From Here to There; or, If Cooperative Ownership Is So Desirable, Why are There So Few Cooperatives?

1989 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 93-111 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jon Elster

In this paper I want to discuss a well-known but poorly understood problem: how can socialists reconcile the observed paucity of cooperatives in capitalist societies with their alleged superiority on normative grounds? If cooperatives are so desirable, why don't workers desire them? If one's ideal of socialism is central planning, it is clear enough that it cannot emerge gradually within the womb of the capitalist economy. If instead it is something like market socialism, it is not clear that a discontinuous transformation of society is required. If workers want (market) socialism, they can start up here and now. If they don't, doesn't it prove that they do not want it?I shall proceed as follows. Section I argues that the usual explanation - that cooperatives are not economically viable or that workers prefer working in capitalist firms – is not necessarily correct. The explanation may lie elsewhere, in endogenous preference formation, adverse selection, discrimination, or externalities.Section II is concerned with the variety of cooperative arrangements. Only rarely do we find cooperatives in their pure form, with all workers and only workers having equal ownership rights. Non-working owners, non-owning workers and unequal distribution of shares are frequent. When the deviations become sufficiently large, the firms cease to become cooperatives in any meaningful sense.Section III extends the argument of Section I by surveying the causes of cooperative failure. Some fail by success: profitable cooperatives often attract or turn into private ownership. Others fail outright, partly because they tend to be established under unfavorable circumstances and partly because of intrinsic difficulties of management.

1991 ◽  
Vol 5 (4) ◽  
pp. 229-236 ◽  
Author(s):  
Joseph Persky

In the debates over “economic calculation” launched by Ludwig von Mises in 1920 and extending well into the 1940s, the central issue concerned the ability of a socialist economy to achieve allocative efficiency. Von Mises emphasized that a collectivist state would have great difficulty in gathering and acting on relevant information; therefore, under socialism, even well-intentioned bureaucrats would lack a meaningful system of values on which to calculate. Defenders of socialism, such as Oskar Lange, countered that a market socialism could match demand to supply just as well as capitalism and meet the range of static conditions required for Pareto optimality. That debate is a rich and interesting story that has been told many times before. But in all that has been written, an important aspect of the original debate has been lost. Somewhat oddly, both the socialists like Oskar Lange and the advocates of private ownership like von Mises and Friedrich Hayek maintained that they were defending the progressive tendencies of competitive capitalism against the deadening hand of monopoly power. This historic paradox deserves consideration, if only because it serves to focus attention on our still incomplete theories of large-scale enterprises under socialism and capitalism.


2015 ◽  
Vol 20 (2) ◽  
pp. 348-365

This abstract relates to the following paper: AdamsC.Adverse selection in a start-up long-term care insurance market. British Actuarial Journal. doi:10.1017/S1357321714000270


2015 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 38-54
Author(s):  
Brett Sylvester Matulis

The practice of making “payments for ecosystem services” (PES) is about the formation of new social relations between land managers and the human beneficiaries of functioning ecological systems. More specifically, it is about establishing economic relations that (theoretically) transfer financial resources from “users” of services to “producers” who institute prescribed land management practices. Interpreted as a form of “neoliberal conservation”, this approach to environmental governance can be seen as a driving force in the commodification, marketization, and financialization of nature. Hinging on “clearly defined and enforced” property rights, it can also be seen as a factor in the expansion of individualized private ownership. Troubled by this renewed prospect of privatization, critical scholars have done well to challenge the new enclosures of land and resources. But what about when PES operates in areas where private ownership rights are robust and widespread? Are we to believe that the tendency towards privatization poses no threat because those areas are already “lost” to private ownership? This paper considers how the social relationships that constitute property are shifting under the prescribed management practices of PES. I present evidence from Costa Rica's national PES program to suggest that, even on lands that are ostensibly already privately owned, these new practices are resulting in an expansion of exclusionary management. The objective is to demonstrate some of the reasons why financialized approaches to conservation are a problem in “already neoliberal” economies and to offer some conceptual tools for challenging the uncritical assumption that PES is harmless in areas where private ownership is already well established.


1988 ◽  
Vol 3 (7) ◽  
pp. 353 ◽  
Author(s):  
Domenico Mario Nuti ◽  
Seppo Honkapohja ◽  
George Yarrow

1999 ◽  
Vol 29 (1) ◽  
pp. 217-224 ◽  
Author(s):  
ANDREW HINDMOOR

As the deficiencies of central planning have become more obvious, shares in market socialism have risen. Whilst accepting the case for competitive markets, market socialists question the desirability of and the need for capitalist forms of private property and share a commitment to more inclusive forms of ownership. Whilst this leaves open the question of precisely what form of ownership is appropriate, many have advocated the use of labour co-operatives in which (i) only those who work for a firm are entitled to a share of its ownership, (ii) all those who work for a firm are entitled to a share of its ownership, and in which consequently (iii) profits and (iv) decision making are shared.


1988 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-43 ◽  
Author(s):  
L. K. Agbosu

The Land Use Act, 1978, is a product of the inherent contradictions of the colonial and neo-colonial dependent, pseudo-capitalist economic structures established in Nigeria since colonial times. By the 1970s these contradictions became so seŕious that they threatened to become a clog on the growth of the capitalist economy. If such contradictions were allowed to reach a nodal point, conditions for the self-negation of the existing socio-economic and legal order would have ensued. The legislature, it would seem, narrowly identified the problem with private ownership of lands from its own class perspective, that is without a scientific conception of the problems in terms of ownership in the theory of social relations. A scientific conception of the problems would have revealed the essence of the difficulties as relating, not merely to the procedural aspects of private ownership of the lands, such as certainty of title, registration of title, etc., but concerning the institution of private ownership as an economic and legal category around which the exploitation of man by man is organised in class-divided societies.Such a scientific perception of the problems would have demanded a lasting solution that not only abolished private ownership rights in land but also abolished private ownership of other means of production. The socialisation of all means of production would have amounted to a holistic approach to the solution of the problems in the interest of the nation as a whole.


2021 ◽  
Vol 111 (2) ◽  
pp. 720-754
Author(s):  
B. Douglas Bernheim ◽  
Luca Braghieri ◽  
Alejandro Martínez-Marquina ◽  
David Zuckerman

We propose and develop a dynamic theory of endogenous preference formation in which people adopt worldviews that shape their judgments about their experiences. The framework highlights the role of mindset flexibility, a trait that determines the relative weights the decision-maker places on her current and anticipated worldviews when evaluating future outcomes. The theory generates rich behavioral dynamics, thereby illuminating a wide range of applications and providing potential explanations for a variety of observed phenomena. (JEL D11, D81, D91, Z13)


2020 ◽  
Vol 2020 (27) ◽  
pp. 31-45
Author(s):  
Wan Amir Azlan Wan Haniff ◽  
Asma Hakimah Ab Halim ◽  
Rahmah Ismail

Pelaburan secara pengumpulan dana masyarakat atau Crowdfunding Ekuiti (ECF) telah muncul sebagai suatu alternatif untuk Pasaran Kecil dan Sederhana (IKS) dan start-up (penerbit) bagi mengumpul dana dengan cara menjual sekuriti kepada masyarakat awam menggunakan platform berasaskan portal dalam talian (Platform ECF). Malaysia menjadi negara pertama di Asia Pasifik yang memperkenalkan rangka kerja pengawalseliaan untuk ECF pada tahun 2015. Walaupun pelbagai usaha telah dijalankan oleh Suruhanjaya Sekuriti dan pengendali-pengendali Platform ECF berdaftar untuk mendidik orang ramai dan usahawan terhadap pembiayaan alternatif perusahaan ini, namun pasaran ini tidak menjadi pilihan masyarakat selain berlaku penurunan dari aspek jumlah kutipan dana pada tahun 2018. Kajian ini bertujuan untuk memberi cadangan penambahbaikan dalam aspek pengawalseliaan serta penglibatan masyarakat terhadap pasaran ECF di Malaysia. Penambahbaikan ini bukan bertujuan untuk mencari mekanisme urus tadbir terbaik bagi mengembangkan pasaran ECF semata-mata, tetapi turut bertujuan untuk mengurangkan risiko pemilihan buruk (adverse selection) dan bahaya moral (moral hazard) yang dibuat oleh para pelabur selain memudahkan akses pembiayaan demi mengurangkan kekangan kewangan kepada penerbit. Penyelidikan kualitatif ini menggunakan data primer dan sekunder yang diperolehi daripada pangkalan data saintifik dan penyelidikan kepustakaan seperti garis panduan, buku-buku, artikel-artikel dan laporan mengenai ECF. Kesemua data ini dianalisis secara interpretasi undang-undang, penilaian perbandingan, sejarah dan kajian kes. Kajian ini mendapati bahawa kelonggaran pengawalseliaan sekuriti, insentif cukai, usahasama antara Pengendali Platform ECF dengan pelabur angel dan sofistikated serta kempen adalah langkah terbaik bagi menarik masyarakat negara menyertai pasaran ECF ini. Di akhir perbincangan, artikel ini menawarkan pelan tindakan masa hadapan demi memastikan pasaran ECF terus mampan.


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