The Number of Unanimous Witnesses who Identify a Suspect from a Lineup Influences Mock Jurors

<p>During a criminal proceeding, jurors need to weigh up the presented evidence and determine a verdict. Research has shown that witness identification evidence is compelling to jurors, despite the fact that it can be unreliable. How reliable are the combined lineup decisions gathered from multiple witnesses? Generally, the more witnesses who identify the same person from a lineup, the more likely that person is guilty. But recent theoretical evidence suggests that a greater number of witnesses identifying the same person from a biased lineup can indicate that person is actually less likely to be guilty than if there were a smaller number of witnesses identifying that person (Gunn et al., 2016). As the number of agreeing witnesses increases, the more likely that agreement is caused by the lineup bias, rather than consistent witness memories of the crime. In this thesis, I examined how unanimity and lineup bias influenced jurors’ perceptions of guilt. Subjects who saw a biased lineup gave lower ratings of guilt compared to subjects that were shown a lineup that had no obvious bias. In addition, warning subjects that a lineup was biased led them to give lower guilt ratings than subjects who did not receive a warning. Subjects who were told there were two witnesses who identified the police suspect gave higher guilt ratings than subjects who were told there was one witness who identified the police suspect, but only when the lineup was clearly not biased. Subjects’ guilt ratings were not significantly greater in conditions with more than two unanimous witnesses identifying the police suspect. It seems subjects had a limit of certainty based on changes in witness numbers alone. We also found that the way in which witness numbers were presented to subjects influenced guilt ratings. When we presented witnesses coming forward in different groups and on different days, subjects shifted their guilt ratings upwards. When the number of witnesses decreased during the experiment, subjects did not decrease their guilt ratings to the same extent as those subjects in conditions in which the number of witnesses increased by the same magnitude. This finding is consistent with the literature on confirmation bias and the story model of juror decision-making—subjects likely formed an initial belief that the identified suspect was guilty and subsequent evidence was evaluated against that belief (Nickerson, 1988; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). The finding that presenting witnesses coming forward in separate groups increased subjects’ guilt ratings adds to the literature showing that jurors are influenced by irrelevant information presented to them during a proceeding. This research also demonstrates that future research should examine strength of evidence manipulations over multiple levels—rather than as dichotomous “strong” and “weak” extremes.</p>

The Number of Unanimous Witnesses who Identify a Suspect from a Lineup Influences Mock Jurors

<p>During a criminal proceeding, jurors need to weigh up the presented evidence and determine a verdict. Research has shown that witness identification evidence is compelling to jurors, despite the fact that it can be unreliable. How reliable are the combined lineup decisions gathered from multiple witnesses? Generally, the more witnesses who identify the same person from a lineup, the more likely that person is guilty. But recent theoretical evidence suggests that a greater number of witnesses identifying the same person from a biased lineup can indicate that person is actually less likely to be guilty than if there were a smaller number of witnesses identifying that person (Gunn et al., 2016). As the number of agreeing witnesses increases, the more likely that agreement is caused by the lineup bias, rather than consistent witness memories of the crime. In this thesis, I examined how unanimity and lineup bias influenced jurors’ perceptions of guilt. Subjects who saw a biased lineup gave lower ratings of guilt compared to subjects that were shown a lineup that had no obvious bias. In addition, warning subjects that a lineup was biased led them to give lower guilt ratings than subjects who did not receive a warning. Subjects who were told there were two witnesses who identified the police suspect gave higher guilt ratings than subjects who were told there was one witness who identified the police suspect, but only when the lineup was clearly not biased. Subjects’ guilt ratings were not significantly greater in conditions with more than two unanimous witnesses identifying the police suspect. It seems subjects had a limit of certainty based on changes in witness numbers alone. We also found that the way in which witness numbers were presented to subjects influenced guilt ratings. When we presented witnesses coming forward in different groups and on different days, subjects shifted their guilt ratings upwards. When the number of witnesses decreased during the experiment, subjects did not decrease their guilt ratings to the same extent as those subjects in conditions in which the number of witnesses increased by the same magnitude. This finding is consistent with the literature on confirmation bias and the story model of juror decision-making—subjects likely formed an initial belief that the identified suspect was guilty and subsequent evidence was evaluated against that belief (Nickerson, 1988; Pennington & Hastie, 1993). The finding that presenting witnesses coming forward in separate groups increased subjects’ guilt ratings adds to the literature showing that jurors are influenced by irrelevant information presented to them during a proceeding. This research also demonstrates that future research should examine strength of evidence manipulations over multiple levels—rather than as dichotomous “strong” and “weak” extremes.</p>

Critical distance between two irregular adjacent buildings in order to prevent collision during earthquake

The aim of this study is to evaluate the value of suitable distance due to prevent the impact between two irregular adjacent buildings when earthquake is caused to occur large lateral displacement and damage the elements of buildings. For this purpose, by using a mathematical program based on neural network, the number of stories, the period and height of investigated models, PGD, PGV and PGA of earthquake records are defined and the nonlinear lateral displacements of different structures are determined in order to use in the program. Thus, the results of displacements based on all inputs are listed and the minimum critical distance is approximately estimated based on especial regression. For instance, a 3-4 story model is numerically investigated by Tabas earthquake record, which is suggested to provide required gap size about 70 cm. In fact, each model has to observe a 35 cm gap. A newly developed program based on mathematical equations are applied for determining the lateral displacements of each story. A new mathematical formula is proposed by neural network, which shows the least distance between irregular adjacent buildings. For investigating the accuracy of formula, two different ways are performed and the results of analyses confirm suggested equation. For this challenge, a 2-4 story model is considered and three different critical distances are calculated to be 59, 62 and 75 cm which show the last gap size is able to provide safety gap size, determined by suggested formula.

The Story Model of Judicial Decision-Making and Reasoning With Evidence

The argumentative approach, the probability approach, and the story model are the three normative frameworks to reasoning with judicial evidence. The story model describes that judges reach the final conclusion by going through three different stages. The model also offered certainty principles, including evidential coverage, coherence, consistency, plausibility, and structural completeness to evaluate the stories. Different researchers have criticized the story model by pointing out that the model does not elaborate the meaning of evidential coverage and plausibility. Additionally, the story model has also been charged on the ground that it does not guide how to evaluate evidential coverage or plausibility of a story and how to select the best story when judges make more than one story. The present study demonstrates that these shortcomings may be overcome by using anchored narrative theory, causal abductive reasoning, story schemes, critical questions, and principles of inference to the best explanation.

How education can help shape a new story in a post-pandemic world.

Globally, nations are grappling with massive social and economic disruptions and the disparities exposed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The world is in the middle of a wicked problem—one so complex that it is difficult to find a solution. The “Story Model” was developed as a transdisciplinary curriculum model and a collaborative problem-solving model for K to 16. The model can address wicked problems in ways that traditional problem-solving procedures cannot because it allows for messiness, multilayered complexity, and a big picture perspective. With a deeper understanding of the interdependent and interconnected patterns occurring both locally and globally, educators and students alike can contribute actively to shaping a new story that reflects their values, beliefs, and actions.

Thin empirics

In the Target Article Relative Plausibility and Its Critics, Ron Allen and Michael Pardo set out to make the empirical claim that Relative Plausibility provides the best account of juridical proof. While I tend to agree with this conclusion, the article suffers from notable weaknesses. Allen and Pardo do not define a unit of analysis, they offer no testable hypotheses, and they present no data–all of which render the empirical claim befuddling. The empirical claim cannot be salvaged by the recruitment of the Story Model. For all its brilliance, the Story Model provides too narrow a foundation to sustain a general model of legal fact-finding. Allen and Pardo’s reliance on holistic processing stands on sounder scientific grounds, but the casual referencing cannot amount to empirical proof. More importantly, Allen and Pardo refrain from reckoning with the implications of holism, and thus ignore both the promise and perils of the cognitive process they espouse. The experimental paradigm of Coherence Based Reasoning reveals a number of such implications. Notably, holism cannot deliver the objectivity and accuracy that Allen and Pardo seem to ascribe to it. Moreover, holistic processing entails a distortion of the evidence, which could lead to dismissing evidence that would otherwise raise a valid doubt, and inflate a hesitant fact-finder’s confidence up to a firm conviction in the defendant’s guilt. Holism also entails vast interconnectivity among the evidence items, which can trigger non-normative inferences and enable extra-evidential information to alter the fact-finder’s perception of correctly-admitted evidence.