. The explanationist revolution, argue Allen and Pardo, has placed explanationist -rather than probabilistic criteria- at the core of the fact-finding process and, in contrast to probabilism, has advanced a comparative understanding of the theory of legal proof. This paper develops an alternative interpretation of the explanationist revolution in evidence law. First, it elaborates on the concept of legal revolution and argues that it involves a kind of shift that is best characterized as a Hacking -rather than a Kuhnean- type of revolution and, thus, as an ‘emplacement’ instead of a ‘replacement’ revolution. Second, it claims that the shift from probabilism to explanationism involves a deep -genuinely revolutionary- change in the conception of rationality that is taken to govern the processes of evidence and legal proof. Other differences between probabilistim and explanationism, such as those mentioned by Allen and Pardo, are not central to the revolutionary shift, but rather emanate from this basic distinction. Last, it argues that the explanationist paradigm embraces, but cannot be reduced to, the relative plausibility theory; the identification of explanationism with the relative plausibility theory occludes the richness and possibilities harboured by the new, explanationist, paradigm.

A system of circumstantial evidence for fact-finding in criminal trial

2021 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 245-261
Author(s):  
Yong-Sok Ri ◽  
Yong-Min Kwon ◽  
Wi-Song Pang
Keyword(s):  
Logical Structure ◽  
Criminal Trial ◽  
Circumstantial Evidence ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Legal Evidence ◽  
Fact Finding

Abstract One of the most intractable, but significant problems in the theory of legal evidence concerns circumstantial evidence. The diversity and complexity of criminal cases cause some bottlenecks and difficulties in developing reasonable methods to prove the criminal issue by means of circumstantial evidence. The main purpose of this paper is to present more effective methods of fact-finding just by means of a system of circumstantial evidence (SCE). On the basis of analysis of the nature of circumstantial evidence, we find it necessary for the prosecution to construct a SCE in order to make a judge or jury accept the prosecution’s conclusion as the best explanation. We also present a reasonable logical structure of such a system and address some legal and logical problems in introducing it.

The implications of Koehler's approach for fact finding

1996 ◽  
Vol 19 (1) ◽  
pp. 18-18
Author(s):  
Craig R. Callen
Keyword(s):  
Empirical Research ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Fact

AbstractKoehler's work will assist the effort to understand legal fact finding. It leaves two questions somewhat open: (i) the extent to which empirical research can measure correctness of fact-finding, a function that involves the resolution of normative questions and (ii) the standards judges should use in the absence of the research he advocates.

scholarly journals Data Elektronik Sebagai Alat Bukti Yang Sah Dalam Pembuktian Tindak Pidana Pencucian Uang

2019 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 33-46
Author(s):  
Pandoe Pramoe Kartika
Keyword(s):  
Criminal Procedure ◽  
Scientific Work ◽  
Criminal Cases ◽  
Descriptive Data ◽  
Legal Evidence ◽  
Electronic Evidence ◽  
Procedural Law ◽  
Procedure Code ◽  
Qualitative Descriptive ◽  
Legal Proof

The writing of this scientific work is motivated by the difficulty of legal institutions such as the court in carrying out the verification of criminal cases related to Electronic Data. Evidence is fundamental in every criminal case. Therefore, evidence becomes a very decisive thing whether or not a person is convicted. However, the Criminal Procedure Code as a formal law in Indonesia, has not regulated electronic evidence as a legal evidence. The research method used is normative research using a statutory and analytical approach, while data collection through literature studies and interviews and qualitative descriptive data analysis. The results of the study indicate that proof of the ITE Law is lex specialis, because the ITE Law regulates everything that is more specific in the evidentiary law contained in the Criminal Procedure Code. The legal proof of electronic aspect as a legitimate evidence in the case of money laundering is regulated in Article 73 and with the enactment of the ITE Law, it is increasingly emphasized that electronic documentary evidence is a legitimate and recognized evidence in Indonesian procedural law. Penulisan karya ilmiah ini dilatar belakangi oleh sulitnya lembaga hukum seperti pengadilan dalam hal melaksanakan pembuktian perkara pidana yang berhubungan dengan Data Elektronik. Bukti merupakan hal mendasar dalam setiap perkara pidana. Oleh karena itu, alat bukti menjadi hal yang sangat menentukan dapat tidaknya seseorang dipidana. Namun, Kitab Undang-Undang Hukum Acara Pidana sebagai hukum formil di Indonesia, belum mengatur mengenai alat bukti elektronik sebagai alat bukti yang sah. Metode penelitian yang digunakan adalah penelitian normatif dengan menggunakan pendekatan perundang-undangan dan analitis, sedangkan pengumpulan data melalui studi pustaka dan wawancara serta analisis data secara deskriptif kualitatif. Hasil kajian menunjukkan bahwa pembuktian pada UU ITE bersifat lex specialis, dikarenakan UU ITE mengatur segala sesuatu yang lebih spesifik dalam hukum pembuktian yang terdapat di dalam KUHAP. Aspek hukum pembuktian elektronik sebagai alat bukti yang sah dalam kasus tindak pidana pencucian uang diatur dalam Pasal 73 dan dengan diberlakukannya UU ITE semakin dipertegas bahwa alat bukti dokumen elektronik merupakan alat bukti yang sah dan diakui dalam hukum acara Indonesia.

scholarly journals Thin empirics

2019 ◽  
Vol 23 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 82-89 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dan Simon
Keyword(s):  
General Model ◽  
Cognitive Process ◽  
Holistic Processing ◽  
Experimental Paradigm ◽  
Unit Of Analysis ◽  
Empirical Claim ◽  
Story Model ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Fact Finding ◽  
Legal Fact

In the Target Article Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, Ron Allen and Michael Pardo set out to make the empirical claim that Relative Plausibility provides the best account of juridical proof. While I tend to agree with this conclusion, the article suffers from notable weaknesses. Allen and Pardo do not define a unit of analysis, they offer no testable hypotheses, and they present no data–all of which render the empirical claim befuddling. The empirical claim cannot be salvaged by the recruitment of the Story Model. For all its brilliance, the Story Model provides too narrow a foundation to sustain a general model of legal fact-finding. Allen and Pardo’s reliance on holistic processing stands on sounder scientific grounds, but the casual referencing cannot amount to empirical proof. More importantly, Allen and Pardo refrain from reckoning with the implications of holism, and thus ignore both the promise and perils of the cognitive process they espouse. The experimental paradigm of Coherence Based Reasoning reveals a number of such implications. Notably, holism cannot deliver the objectivity and accuracy that Allen and Pardo seem to ascribe to it. Moreover, holistic processing entails a distortion of the evidence, which could lead to dismissing evidence that would otherwise raise a valid doubt, and inflate a hesitant fact-finder’s confidence up to a firm conviction in the defendant’s guilt. Holism also entails vast interconnectivity among the evidence items, which can trigger non-normative inferences and enable extra-evidential information to alter the fact-finder’s perception of correctly-admitted evidence.

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