Ultimate Responsibility and Dumb Luck

1999 ◽  
Vol 16 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-293 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred R. Mele
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ultimate Responsibility ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Universe

My topic lies on conceptual terrain that is quite familiar to philosophers. For others, a bit of background may be in order. In light of what has filtered down from quantum mechanics, few philosophers today believe that the universe is causally deterministic (or “deterministic,” for short). That is, to use Peter van Inwagen's succinct definition of “determinism,” few philosophers believe that “there is at any instant exactly one physically possible future.” Even so, partly for obvious historical reasons, philosophers continue to argue about whether free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Compatibilists argue for compatibility, and incompatibilists argue against it. Some incompatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are illusions. But most are libertarians, libertarianism being the conjunction of incompatibilism and the thesis that at least some human beings are possessed of free will and moral responsibility.

Fate and Foreknowledge in Greek Philosophy

2021 ◽  
pp. 53-72
Author(s):  
Claire Hall
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Greek Philosophy ◽  
Ethical Considerations ◽  
Logical Problem ◽  
Early Christian ◽  
Future Contingent ◽  
The Future ◽  
Human Autonomy

The majority of this chapter focuses on Greek philosophical approaches to fate and foreknowledge. To understand the background of Origen’s thought on these topics, we must distinguish between three distinct types of problem: a) logical problems that concern the possibility of making true statements about the contingent future, b) the problem of how human beings can be held morally responsible for their actions if their actions are fated, and c) the problem of how human beings can choose freely between courses of action if God (or the gods) can have foreknowledge of the future. This chapter shows where and why these conceptions of fate, prophecy, and human autonomy differ, and why these distinctions matter. First, it examines the puzzles set and answered by Aristotle concerning the logical problem of future contingent statements. Then it explores some of the terminological difficulty in talking about ‘free will’ in the Greek context. Next it examines Stoic and Platonist discussions about choice and autonomy, which focus primarily on ethical considerations. Finally, it argues that Origen’s framing of these issues was heavily influenced by his pagan near-contemporary Alexander of Aphrodisias. The chapter ends with a survey of some other early Christian texts on autonomy and moral responsibility that show the Christian context in which Origen was arguing and sets the stage for the argument that Origen deviates significantly from his Christian contemporaries.

A Positive View of Freedom?

2019 ◽  
pp. 147-161
Author(s):  
Brian Leiter
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Positive View ◽  
Textual Evidence ◽  
External Influences ◽  
Positive Valence ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
Persuasive Definition ◽  
Do So

This chapter reviews the textual evidence that Nietzsche retains a positive conception of “freedom.” Interpretive proposals due to Gemes and Poellner are shown not to be borne out by the texts. The chapter concludes that Nietzsche offers a “persuasive definition” of freedom, attaching the term’s positive valence to a sense of freedom unfamiliar in the modern Humean or Kantian traditions, but having echoes in Spinoza: “freedom” as acting from one’s inner nature rather than from external influences, something one can only do if fated to do so. The Spinoza-type view is shown not to be a kind of Control view of free will, so not one that vindicates moral responsibility.

Can Libertarians Make Promises?

2004 ◽  
Vol 55 ◽  
pp. 217-241
Author(s):  
Alfred Mele
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Free Action ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Van Inwagen ◽  
Peter Van Inwagen

Libertarians hold that free action and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism and that some human beings occasionally act freely and are morally responsible for some of what they do. Can libertarians who know both that they are right and that they are free make sincere promises? Peter van Inwagen, a libertarian, contends that they cannot—at least when they assume that should they do what they promise to do, they would do it freely. Probably, this strikes many readers as a surprising thesis for a libertarian to hold. In light of van Inwagen's holding it, the title of his essay—‘Free Will Remains a Mystery’—may seem unsurprising.

Once More on the Free Will Defence

1974 ◽  
Vol 10 (3) ◽  
pp. 301-311 ◽  
Author(s):  
Axel D. Steuer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Religious Thought ◽  
Considerable Portion ◽  
Christian Understanding

In responding to the problem that evil poses for belief in the existence of an omnipotent and all good deity, a number of Christian philosophers have followed Augustine in making the free will defence (FWD) the foundation of their theodicies. The FWD seems to be well suited for the important role it has played in Christian religious thought. Not only does it admit the reality of evil in God's world, but it also proposes to free God from moral responsibility for at least a considerable portion of that evil. A few philosophers, e.g. Terence Penelhum, have even argued that ‘… the Christian theist is committed to some form or other of the free will defence …’ because of the Christian understanding of the nature of God and man. Whether or not this is true, the argument that it was not possible for God to create free human beings without permitting some degree of evil in his world (the FWD) has been sufficiently influential that those sceptics who have intended to show that the reality of evil makes theism an intellectually indefensible position have usually felt compelled to treat it. For similar reasons, a number of theistic philosophers have felt obligated to defend the FWD against such sceptical attacks.

scholarly journals Free Will Skepticism and Personhood as a Desert Base

2009 ◽  
Vol 39 (3) ◽  
pp. 489-511 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin Vilhauer
Keyword(s):  
Moral Responsibility ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Ethical Theories ◽  
Substantial Role ◽  
Free Will Skepticism ◽  
Will Theory

In contemporary free will theory, a significant number of philosophers are once again taking seriously the possibility that human beings do not have free will, and are therefore not morally responsible for their actions. (Free will is understood here as whatever satisfies the control condition of moral responsibility.) Free will theorists commonly assume that giving up the belief that human beings are morally responsible implies giving up all our beliefs about desert. But the consequences of giving up the belief that we are morally responsible are not quite this dramatic. Giving up the belief that we are morally responsible undermines many, and perhaps most, of the desert claims we are pretheoretically inclined to accept. But it does not undermine desert claims based on the sheer fact of personhood. Even in the absence of belief in moral responsibility, personhood-based desert claims require us to respect persons and their rights. So personhood-based desert claims can provide a substantial role for desert in free will skeptics’ ethical theories.

scholarly journals Medieval Scientific Policy in Medicine, Measuring Realism in Prophet Medicine

2021 ◽  
Vol 2 (12) ◽  
pp. 1322-1324
Author(s):  
Mohammadreza Shahidipak
Keyword(s):  
Middle Ages ◽  
Intelligent System ◽  
Scientific Policy ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Health Food ◽  
Divine Wisdom ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Universe ◽  
Biology Research ◽  
A Current

In dark days of Europe, which was a barren science, you saw the world through superstitions of alchemy and methods based on ignorance and speculation. A current of science emerged in medieval world that provided a new definition of science. In modern definition of science, it is knowledge of fixed truths of nature, man and society, which you have acquired with the tools of empirical intellect and by observation and induction, and which have been useful for ensuring the welfare and security of human beings. The background of this scientific current is call to reason, realism and philosophy. The intellect is source of knowledge of world, and the dimensions of the universe are based on principles of philosophy and method of realism. Sarton, leader of historiography of science in middle Ages, introduced Muslims as leaders of science in middle Ages. A collection of health, food, medicine and theoretical treatments is attributed to Muhammad, which has been published under the title of Prophetic Medicine. Ibn Khaldu criticized medicine of Prophet eight hundred years ago. he writes that Prophet was not a physician and a specialist in worldly affairs, and that use of Prophet's medicine does not require observance of status of prophethood The hypothesis of the present study is that despite Ibn Khaldun's criticism, the realism of the Prophet's medical works shows that Prophet's medicine needs new reflection and study, and a special type of medicine is based on trust in divine wisdom in creating an intelligent system between disease and medicine in nature. The present study has analyzed and explained realism in Prophet's medical words about fenugreek and has shown and proved it according to modern medical data. The Prophet issued a general decree regarding fenugreek and said; Hundreds of new laboratory and clinical research in medicine, veterinary medicine, agriculture, biology show general effectiveness of fenugreek in maintaining human health, livestock, nature and environment, and fenugreek is at heart of biology research, which Proves realism of comprehensive speech of Prophet.

Quantum transition between spaces in a multidimensional Universe and spatial unconnectivity explain free will and solve the measurement problem of quantum mechanics

2020 ◽  
Vol 33 (1) ◽  
pp. 34-37
Author(s):  
José M. Frade
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Measurement Problem ◽  
Fundamental Property ◽  
Quantum Transition ◽  
Observable Universe ◽  
Temporal Dimension ◽  
Spatial Dimensions ◽  
Future Events ◽  
The Universe

Spacetime is deterministic, but the Universe appears to be stochastic. How to reconcile free will with the determinism inherent to the Universe? In this essay, we postulate that free will can only emanate from the existence of multiple additional spatial dimensions constituting the Universe. As our space displaces through the temporal dimension, we can choose any of the infinite possibilities defined by the additional spatial dimensions, through a process we refer to as quantum transition between spaces. Reality would emerge from the specific materialization of this quantum transition, resulting in a time series of events. This materialization is based on a fundamental property of any space, independently of its dimensions, which we refer to as spatial unconnectivity. This property implies the inability of the constituents of a particular space to observe spaces located in other dimensions. Therefore, the unconnectivity between spaces would prevent the simultaneous observation of all possible events at a specific time point, as well as past and future events, resulting in a unique reality. It would be the observers who determine the temporal trajectory of events, thus providing themselves with free will. In the absence of observers, all possibilities are feasible, thus explaining the quantum properties of elementary particles when they are not directly observed. Our model reconciles quantum mechanics with relativistic physics and is the easiest way to understand how reality arises in our observable Universe.

From Russian Icaria to Russian Cosmism

2021 ◽  
Vol 64 ◽  
pp. 361-368
Author(s):  
Fedor I. Girenok
Keyword(s):  
Space Flight ◽  
Human Being ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
The Earth ◽  
The World ◽  
Global Problems ◽  
History Of ◽  
Definition Of ◽  
The Universe

In the article the author analyzes the phenomenon of Russian cosmism and shows its difference from other possible varieties of cosmism. The author understands Russian cosmism as the idea of extending the definition of the universe by the human beings. A human being doesn’t simply have his place in history, on the Earth and in space, but also broadens it by means of his material and spiritual actions. The idea of the world broadening was popular among Russian naturalists in the 19th and the 20th centuries. The most prominent figures among the Russian cosmism followers were N.F. Fedorov and K. E. Tsiolkovsky. The author distinguishes three directions in the history of Russian cosmism – religious, natural-scientific and artistic-poetical. According to the author, only after Gagarin’s space flight the idea of Russian Icaria transferred itself into Russian cosmism. The article studies the sources of Russian cosmism and explains the meaning of anthropocosmism. The author arrives at the conclusion that Russian cosmism offers its own approach to solving modern global problems that differs from the ideas in the reports to the Roman club.

Quantum Mechanics and Revelation

2021 ◽  
pp. 504-517
Author(s):  
Stephen M. Barr
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Short Answer ◽  
The Church

It is widely acknowledged that quantum mechanics may have profound philosophical implications, but what those implications are has been debated for nearly a century. The question addressed in this chapter is whether it has any implications that touch upon the truths of Christian revelation. The short answer is that quantum mechanics does not say anything directly about revealed truths but does have implications relevant to certain philosophical truths that the Church regards as entailed by Christian revelation. These include the truths that human beings have free will and that human beings are not entirely reducible to matter or explicable in purely physical terms. Before getting to these questions, the chapter makes some preliminary remarks about quantum mechanics for context.

scholarly journals The indeterminist objectivity of quantum mechanics versus the determinist subjectivity of classical physics

2020 ◽  
Author(s):  
Vasil Dinev Penchev
Keyword(s):  
Quantum Mechanics ◽  
Free Will ◽  
Hidden Variables ◽  
Classical Mechanics ◽  
Niels Bohr ◽  
Necessary Condition ◽  
Human Beings ◽  
Classical Physics ◽  
Physical Universe ◽  
Max Born

Indeterminism of quantum mechanics is considered as an immediate corollary from the theorems about absence of hidden variables in it, and first of all, the Kochen – Specker theorem. The base postulate of quantum mechanics formulated by Niels Bohr that it studies the system of an investigated microscopic quantum entity and the macroscopic apparatus described by the smooth equations of classical mechanics by the readings of the latter implies as a necessary condition of quantum mechanics the absence of hidden variables, and thus, quantum indeterminism. Consequently, the objectivity of quantum mechanics and even its possibility and ability to study its objects as they are by themselves imply quantum indeterminism. The so-called free-will theorems in quantum mechanics elucidate that the “valuable commodity” of free will is not a privilege of the experimenters and human beings, but it is shared by anything in the physical universe once the experimenter is granted to possess free will. The analogical idea, that e.g. an electron might possess free will to “decide” what to do, scandalized Einstein forced him to exclaim (in a letter to Max Born in 2016) that he would be а shoemaker or croupier rather than a physicist if this was true. Anyway, many experiments confirmed the absence of hidden variables and thus quantum indeterminism in virtue of the objectivity and completeness of quantum mechanics. Once quantum mechanics is complete and thus an objective science, one can ask what this would mean in relation to classical physics and its objectivity. In fact, it divides disjunctively what possesses free will from what does not. Properly, all physical objects belong to the latter area according to it, and their “behavior” is necessary and deterministic. All possible decisions, on the contrary, are concentrated in the experimenters (or human beings at all), i.e. in the former domain not intersecting the latter. One may say that the cost of the determinism and unambiguous laws of classical physics, is the indeterminism and free will of the experimenters and researchers (human beings) therefore necessarily being out of the scope and objectivity of classical physics. This is meant as the “deterministic subjectivity of classical physics” opposed to the “indeterminist objectivity of quantum mechanics”.

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