Empathy: A unitary circuit or a set of dissociable neuro-cognitive systems?

2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Blair ◽  
Karina S. Perschardt
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
Neural Responses ◽  
Neuroimaging Data

We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.

scholarly journals Evidence of assortative mating for Theory of Mind via facial expressions but not language

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emily Jackson ◽  
John Galvin ◽  
Varun Warrier ◽  
Simon Baron-Cohen ◽  
Shanhong Luo ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Assortative Mating ◽  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Social Stratification ◽  
Online Survey ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Romantic Partners ◽  
Heterosexual Couples ◽  
Partner Similarity ◽  
The Mind

Assortative mating (AM) is a phenomenon in which romantic partners typically resemble each other at a level greater than chance. There is converging evidence that social behaviours are subject to AM, though less is known regarding social cognition. Social functioning requires the ability to identify and understand the mental states of others, i.e., Theory of Mind (ToM). The present study recruited a sample of 102 heterosexual couples via an online survey to test if ToM as measured using facial expressions (Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test) or language (Stiller-Dunbar Stories Task) is associated with AM. Results showed existence of AM for ToM via facial expressions, though no such effect for ToM via language. AM for ToM via facial expressions was not moderated by length of relationship nor by partner similarity in age, educational attainment, or religiosity, all variables relevant to social stratification. This suggests AM for ToM via facial expressions is better explained by partners being alike at the start of their relationship (initial assortment) rather than becoming similar through sustained social interaction (convergence), and by people seeking out partners that are like themselves (active assortment) rather than simply pairing with those from similar demographic backgrounds (social homogamy).

scholarly journals Understanding Individual Differences in Theory of Mind via Representation of Minds, Not Mental States; Conway, Catmur & Bird.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Conway ◽  
Caroline Catmur ◽  
Geoff Bird
Keyword(s):  
Individual Differences ◽  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Cognitive Systems ◽  
State Representation ◽  
Social Stimuli ◽  
Group Relations ◽  
Limited Success ◽  
Human Ability ◽  
Clinical Conditions

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented as vectors in a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, inter-group relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

What you morph is not what you get: Subjective and neural responses to facial expressions of emotion depend on perceived intensity/arousal (not on amount of morphing)

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Fernando Ferreira-Santos ◽  
Mariana R. Pereira ◽  
Tiago O. Paiva ◽  
Pedro R. Almeida ◽  
Eva C. Martins ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Electrophysiological Study ◽  
Objective Measure ◽  
Event Related Potential ◽  
Supporting Evidence ◽  
Emotional Intensity ◽  
Neural Responses ◽  
Facial Stimuli ◽  
Facial Expressions Of Emotion ◽  
Processing Techniques

The behavioral and electrophysiological study of the emotional intensity of facial expressions of emotions has relied on image processing techniques termed ‘morphing’ to generate realistic facial stimuli in which emotional intensity can be manipulated. This is achieved by blending neutral and emotional facial displays and treating the percent of morphing between the two stimuli as an objective measure of emotional intensity. Here we argue that the percentage of morphing between stimuli does not provide an objective measure of emotional intensity and present supporting evidence from affective ratings and neural (event-related potential) responses. We show that 50% morphs created from high or moderate arousal stimuli differ in subjective and neural responses in a sensible way: 50% morphs are perceived as having approximately half of the emotional intensity of the original stimuli, but if the original stimuli differed in emotional intensity to begin with, then so will the morphs. We suggest a re-examination of previous studies that used percentage of morphing as a measure of emotional intensity and highlight the value of more careful experimental control of emotional stimuli and inclusion of proper manipulation checks.

Sources of cognitive conflict and their relevance to Theory of Mind proficiency in healthy ageing. A preregistered study.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Foyzul Rahman ◽  
Sabrina Javed ◽  
Ian Apperly ◽  
Peter Hansen ◽  
Carol Holland ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Executive Control ◽  
Spatial Working Memory ◽  
Age Groups ◽  
Response Speed ◽  
Cognitive Conflict ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Younger Adults ◽  
Age Related ◽  
Outcome Knowledge

Age-related decline in Theory of Mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about others’ mental states. We assessed how older (OA; n=50) versus younger adults (YA; n=50) were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and motor response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through conflicting Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.

DISCOURSE ON FAILURE OF INTELLIGENCE: A THEORY OF MIND PERSPECTIVE

2018 ◽  
Vol 3 (2) ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Elena Botts
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Psychological Processes ◽  
Mind Theory ◽  
Improve Analysis ◽  
Epistemic Process

This article aims at explicating that can we usefully talk about a failure of intelligence and deliberating the perspective of mind theory into it. Failures of intelligence are useful insofar as they can be evaluated so as to improve analysis. In this process, it is important that one considers the psychological processes that underpin analytical failures. It is especially important to consider how failures of intelligence are governed by an insufficient ability to understand the perspectives of others. This ability to determine others mental states is known as the theory of mind. This paper further argues that discourse on the failure of intelligence is increased because of a flaw in the epistemic process among intelligence operators and consumers.

Thinking about Things

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Mark Sainsbury
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Semantic Description ◽  
President Obama ◽  
Representational Theory Of Mind

In the blink of an eye, I can redirect my thought from London to Cairo, from cookies to unicorns, from former President Obama to the mythical flying horse, Pegasus. How is this possible? How can we think about things that do not exist, like unicorns and Pegasus? Thinking About Things addresses these and related questions, taking as its framework a representational theory of mind. It explains how mental states are attributed, what their aboutness consists in, whether or not they are relational, and whether any of them involve nonexistent things like unicorns. The explanation centers on display theory, a theory of what is involved in attributing attitudes like thinking, hoping, and wanting. These attributions are intensional: some of them seem to involve nonexistent things, and they typically have semantic and logical peculiarities, like the fact that one cannot always substitute one expression for another that refers to the same thing without affecting truth. Display theory explains away these seeming anomalies. For example, substituting coreferring expressions does not always preserve truth because the correctness of an attribution depends on what concepts it displays, not on what the concepts refer to. And a concept that refers to nothing may be used in an accurate display of what someone is thinking. The book describes how concepts can be learned, originated, and given a systematic semantic description, independently of whether there exist things to which they refer. There being no things we are thinking about does not mean that we are not thinking about things.

Do people with schizophrenia display theory of mind deficits in clinical interactions?

2004 ◽  
Vol 34 (3) ◽  
pp. 401-412 ◽  
Author(s):  
R. McCABE ◽  
I. LEUDAR ◽  
C. ANTAKI
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Health Professionals ◽  
Negative Symptoms ◽  
Experimental Studies ◽  
Chronic Schizophrenia ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Behaviour Therapy ◽  
Cognitive Behaviour ◽  
Clinical Interactions ◽  
Therapy Sessions

Background. Having a ‘theory of mind’ (ToM) means that one appreciates one's own and others' mental states, and that this appreciation guides interactions with others. It has been proposed that ToM is impaired in schizophrenia and experimental studies show that patients with schizophrenia have problems with ToM, particularly during acute episodes. The model predicts that communicative problems will result from ToM deficits.Method. We analysed 35 encounters (>80 h of recordings) between mental health professionals and people with chronic schizophrenia (out-patient consultations and cognitive behaviour therapy sessions) using conversation analysis in order to identify how the participants used or failed to use ToM relevant skills in social interaction.Results. Schizophrenics with ongoing positive and negative symptoms appropriately reported first and second order mental states of others and designed their contributions to conversations on the basis of what they thought their communicative partners knew and intended. Patients recognized that others do not share their delusions and attempted to reconcile others' beliefs with their own but problems arose when they try to warrant their delusional claims. They did not make the justification for their claim understandable for their interlocutor. Nevertheless, they did not fail to recognize that the justification for their claim is unconvincing. However, the ensuing disagreement did not lead them to modify their beliefs.Conclusions. Individuals with schizophrenia demonstrated intact ToM skills in conversational interactions. Psychotic beliefs persisted despite the realization they are not shared but not because patients cannot reflect on them and compare them with what others believe.

Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology

1980 ◽  
Vol 3 (1) ◽  
pp. 63-73 ◽  
Author(s):  
J. A. Fodor
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Propositional Attitudes ◽  
Mental States ◽  
Research Strategy ◽  
Computational Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Processes ◽  
Computational Theory ◽  
Methodological Solipsism ◽  
Semantic Properties

AbstractThe paper explores the distinction between two doctrines, both of which inform theory construction in much of modern cognitive psychology: the representational theory of mind and the computational theory of mind. According to the former, propositional attitudes are to be construed as relations that organisms bear to mental representations. According to the latter, mental processes have access only to formal (nonsemantic) properties of the mental representations over which they are defined.The following claims are defended: (1) That the traditional dispute between “rational” and “naturalistic” psychology is plausibly viewed as an argument about the status of the computational theory of mind. Rational psychologists accept a formality condition on the specification of mental processes; naturalists do not. (2) That to accept the formality condition is to endorse a version of methodological solipsism. (3) That the acceptance of some such condition is warranted, at least for that part of psychology which concerns itself with theories of the mental causation of behavior. This is because: (4) such theories require nontransparent taxonomies of mental states; and (5) nontransparent taxonomies individuate mental states without reference to their semantic properties. Equivalently, (6) nontransparent taxonomies respect the way that the organism represents the object of its propositional attitudes to itself, and it is this representation which functions in the causation of behavior.The final section of the paper considers the prospect for a naturalistic psychology: one which defines its generalizations over relations between mental representations and their environmental causes, thus seeking to account for the semantic properties of propositional attitudes. Two related arguments are proposed, both leading to the conclusion that no such research strategy is likely to prove fruitful.

scholarly journals Effects of a α2C-Adrenoreceptor Gene Polymorphism on Neural Responses to Facial Expressions in Depression

2006 ◽  
Vol 31 (8) ◽  
pp. 1750-1756 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alexander Neumeister ◽  
Wayne C Drevets ◽  
Inna Belfer ◽  
David A Luckenbaugh ◽  
Shannan Henry ◽  
...  
Keyword(s):  
Gene Polymorphism ◽  
Facial Expressions ◽  
Neural Responses
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