scholarly journals Understanding Individual Differences in Theory of Mind via Representation of Minds, Not Mental States; Conway, Catmur & Bird.

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jane Conway ◽  
Caroline Catmur ◽  
Geoff Bird

The human ability to make inferences about the minds of conspecifics is remarkable. The majority of work in this area focuses on mental state representation (‘theory of mind’), but has had limited success in explaining individual differences in this ability, and is characterized by the lack of a theoretical framework that can account for variability in the population of minds to which individuals are exposed. We draw analogies between faces and minds as complex social stimuli, and suggest that theoretical and empirical progress on understanding the mechanisms underlying mind representation can be achieved by adopting a ‘Mind-space’ framework; that minds, like faces, are represented as vectors in a multidimensional psychological space. This Mind-space framework can accommodate the representation of whole cognitive systems, and may help to explain individual differences in the consistency and accuracy with which the mental states of others are inferred. Mind-space may also have relevance for understanding human development, inter-group relations, and the atypical social cognition seen in several clinical conditions.

2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marlene Berke ◽  
Julian Jara-Ettinger

Human Theory of Mind enables us to attribute mental states like beliefs and desires based on how other people act. However, in many social interactions (particularly ones that lack observable action), people also directly think about other people's thinking. Here we present a computational framework, Bayesian inverse reasoning, for thinking about other people's thoughts. Our framework formalizes inferences about thinking by inferring a generative model of reasoning decisions and computational processes, structured around a principle of rational mental effort --- the idea that people expect other agents to allocate thinking rationally. We show that this model quantitatively predicts human judgements in a task where participants must infer the mental causes behind an agent's pauses as they navigate and solve a maze. Our results contribute to our understanding of the richness of the human ability to think about other minds, and to even think about thinking itself.


Author(s):  
Brooke Sinclair

Depression is associated with pervasive impairments in social and interpersonal functioning. Research demonstrates that individuals with depression have difficulty interacting with peers and show lower levels of social activity than do nondepressed individuals (Levendosky, Okun, & Parker, 1995). In addition, depressed individuals report that their social interactions are less supportive and less rewarding than those of non‐depressed individuals (Nezlek, Hamptom, & Shean, 2000). This reduced social competence may cause depressed individuals to disengage from social interaction, which may in turn exacerbate their state of depression (Rippere, 1980). It is thus important to understand and identify the mechanisms beneath these deficits.  Researchers commonly use the theory of mind framework to understand impaired social functioning in clinical conditions. Theory of mind refers to the ability to make judgments about others’ mental states to understand and predict their social behaviour. Research has found a relationship between theory of mind and dysphoria (i.e., elevated scores on a measure of depression symptoms, but not necessarily a diagnosis of clinical depression). Specifically, dysphoric individuals demonstrate enhanced mental state judgments (Harkness, Sabbagh, Jacobson, Chowdrey, & Chen, 2005).  My research investigates social motivation as an underlying mechanism for dysphoric individuals’ enhanced decoding ability. A sample of undergraduates will participate in a theory of mind decoding task following social, monetary or no motivation. I hypothesize that dysphoric individuals will make significantly more accurate judgments than non‐dysphoric individuals. Further, I predict that social motivation will enhance non‐dysphoric individuals’ sensitivity to others’ mental states.


2002 ◽  
Vol 25 (1) ◽  
pp. 27-28 ◽  
Author(s):  
James R. Blair ◽  
Karina S. Perschardt

We question whether empathy is mediated by a unitary circuit. We argue that recent neuroimaging data indicate dissociable neural responses for different facial expressions as well as for representing others' mental states (Theory of Mind, TOM). We also argue that the general empathy disorder considered characteristic of autism and psychopathy is not general but specific for each disorder.


2008 ◽  
Vol 22 (4) ◽  
pp. 323-335 ◽  
Author(s):  
Daniel Nettle ◽  
Bethany Liddle

We hypothesise on a number of grounds that the personality dimension of Agreeableness may be associated with inter‐individual differences in theory of mind (ToM) functioning. However, it is important to distinguish social‐perceptual from social‐cognitive ToM. Previous findings on ToM in psychopathic individuals, sex differences in ToM and the associations between ToM and social relationships, all suggest that social‐cognitive ToM is more likely than social‐perceptual ToM to relate to Agreeableness. In separate empirical studies, we find that Agreeableness is substantially correlated with social‐cognitive ToM performance, but uncorrelated with social‐perceptual ToM performance. We suggest that the propensity or motivation to attend to the mental states of others may be central to the personality dimension of Agreeableness. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.


2019 ◽  
Vol 46 (4) ◽  
pp. 559-571
Author(s):  
Lily Tsoi ◽  
Katherine McAuliffe

Early in human development, children react negatively to receiving less than others, and only later do they show a similar aversion to receiving more. We tested whether theory of mind (ToM) can account for this developmental shift we see in middle childhood. We conducted a face-to-face fairness task that involved a ToM manipulation, measured individual differences in ToM, and collected parent-ratings of children’s empathy, a construct related to ToM. We find that greater ToM capacities lead to more rejections of unequal offers, regardless of the direction of inequality, demonstrating that children with greater ToM are more likely to engage in costly compliance with fairness norms. Moreover, drawing attention to mental states sufficiently elicits aversion to advantageous inequity in younger children. These findings contribute to our growing understanding that people’s concerns for fairness rely not just on their own thoughts and beliefs but on the thoughts, beliefs, and expectations of others.


2021 ◽  
Vol 12 ◽  
Author(s):  
Marta Zammuto ◽  
Cristina Ottaviani ◽  
Fiorenzo Laghi ◽  
Antonia Lonigro

Theory of mind (ToM) is the human ability to infer the mental states of others in order to understand their behaviors and plan own actions. In the past decades, accumulating evidence has shown that heart rate variability (HRV), an index of parasympathetic control of the heart, is linked to behavioral regulation, social competence, and social cognition abilities, all implicated—to some extent—in ToM. This study aims to systematically review and meta-analyze the available studies, investigating the relation between ToM and HRV in typically developing people. Six studies were eligible for the meta-analysis, yielding a significant association between HRV and ToM of a small-to-medium effect size (g = 0.44). This result was not influenced by publication bias. Due to the small number of studies eligible for the meta-analysis, it was not possible to test for the effect of categorical moderators. The moderating role of sex and quality of the studies was examined by meta-regression analysis. Moderation analysis did not yield any significant effect; however, at a descriptive level, studies yielding the largest effect size were characterized by the use of high frequency-HRV assessment at rest and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test to evaluate ToM abilities. The results preliminarily suggest that tonic HRV might be used as an indicator of the ability to understand the content of mind of others.


Reading Minds ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 1-9
Author(s):  
Henry M. Wellman

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the vital human ability of reading minds. Every day, people try to get into the minds of other people. They observe their words and actions to figure out their thoughts, feelings, hopes, and intentions. People can also read, interpret, and communicate their own mental states. This everyday, ordinary mind reading is something people begin to learn in infancy. Indeed, researchers have found its beginnings in babies only ten or twelve months old. The chapter then presents the idea of “theory of mind,” which pervades all of childhood development and allows us to read minds. It also briefly considers individuals with autism, providing a look at what it might be like to live without a theory of mind and without mind reading.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (6) ◽  
pp. 599-613 ◽  
Author(s):  
Timothy A. Allen ◽  
Amanda R. Rueter ◽  
Samantha V. Abram ◽  
James S. Brown ◽  
Colin G. Deyoung ◽  
...  

Theory of mind, or mentalizing, defined as the ability to reason about another's mental states, is a crucial psychological function that is disrupted in some forms of psychopathology, but little is known about how individual differences in this ability relate to personality or brain function. One previous study linked mentalizing ability to individual differences in the personality trait Agreeableness. Agreeableness encompasses two major subdimensions: Compassion reflects tendencies toward empathy, prosocial behaviour, and interpersonal concern, whereas Politeness captures tendencies to suppress aggressive and exploitative impulses. We hypothesized that Compassion but not Politeness would be associated with better mentalizing ability. This hypothesis was confirmed in Study 1 ( N = 329) using a theory of mind task that required reasoning about the beliefs of fictional characters. Post hoc analyses indicated that the honesty facet of Agreeableness was negatively associated with mentalizing. In Study 2 ( N = 217), we examined whether individual differences in mentalizing and related traits were associated with patterns of resting–state functional connectivity in the brain. Performance on the theory of mind task was significantly associated with patterns of connectivity between the dorsal medial and core subsystems of the default network, consistent with evidence implicating these regions in mentalization. Copyright © 2017 European Association of Personality Psychology


2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Foyzul Rahman ◽  
Sabrina Javed ◽  
Ian Apperly ◽  
Peter Hansen ◽  
Carol Holland ◽  
...  

Age-related decline in Theory of Mind (ToM) may be due to waning executive control, which is necessary for resolving conflict when reasoning about others’ mental states. We assessed how older (OA; n=50) versus younger adults (YA; n=50) were affected by three theoretically relevant sources of conflict within ToM: competing Self-Other perspectives; competing cued locations and outcome knowledge. We examined which best accounted for age-related difficulty with ToM. Our data show unexpected similarity between age groups when representing a belief incongruent with one’s own. Individual differences in attention and motor response speed best explained the degree of conflict experienced through conflicting Self-Other perspectives. However, OAs were disproportionately affected by managing conflict between cued locations. Age and spatial working memory were most relevant for predicting the magnitude of conflict elicited by conflicting cued locations. We suggest that previous studies may have underestimated OA’s ToM proficiency by including unnecessary conflict in ToM tasks.


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