Hannah Arendt’s Hidden Phenomenology of the Body

Amongst the Arendtian scholars, there is almost a consensus on Arendt’s supposedly reluctance to the question of the body. The Arendtian body is said to belong to the unpolitical realm of necessity, in other words, the body is a private matter that should not appear in public. It is antipolitical. However, in this paper, I want to suggest that there is a possibility to outline a phenomenology of embodied political action in what I think to be Arendt’s hidden phenomenology of the body. To make my point, I will first show that what the scholars call the Arendtian body is in fact an Arendtian Body. Secondly, in the German version of The Human Condition, Arendt surprisingly used the Heideggerian term Befindlichkeit (disposition) that, I will argue, outline the basis of a political phenomenology of the body in Arendt’s work. More precisely, I will try to show that political action is embodied, that there is a hexis, a pathos and an ethos of action.

Body, Self and Others: Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on Intersubjectivity

Douglas Harding developed a unique first-person experimental approach for investigating consciousness that is still relatively unknown in academia. In this paper, I present a critical dialogue between Harding, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty on the phenomenology of the body and intersubjectivity. Like Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, Harding observes that from the first-person perspective, I cannot see my own head. He points out that visually speaking nothing gets in the way of others. I am radically open to others and the world. Neither does my somatic experience establish a boundary between me and the world. Rather to experience these sensations as part of a bounded, shaped thing (a body), already involves bringing in the perspectives of others. The reader is guided through a series of Harding’s first-person experiments to test these phenomenological claims for themselves. For Sartre, the other’s subjectivity is known through The Look, which makes me into a mere object for them. Merleau-Ponty criticised Sartre for making intersubjective relations primarily ones of conflict. Rather he held that the intentionality of my body is primordially interconnected with that of others’ bodies. We are already situated in a shared social world. For Harding, like Sartre, my consciousness is a form of nothingness; however, in contrast to Sartre, it does not negate the world, but is absolutely united with it. Confrontation is a delusion that comes from imagining that I am behind a face. Rather in lived personal relationships, I become the other. I conclude by arguing that for Harding all self-awareness is a form of other-awareness, and vice versa.

Philosophy for Spiders

It's time to recognize Kathy Acker as one of the great postwar American writers. Over the decades readers have found a punk Acker, a feminist Acker, a queer Acker, a kink Acker, and an avant-garde Acker. In Philosophy for Spiders, McKenzie Wark adds a trans Acker. Wark recounts her memories of Acker (with whom she had a passionate affair) and gives a comprehensive reading of her published and archived works. Wark finds not just an inventive writer of fiction who pressed against the boundaries of gender but a theorist whose comprehensive philosophy of life brings a conceptual intelligence to the everyday life of those usually excluded from philosophy's purview. As Wark shows, Acker's engagement with topics such as masturbation, sadism, body-building, and penetrative sex are central to her distinct phenomenology of the body that theorizes the body's relation to others, the city, and technology.

A radical phenomenology of the body: subjectivity and sensations in body image and body schema

The role of sensations for body experience and body representations such as body image and body schema seems indisputable. This chapter discusses the link between sensory input, the experience of one’s own body, and body representations such as body image and body schema. That happens on the basis of Michel Henry’s radical phenomenology of the body, which unites body and subjectivity and reconsiders the role of sensory input for the experience of the body and related representations. Without supporting, but inspired by, Henry’s ontological dualism between subjective and objective body, it is argued that the traditional view that considers sensory signals as all-important for bodily experience misses out a bodily dimension crucial for subjectivity—the body’s subjective dimension, not reigned by current sensory input. Cognitive science seems willing to accept representations that are over and above sensory input but still experiential in nature. The exact status of these ‘offline’ representations is, however, unclear. If it is true that these offline representations are responsible for crucial aspects of bodily subjective life (e.g., unity, ownership, presence), then it is unclear how these representations bring this experience about. Whereas online bodily representations are based on sensory input, offline bodily representations seem to be based on bodily experience over and above sensory life. In other words, they seem to represent or mediate what they are supposed to explain—the subjective body.

The Phenomenology of the Body After 85 Years

The aim of this study was to describe the phenomenology of the body after 85 years, addressing the following question: What is the experience of the body at this age? Within the paradigm of existential phenomenology, this study was philosophically and methodologically underpinned by embodiment theory, positioning the body as the starting point for the exploration of lived experience. In-depth interviews with 20 purposively selected individuals were analyzed using van Manen’s context-sensitive phenomenological orientation. Findings indicated that the body was experienced primarily in negative terms, as compromising engagement in meaningful activity, independence, safety, vitality, dignity, and identity. Participants coped with bodily changes through adaptation, humor, and acceptance. In addition, participants viewed their unreliable and at times unfamiliar body, as distinct from their sense of self. This research addresses the current lack of subjective accounts of bodily and embodied experiences in this group, combating assumptive views and contributing insightful understanding.

Relevance and embodied reflexivity: constellations work between Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel

This paper draws on Aron Gurwitsch's theory of relevance which was of outstanding importance for both Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology of the body and Harold Garfinkel's ethnomethodology. In the first part we discuss Gurwitsch's conception of relevance in contrast to Schutz'. We then develop a theory of embodied reflexivity drawing on Merleau-Ponty and Garfinkel together with some newer approaches on embodied practice and knowledge. In the second, empirical section we use the concepts and conceptions developed for the description and analysis of selected video recordings of systemic constellation sessions. Systemic constellation is a psychotherapeutic method which is used predominantly in psychological and pedagogical contexts as well as in management consultations. The basic assumption underlying constellations work is that the experiences of representatives are relevant for the person who has initiated the constellation and that they provide information about the issue at hand. The origin, validity, and reliability of the representatives' bodily and relational self-perception is difficult to assess and even more difficult to explain. In our contribution we propose a vocabulary with reference to Gurwitsch, Merleau-Ponty, and Garfinkel, that, as we think, allows for the description of the phenomenon and at the same time throws a light on how relevance can be understood from a sociological perspective inspired by phenomenology.

Paddling with Maxine Sheets-Johnstone: Exploring the moving body in sport

This paper aims to contribute to the theoretical discussion and empirical application of phenomenology in the sociology of sport by drawing on Maxine Sheets-Johnstone’s theories. I propose that Sheets-Johnstone’s movement-focused phenomenology can be complementary to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of the body in the analyses of sporting moves and the learning of new moves. I mainly applied two concepts from Sheets-Johnstone, tactile-kinesthetic/kinetic dynamics and emotion-motion dynamics, to explore the moving body in waka ama (outrigger canoe) paddling, based on my beginner’s and other competent paddlers’ experiences. Findings demonstrate that a moving/paddling body is spontaneously a tactile-kinesthetic/kinetic, emotion-motion and intercorporeal body. These bodily dimensions enrich our understandings of the ways of learning new movements, doing sport and doing sport together.

Embodiment and Emergence: Navigating an Epistemic and Metaphysical Dilemma

In this paper, I consider a challenge that naturalism poses for embodied cognition and enactivism, as well as for work on phenomenology of the body that has an argumentative or explanatory dimension. It concerns the connection between embodiment and emergence. In the commitment to explanatory holism, and the irreducibility of embodiment to any mechanistic and/or neurocentric construal of the interactions of the component parts, I argue there is (often, if not always) an unavowed dependence on an epistemic and metaphysical role for emergence, especially concerning certain embodied capacities (motor-intentionality, know-how, skilful habits, affordances, etc.). While the problem of emergence is standardly dismissed as a problem for phenomenology, which brackets away the kind of materialist (and scientific) picture from which reflection on emergence derives, I argue that once a phenomenologist takes a fully-fledged embodied turn, they also have a genuine dilemma of emergence to confront, and I evaluate the relevant options.