The Role of Hand Size in the Fake-Hand Illusion Paradigm

Perception ◽  
10.1068/p5853 ◽  
2007 ◽  
Vol 36 (10) ◽  
pp. 1547-1554 ◽  
Author(s):  
Francesco Pavani ◽  
Massimiliano Zampini

When a hand (either real or fake) is stimulated in synchrony with our own hand concealed from view, the felt position of our own hand can be biased toward the location of the seen hand. This intriguing phenomenon relies on the brain's ability to detect statistical correlations in the multisensory inputs (ie visual, tactile, and proprioceptive), but it is also modulated by the pre-existing representation of one's own body. Nonetheless, researchers appear to have accepted the assumption that the size of the seen hand does not matter for this illusion to occur. Here we used a real-time video image of the participant's own hand to elicit the illusion, but we varied the hand size in the video image so that the seen hand was either reduced, veridical, or enlarged in comparison to the participant's own hand. The results showed that visible-hand size modulated the illusion, which was present for veridical and enlarged images of the hand, but absent when the visible hand was reduced. These findings indicate that very specific aspects of our own body image (ie hand size) can constrain the multisensory modulation of the body schema highlighted by the fake-hand illusion paradigm. In addition, they suggest an asymmetric tendency to acknowledge enlarged (but not reduced) images of body parts within our body representation.

Body schema refers to the system of sensory-motor functions that enables control of the position of body parts in space, without conscious awareness of those parts. Body image refers to a conscious representation of the way the body appears—a set of conscious perceptions, affective attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to one’s own bodily image. In 2005, Shaun Gallagher published an influential book entitled ‘How the Body Shapes the Mind’. This book not only defined both body schema (BS) and body image (BI), but also explored the complicated relationship between the two. The book also established the idea that there is a double dissociation, whereby body schema and body image refer to two different, but closely related, systems. Given that many kinds of pathological cases can be described in terms of body schema and body image (phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia, schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder, among others), we might expect to find a growing consensus about these concepts and the relevant neural activities connected to these systems. Instead, an examination of the scientific literature reveals continued ambiguity and disagreement. This volume brings together leading experts from the fields of philosophy, neuroscience, psychology, and psychiatry in a lively and productive dialogue. It explores fundamental questions about the relationship between body schema and body image, and addresses ongoing debates about the role of the brain and the role of social and cultural factors in our understanding of embodiment.


Author(s):  
Minoru Asada

Proprioception is our ability to sense the position of our own limbs and other body parts in space, and body schema is a body representation that allows both biological and artificial agents to execute their actions based on proprioception. The proprioceptive information used by current artificial agents (robots) is mainly related to posture (and its change) and consists of joint angles (joint velocities) given a linked structure. However, the counterpart in biological agents (humans and other animals) includes more complicated components with associated controversies concerning the relationship between the body schema and the body image. A new trend of constructive approaches has been attacking this topic using computational models and robots. This chapter provides an overview of the biology of proprioception and body representation, summarizes the classical use of body schema in robotics, and describes a series of constructive approaches that address some of the mysteries of body representation.


2021 ◽  
Author(s):  
Janna M. Gottwald ◽  
Laura Bird ◽  
Andrew J. Bremner ◽  
Dorothy Cowie

Children’s and adults’ body representation is constrained by bottom-up multisensory information and by top-down knowledge on possible postures. Using the rubber hand illusion paradigm, this study (N = 229) investigates whether different fake hand sizes (60%, 80%, 100%, 120% or 140% of typical hand size) constrain embodiment in three age groups (6- to 7-year-olds, 12- to 13-year-olds, and adults). Embodiment was measured by questionnaire, proprioceptive drift, and affordance judgements. In line with previous work, we found robust effects of age and synchrony, with higher responses at younger ages and under conditions of visual-tactile synchrony. There were no significant effects of hand size on proprioceptive drift or self-rated hand ownership; nor did participants verbally report that their hand had changed size. Participants of all ages therefore embodied a differently-sized fake hand, without being explicitly aware of the size change. However, manual judgments of own-hand size were significantly influenced by the size of the previously seen fake hand. Therefore, participants did implicitly incorporate a size change into their body schema. In sum, embodiment of differently-sized hands reveals substantial plasticity in body representation, modulated strongly by multisensory information and age. Further, the embodiment of a differently-sized hand specifically affects action-oriented representations of the body.


2007 ◽  
Vol 30 (2) ◽  
pp. 221-222 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alessia Tessari ◽  
Anna M. Borghi

AbstractOur commentary addresses two issues that are not developed enough in the target article. First, the model does not clearly address the distinction among external objects, external body parts, and internal bodies. Second, the authors could have discussed further the role of body schema with regard to its dynamic character, and its role in perspective and in imitation.


2009 ◽  
Vol 40 (9) ◽  
pp. 1531-1539 ◽  
Author(s):  
D. Nico ◽  
E. Daprati ◽  
N. Nighoghossian ◽  
E. Carrier ◽  
J.-R. Duhamel ◽  
...  

BackgroundPatients with anorexia nervosa (AN) overestimate their size despite being severely underweight. Whether this misperception echoes an underlying emotional disturbance or also reflects a genuine body-representation deficit is debatable. Current measures inquire directly about subjective perception of body image, thus distinguishing poorly between top-down effects of emotions/attitudes towards the body and disturbances due to proprioceptive disorders/distorted body schema. Disorders of body representation also emerge following damage to the right parietal lobe. The possibility that parietal dysfunction might contribute to AN is suspected, based on the demonstrated association of spatial impairments, comparable to those found after parietal lesion, with this syndrome.MethodWe used a behavioral task to compare body knowledge in severe anorexics (n=8), healthy volunteers (n=11) and stroke patients with focal damage to the left/right parietal lobe (n=4). We applied a psychophysical procedure based on the perception, in the dark, of an approaching visual stimulus that was turned off before reaching the observer. Participants had to predict whether the stimulus would have hit/missed their body, had it continued its linear motion.ResultsHealthy volunteers and left parietal patients estimated body boundaries very close to the real ones. Conversely, anorexics and right parietal patients underestimated eccentricity of their left body boundary.ConclusionsThese findings are in line with the role the parietal cortex plays in developing and maintaining body representation, and support the possibility for a neuropsychological component in the pathogenesis of anorexia, offering alternative approaches to treatment of the disorder.


Author(s):  
Denisa Butnaru

Body image and body schema are two phenomenological concepts which generated a revival of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical heritage. In the present text I intend to inquire on the relation between these two concepts and that of Logos of life, another challenging point in the Merleau-Pontyan thought.In order to delineate the correlation between body schema, body image and my understanding of a logic of life, I will first explore how what I term “schematism of the body” is connected to an inherent model of life and living and how this schematism is reflected in the body image. I will turn further to the relation between body and world and highlight how the life of the body defines itself as meaningful in the context of both the surrounding world (Umwelt) and the lifeworld (Lebenswelt). In a third part of my analysis I shall point out how the relation between body schematism and motile intentionality redefines corporeal inten-tionality. I shall conclude by noting the role of the Logos of life, through which corporeity, in its position of meaning project, is instituted as body schematism.Los conceptos fenomenológicos de imagen corporal y esquema corporal han dado lugar a un resurgimiento del legado filosófico de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. En este texto pretendo investigar la relación entre estos dos conceptos y el de Logos de la vida, otro elemento estimulante del pensamiento Merleau-Pontiano.Con el fin de trazar la correlación entre es-quema corporal, imagen corporal y mi interpretación de la lógica de la vida, exploraré en pri-mer lugar cómo el término “esquematismo del cuerpo” está conectado con un modelo inheren-te de vida y de vivir, y cómo este esquematis-mo se refleja en la imagen corporal. Consideraré después la relación entre cuerpo y mundo y remarcaré cómo la vida del cuerpo se define como significativa en el contexto tanto del mundo circundante (Umwelt) como del mundo de la vida (Lebenswelt). En la tercera parte de mi análisis señalaré cómo la relación entre esquematismo corporal e intencionalidad moto-ra redefine la intencionalidad corporal. Concluiré destacando el papel del Logos de la vida, a través del cual la corporeidad, en su posición de proyecto significativo, se instituye como esquematismo corpora


2016 ◽  
Vol 10 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-18 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nick Galli ◽  
Justine J. Reel ◽  
Hester Henderson ◽  
Nicole Detling

The purpose of this study was twofold: (a) to explore the body image of athletes with physical disabilities, and (b) to understand how sport influences body image among these athletes. We interviewed 20 male and female athletes (Mage = 34.25, SD = 8.49) from a variety of sports regarding their body image and the role of sport in influencing body image. A thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to generate six themes: (a) personal significance of injury and disability, (b) noncentrality of the body and disability, (c) positive influence of sport on body esteem, (d) social factors influencing body-related emotions and perceptions, (e) body critiques and preferences, and (f) positive thoughts and emotions about the body. Sport seemed to be an important vehicle for experiencing body-related pride, and athletes expressed an intimate connection with the body parts that enabled them to physically compete.


2019 ◽  
Author(s):  
Stephen Gadsby

The distinction between body image and body schema has been incredibly influential in cognitive neuroscience. Recently, researchers have begun to speculate about the relationship between these representations (Gadsby, 2017; 2018; Pitron & de Vignemont, 2017; Pitron et al., 2018). Within this emerging literature, Pitron and colleagues (2018) proposed that the long-term body image and long-term body schema co-construct one another, through a process of reciprocal interaction. In proposing this model, they make two assumptions: that the long-term body image incorporates the spatial characteristics of tools, and that it is distorted in the case of Alice in wonderland syndrome. Here, I challenge these assumptions, with a closer examination of what the term “long-term body image” refers to. In doing so, I draw out some important taxonomic principles for research into body representation.


Author(s):  
Frédérique de Vignemont

This chapter considers the relationship between body representations, action, and bodily experiences. It first clarifies the conceptual landscape of body representations and stresses the conceptual and empirical difficulties that the current body schema/body image taxonomy faces, difficulties that can be explained by their constant interaction but not only. There is indeed a lack of precise understanding of the functional role of the body schema as opposed to the body image. Instead of these unclear notions, the chapter proposes distinguishing different types of body representations on the basis of their direction of fit and of their spatial organization. On the one hand, there is a purely descriptive body map that represents well-segmented categorical body parts, in which one can localize one’s sensations. On the other hand, there is a body map that is both descriptive and directive (i.e. pushmi-pullyu representation), and that encodes structural bodily affordances for action planning and control.


2021 ◽  
pp. 267-284
Author(s):  
Jasmine Ho ◽  
Bigna Lenggenhager

The sense of our body is fundamental to human self-consciousness. Many neurological and psychiatric disorders involve atypical corporeal awareness with symptomatology that might be very heterogeneous, affecting various aspects of the bodily self. A common dichotomy divides disorders of the bodily self into disorders affecting predominantly the body schema and disorders predominantly affecting the body image. Yet, increasing evidence suggests that body schema and body image are mutually dependent, making a clear categorization of most disorders difficult. This interdependence is illustrated with examples of a few selected disorders that encompass an atypical sense of the bodily self. A special focus is placed on underlying neural alterations in various body-related brain regions. While body schema-related disorders might rather be linked to a disruption in the integration of multisensory information into a coherent body representation, especially in premotor and posterior parietal areas, body image disturbances, particularly their affective and cognitive aspects, might be linked to a broader network centred around cortical midline structures that are crucially involved in self-referential processes.


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