Body image and body schema: The shared representation of body image and the role of dynamic body schema in perspective and imitation

2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessia Tessari ◽  
Anna M. Borghi

AbstractOur commentary addresses two issues that are not developed enough in the target article. First, the model does not clearly address the distinction among external objects, external body parts, and internal bodies. Second, the authors could have discussed further the role of body schema with regard to its dynamic character, and its role in perspective and in imitation.

Perception ◽  
10.1068/p5853 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1547-1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Pavani ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini

When a hand (either real or fake) is stimulated in synchrony with our own hand concealed from view, the felt position of our own hand can be biased toward the location of the seen hand. This intriguing phenomenon relies on the brain's ability to detect statistical correlations in the multisensory inputs (ie visual, tactile, and proprioceptive), but it is also modulated by the pre-existing representation of one's own body. Nonetheless, researchers appear to have accepted the assumption that the size of the seen hand does not matter for this illusion to occur. Here we used a real-time video image of the participant's own hand to elicit the illusion, but we varied the hand size in the video image so that the seen hand was either reduced, veridical, or enlarged in comparison to the participant's own hand. The results showed that visible-hand size modulated the illusion, which was present for veridical and enlarged images of the hand, but absent when the visible hand was reduced. These findings indicate that very specific aspects of our own body image (ie hand size) can constrain the multisensory modulation of the body schema highlighted by the fake-hand illusion paradigm. In addition, they suggest an asymmetric tendency to acknowledge enlarged (but not reduced) images of body parts within our body representation.


Body schema refers to the system of sensory-motor functions that enables control of the position of body parts in space, without conscious awareness of those parts. Body image refers to a conscious representation of the way the body appears—a set of conscious perceptions, affective attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own bodily image. In 2005, Shaun Gallagher published an influential book entitled ‘How the Body Shapes the Mind’. This book not only defined both body schema (BS) and body image (BI), but also explored the complicated relationship between the two. The book also established the idea that there is a double dissociation, whereby body schema and body image refer to two different, but closely related, systems. Given that many kinds of pathological cases can be described in terms of body schema and body image (phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia, schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder, among others), we might expect to find a growing consensus about these concepts and the relevant neural activities connected to these systems. Instead, an examination of the scientific literature reveals continued ambiguity and disagreement. This volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a lively and productive dialogue. It explores fundamental questions about the relationship between body schema and body image, and addresses ongoing debates about the role of the brain and the role of social and cultural factors in our understanding of embodiment.


2012 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 157-165
Author(s):  
Sally Gardner

Drawing on experiences that have entailed watching and learning forms of so-called ‘Indian dance’ (Bharata Natyam and Odissi), and watching Odissi dancers performing in various locations in Orissa’s ‘sacred triangle’ (Puri, Konark, Bhubaneswar), and against my own background in contemporary dance, I propose that the difference of the Odissi body is that the dancer dances with his or her feet in more than one kingdom – that is, he or she maintains a link between human bodies and the bodies of plants. Such a perception can help to displace questions of the dancer’s spatiality and representations, challenging western or westernized visions of the industrial or mechanical body, assumed hierarchies of body parts and their signifying powers, and assumptions about the role of the joints. The sense of a botanical imaginary or specific cultural body-schema at work in Odissi dance is supported by discussion of historical and ethnographic literature pertaining to the (former) female dancers of the Jagannath Temple in Puri; the temple’s links with Oriyan tribal cultures; the dancers’ traditional importance according to an axis of social auspiciousness/inauspiciousness as opposed to social purity/impurity; and the particular processes of the reconstruction of Odissi dance (separate from that of Bharata natyam) after independence.


Author(s):  
Denisa Butnaru

Body image and body schema are two phenomenological concepts which generated a revival of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical heritage. In the present text I intend to inquire on the relation between these two concepts and that of Logos of life, another challenging point in the Merleau-Pontyan thought.In order to delineate the correlation between body schema, body image and my understanding of a logic of life, I will first explore how what I term “schematism of the body” is connected to an inherent model of life and living and how this schematism is reflected in the body image. I will turn further to the relation between body and world and highlight how the life of the body defines itself as meaningful in the context of both the surrounding world (Umwelt) and the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). In a third part of my analysis I shall point out how the relation between body schematism and motile intentionality redefines corporeal inten-tionality. I shall conclude by noting the role of the Logos of life, through which corporeity, in its position of meaning project, is instituted as body schematism.Los conceptos fenomenológicos de imagen corporal y esquema corporal han dado lugar a un resurgimiento del legado filosófico de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. En este texto pretendo investigar la relación entre estos dos conceptos y el de Logos de la vida, otro elemento estimulante del pensamiento Merleau-Pontiano.Con el fin de trazar la correlación entre es-quema corporal, imagen corporal y mi interpretación de la lógica de la vida, exploraré en pri-mer lugar cómo el término “esquematismo del cuerpo” está conectado con un modelo inheren-te de vida y de vivir, y cómo este esquematis-mo se refleja en la imagen corporal. Consideraré después la relación entre cuerpo y mundo y remarcaré cómo la vida del cuerpo se define como significativa en el contexto tanto del mundo circundante (Umwelt) como del mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). En la tercera parte de mi análisis señalaré cómo la relación entre esquematismo corporal e intencionalidad moto-ra redefine la intencionalidad corporal. Concluiré destacando el papel del Logos de la vida, a través del cual la corporeidad, en su posición de proyecto significativo, se instituye como esquematismo corpora


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Galli ◽  
Justine J. Reel ◽  
Hester Henderson ◽  
Nicole Detling

The purpose of this study was twofold: (a) to explore the body image of athletes with physical disabilities, and (b) to understand how sport influences body image among these athletes. We interviewed 20 male and female athletes (Mage = 34.25, SD = 8.49) from a variety of sports regarding their body image and the role of sport in influencing body image. A thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to generate six themes: (a) personal significance of injury and disability, (b) noncentrality of the body and disability, (c) positive influence of sport on body esteem, (d) social factors influencing body-related emotions and perceptions, (e) body critiques and preferences, and (f) positive thoughts and emotions about the body. Sport seemed to be an important vehicle for experiencing body-related pride, and athletes expressed an intimate connection with the body parts that enabled them to physically compete.


Author(s):  
Emanuelle Francine Detogni Schmit ◽  
Ana Paula Rodrigues ◽  
Catiane Souza ◽  
Cláudia Tarragô Candotti ◽  
Jefferson Fagundes Loss

DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1980-0037.2017v19n2p214 A body schema is a cortical representation of the spatial relations of body parts. It can be evaluated using the Image Marking Procedure (IMP). However, that instrument lacks information regarding its reliability and a standardized set of procedures. The aim of this study was to test the repeatability and intra-rater reproducibility of an adapted IMP. Methods: It consisted of two steps: (1) adaptation of the instrument; (2) verification of its reliability. Sixty-five young adult women were evaluated on two different days by a single rater, with a one-week interval between evaluations. Three consecutive measurements were performed on each day. Regarding repeatability, for all the variables (coordinates, distances and area), the ICC scores were classified as excellent, with low SEM (<4.5cm) and MDC (<8.5cm) values. Regarding intra-rater reproducibility, only the variables area and distance between the trochanters presented ICC> 0.6. The adapted IMP needs to be conducted only once. Regarding reproducibility, the variables apt for use are the area within the points and the distance between the trochanters. In contrast to the original IMP test, in this adapted version we do not recommend the use of the distances between the shoulders, the hip/waist or the top of the head in relation to the ground.


Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont

This chapter considers the relationship between body representations, action, and bodily experiences. It first clarifies the conceptual landscape of body representations and stresses the conceptual and empirical difficulties that the current body schema/body image taxonomy faces, difficulties that can be explained by their constant interaction but not only. There is indeed a lack of precise understanding of the functional role of the body schema as opposed to the body image. Instead of these unclear notions, the chapter proposes distinguishing different types of body representations on the basis of their direction of fit and of their spatial organization. On the one hand, there is a purely descriptive body map that represents well-segmented categorical body parts, in which one can localize one’s sensations. On the other hand, there is a body map that is both descriptive and directive (i.e. pushmi-pullyu representation), and that encodes structural bodily affordances for action planning and control.


Author(s):  
Minoru Asada

Proprioception is our ability to sense the position of our own limbs and other body parts in space, and body schema is a body representation that allows both biological and artificial agents to execute their actions based on proprioception. The proprioceptive information used by current artificial agents (robots) is mainly related to posture (and its change) and consists of joint angles (joint velocities) given a linked structure. However, the counterpart in biological agents (humans and other animals) includes more complicated components with associated controversies concerning the relationship between the body schema and the body image. A new trend of constructive approaches has been attacking this topic using computational models and robots. This chapter provides an overview of the biology of proprioception and body representation, summarizes the classical use of body schema in robotics, and describes a series of constructive approaches that address some of the mysteries of body representation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 52-68
Author(s):  
Helena De Preester

The role of sensations for body experience and body representations such as body image and body schema seems indisputable. This chapter discusses the link between sensory input, the experience of one’s own body, and body representations such as body image and body schema. That happens on the basis of Michel Henry’s radical phenomenology of the body, which unites body and subjectivity and reconsiders the role of sensory input for the experience of the body and related representations. Without supporting, but inspired by, Henry’s ontological dualism between subjective and objective body, it is argued that the traditional view that considers sensory signals as all-important for bodily experience misses out a bodily dimension crucial for subjectivity—the body’s subjective dimension, not reigned by current sensory input. Cognitive science seems willing to accept representations that are over and above sensory input but still experiential in nature. The exact status of these ‘offline’ representations is, however, unclear. If it is true that these offline representations are responsible for crucial aspects of bodily subjective life (e.g., unity, ownership, presence), then it is unclear how these representations bring this experience about. Whereas online bodily representations are based on sensory input, offline bodily representations seem to be based on bodily experience over and above sensory life. In other words, they seem to represent or mediate what they are supposed to explain—the subjective body.


2020 ◽  
Vol 43 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas Parr

Abstract This commentary focuses upon the relationship between two themes in the target article: the ways in which a Markov blanket may be defined and the role of precision and salience in mediating the interactions between what is internal and external to a system. These each rest upon the different perspectives we might take while “choosing” a Markov blanket.


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