Triadic bodily mimesis is the difference

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 720-721 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jordan Zlatev ◽  
Tomas Persson ◽  
Peter Gärdenfors
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Public Language ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Motor Experience ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Sensory Motor ◽  
The Difference

We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.

scholarly journals Neuronal Coherence Agent for Shared Intentionality: A Hypothesis of Neurobiological Processes Occurring during Social Interaction

2021 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 1-1
Author(s):  
Igor Val Danilov ◽  
◽  
Sandra Mihailova ◽  
Keyword(s):  
Social Interaction ◽  
Case Studies ◽  
Present Report ◽  
Biological Systems ◽  
Long Term Potentiation ◽  
Evolutionary Development ◽  
Entire Group ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Neuronal Coherence

The present interdisciplinary study discusses the physical foundations of the neurobiological processes occurring during social interaction. The review of the literature establishes the difference between Intentionality and Intention, thereby proposing the theoretical basis of Shared Intentionality in humans. According to the present study, Shared Intentionality in humans (Goal-directed coherence of biological systems), which is the ability among social organisms to instantly select just one stimulus for the entire group, is the outcome of evolutionary development. Therefore, this interaction modality should be the preferred, archetypal, and most propagated modality in organisms, attributed to the Model of Hierarchical Complexity Stage 3. This characteristic of biological systems facilitates the training of the new members of the group and also ensures efficient cooperation among the members of the group without requiring communication. In humans, Shared Intentionality contributes to the learning of newborns. The neurons of a mature organism may teach the neonate neurons regarding the fitting reactions to the excitatory inputs of the specific structural organization. This enables the neonate neurons to develop a Long-Term Potentiation that links particular stimuli with specific embodied sensorimotor neural networks. The present report discusses three possible neuronal coherence agents that could involve quantum mechanisms in cells, thereby enabling the distribution of the quality of goal-directed coherence in biological systems (Shared Intentionality in humans). Recently reported case studies conducted online with the task of conveying the meaning of numerosity to the children of age 18–33 months revealed the occurrence of Shared Intentionality in mother-child dyads in the absence of sensory cues between the two, which promoted cognitive development in the children. The findings of these case studies support the concept of physical foundations and the hypothesis of the neurophysiological process of social interaction proposed in the present study.

Embodied meaning and negative priming

2003 ◽  
Vol 26 (5) ◽  
pp. 644-647 ◽  
Author(s):  
Arthur M. Glenberg ◽  
David A. Robertson ◽  
Michael P. Kaschak ◽  
Alan J. Malter
Keyword(s):  
Recent Work ◽  
Negative Priming ◽  
Perception And Action ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Target Article ◽  
Embodied Meaning ◽  
Standard Models

Standard models of cognition are built from abstract, amodal, arbitrary symbols, and the meanings of those symbols are given solely by their interrelations. The target article (Glenberg 1997t) argues that these models must be inadequate because meaning cannot arise from relations among abstract symbols. For cognitive representations to be meaningful they must, at the least, be grounded; but abstract symbols are difficult, if not impossible, to ground. As an alternative, the target article developed a framework in which representations are grounded in perception and action, and hence are embodied. Recent work (Glenberg & Robertson 1999; 2000; Glenberg & Kaschak 2002; Kaschak & Glenberg 2000) extends this framework to language.

Two joints are more than twice one joint

1995 ◽  
Vol 18 (4) ◽  
pp. 779-780
Author(s):  
Jeroen B. J. Smeets
Keyword(s):  
Target Article ◽  
The Difference

AbstractAn alternative multi-joint extension to the lambda model is proposed. According to this extension, the activity of a muscle depends not only on the difference between lambda and length of that muscle, but also on the difference between lambda and length of other muscles. This 2-D extension can describe more neurophysiological experiments than the extension proposed in the target article.

Understanding and sharing intentions: The origins of cultural cognition

2005 ◽  
Vol 28 (5) ◽  
pp. 675-691 ◽  
Author(s):  
Michael Tomasello ◽  
Malinda Carpenter ◽  
Josep Call ◽  
Tanya Behne ◽  
Henrike Moll
Keyword(s):  
Social Institutions ◽  
Human Cognition ◽  
Cultural Learning ◽  
Cultural Cognition ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Psychological States ◽  
Shared Intentionality ◽  
Crucial Difference ◽  
Intentional Agents ◽  
Collaborative Activities

We propose that the crucial difference between human cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative activities with shared goals and intentions: shared intentionality. Participation in such activities requires not only especially powerful forms of intention reading and cultural learning, but also a unique motivation to share psychological states with others and unique forms of cognitive representation for doing so. The result of participating in these activities is species-unique forms of cultural cognition and evolution, enabling everything from the creation and use of linguistic symbols to the construction of social norms and individual beliefs to the establishment of social institutions. In support of this proposal we argue and present evidence that great apes (and some children with autism) understand the basics of intentional action, but they still do not participate in activities involving joint intentions and attention (shared intentionality). Human children's skills of shared intentionality develop gradually during the first 14 months of life as two ontogenetic pathways intertwine: (1) the general ape line of understanding others as animate, goal-directed, and intentional agents; and (2) a species-unique motivation to share emotions, experience, and activities with other persons. The developmental outcome is children's ability to construct dialogic cognitive representations, which enable them to participate in earnest in the collectivity that is human cognition.

Knowledge

2019 ◽  
pp. 58-91
Author(s):  
Paul Thagard
Keyword(s):  
Theory Of Mind ◽  
Mental Representations ◽  
Social Dimensions ◽  
Neural Firing ◽  
Motor Experience ◽  
The World ◽  
Sensory Motor

For the semantic pointer theory of mind, the bearers of knowledge are not abstract propositions but rather patterns of neural firing that constitute mental representations, including concepts, beliefs, nonverbal rules, images, and emotions. This neurocognitive perspective suggests new answers for questions about the generation of candidates for knowledge and their relations to the world via sensory-motor interactions. Semantic pointers support knowledge that beliefs are true or false, how to do things using multimodal rules, and of things via sensory-motor experience. The Semantic Pointer Architecture meshes well with coherence-based justification that abandons foundational certainty for fallible attempts to fit diverse elements of knowledge into the best overall explanation. Knowledge has important social dimensions.

Emergence of vocal alternation in mother-infant interchanges

1988 ◽  
Vol 15 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-235 ◽  
Author(s):  
G. P. Ginsburg ◽  
Brock K. Kilbourne
Keyword(s):  
Prior Work ◽  
Early Emergence ◽  
Sensory Motor ◽  
The Difference

ABSTRACTMicroanalyses of unstructured videotaped interactions of three mother-infant dyads revealed dramatic shifts in dyadic vocalization patterns from primarily overlapping to primarily alternating. Maximal overlapping vocalization appeared between 7 and 13 weeks for the different dyads, and subsequent alternation predominance peaked between 12 and 18 weeks. The findings are compared with prior work which had not found alternation predominance and reasons for the difference are suggested. The early emergence of a sequence of predominantly overlapping vocalization followed by predominantly alternating vocalization may be linked to the concomitant development of multimodal sensory-sensory and sensory-motor integration. If so, then the emergent patterns reflect increased potential for co-ordination within the dyad, which may be capitalized upon by the mother and by the infant.

scholarly journals Why Bilateral Damage Is Worse than Unilateral Damage to the Brain

2013 ◽  
Vol 25 (12) ◽  
pp. 2107-2123 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna C. Schapiro ◽  
James L. McClelland ◽  
Stephen R. Welbourne ◽  
Timothy T. Rogers ◽  
Matthew A. Lambon Ralph
Keyword(s):  
Relative Magnitude ◽  
Striking Difference ◽  
Feedforward Networks ◽  
Intact Side ◽  
Computational Explanation ◽  
Sensory Motor ◽  
Lesion Studies ◽  
The Difference ◽  
Bilateral Lesions ◽  
The Brain

Human and animal lesion studies have shown that behavior can be catastrophically impaired after bilateral lesions but that unilateral damage often produces little or no effect, even controlling for lesion extent. This pattern is found across many different sensory, motor, and memory domains. Despite these findings, there has been no systematic, computational explanation. We found that the same striking difference between unilateral and bilateral damage emerged in a distributed, recurrent attractor neural network. The difference persists in simple feedforward networks, where it can be understood in explicit quantitative terms. In essence, damage both distorts and reduces the magnitude of relevant activity in each hemisphere. Unilateral damage reduces the relative magnitude of the contribution to performance of the damaged side, allowing the intact side to dominate performance. In contrast, balanced bilateral damage distorts representations on both sides, which contribute equally, resulting in degraded performance. The model's ability to account for relevant patient data suggests that mechanisms similar to those in the model may operate in the brain.

Is there Even a Grammar of Music ?

1998 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 55-65 ◽  
Author(s):  
Douglas Dempster
Keyword(s):  
Cognitive Functions ◽  
Music Cognition ◽  
Aesthetic Theory ◽  
Cognitive Representations ◽  
Regular Structures ◽  
Musical Structures ◽  
The Difference

Does the music that we know have a language-like semantics? I argue that mere agreement among auditors about their cognitive representations and descriptions of music doesn't give grounds for attributing meaning to music. I also argue that music does not have a language-like semantics not because it fails to be robustly referential, but because musical structures are not genuine grammars. The reason is that while music typically has very elaborate and regular structures - much like language - these structures do not apparently originate from nor are they in the service of the need to encode meanings - exactly unlike language. Nonetheless, the difference between languages and music is more a matter of degree than of kind. In other words, we can imagine transforming what we now call music into a language; if, by some strange necessity, music were pressed into service on a day-to day basis for the purposes of comprehension and communication, then it could without much trouble become a language. But we would very likely no longer regard the strangely melodious utterances of such a language to be real music once it came to serve, in a quite transparent way, its pragmatic communicative and cognitive functions. I explain these views as a consequence of an old-fashioned aesthetic theory of music cognition as newly formulated by Raffman (1993).

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