NOTIFICATION OF ACCEPTANCE AND THE CONCLUSION OF A CONTRACT Withok Small Farms (Pty) Ltd v Amber Sunrise Properties 5 (Pty) Ltd 2009 2 SA 504 (SCA)

It is a long-standing principle in our law that generally a contract is only concluded when the offeree notifies the offeror of acceptance and, consequently no contract arises if there is no notification of acceptance. This general rule is derived from the will theory, which requires not only coinciding expressions of intention (usually styled “offer” and “acceptance”), but also knowledge of the offeree’s acceptance by the offeror so that conscious agreement exists between the parties (consensus ad idem). However, the offeror may expressly or impliedly dispense with this requirement, since the offeror may prescribe the method by which his offer may be accepted by the offeree. It also seems that where there is doubt, “the presumption that the contract will be completed when the offeror comes to hear of the offeree’s acceptance, should prevail”. In the recent matter of Withok Small Farms (Pty) Ltd v Amber Sunrise Properties 5 (Pty) Ltd (2009 2 SA 504 (SCA)) the Supreme Court of Appeal had to decide the very issue of whether the offeror had dispensed with notification of acceptance by the offeree. The context in which the court had to decide this issue and the approach adopted raise some interesting issues for discussion.

4. Rules of attribution—corporate acts and liabilities

This chapter looks at identifying whose acts are the acts of the company for the purposes of determining the rights and liabilities of the company, given that the company is an artificial legal entity. There are several distinct rules of attribution which may assist in this context. The chapter examines corporate liability in contract, corporate liability in tort, and criminal liability of the company. The chapter addresses the debate between the traditional approach to attribution, relying on directing mind and will theory, (especially in criminal matters) and the more purposive approach being adopted in civil matters. Attribution in the case of the wrongdoing director is considered as well as the application of an illegality defence.

Deconstruction of the legal personhood of artificial intelligence

Calls to rethink the content of “legal personhood” are increasingly being heard at the present time: to recognize animals, artificial intelligence, etc. as a subject. There are several explanations for this: firstly, a change in ideas about a person and their position in society, and secondly, attempts to rethink the traditional categories of law. Throughout long periods of history, the definition of legal personhood depended on the definition of subjective right; the subjective right was associated with the legally significant will of the person. Consequently, a change in views on the will theory of subjective right inevitably lead to a revision of the content of the person. The main purpose of this article is to determine the essence of the legal personhood. To do this, using the historical method, the evolution of ideas about the legal personhood is revealed. It is argued that Hohfeld’s approach to understanding subjective-legal structures made it possible to look differently at the content of the category of legal personhood: it became possible to recognize animals or artificial intelligence as the owners of various subjective-legal categories. Nevertheless, the logic of modern commentators, as well as supporters of such a flexible approach to the definition of legal personhood, is not free from shortcomings. Using the method of analytical jurisprudence, the author demonstrates the emerging problems.

1. Introduction and fundamental themes

This introductory chapter provides a brief overview of the fundamental elements of what constitutes a contract. It discusses undertakings or promises, deeds, written and oral promises, bargains, and bilateral and unilateral contracts. It concludes by examining some general themes in contract law to which reference will be made throughout the present title. These include freedom of contract, will theory, economic efficiency, objectivity in contract law, common law and equity, contract law within private law, and international influences on contract law. The outline provided in this chapter is necessarily brief; although some of the themes may seem a little difficult in the abstract, students approaching this subject for the first time should not be troubled. The concepts will become familiar and more easily understood through concrete examples provided in later chapters.

The Unavoidability of Evaluation for Interest Theories of Rights

In debates over rights, as much as, or perhaps more than, in any philosophical debate, it is important to see the wood from the trees. A little while ago, new life was breathed into debates over rights, as a new candidate theory emerged to rival the extant options. More specifically, Gopal Sreenivasan’s hybrid theory of (claim-) rights emerged to rival both will theory and interest theory. This new hybrid theory underwent a series of skirmishes with the interest theory. Moving from the wood, one principal ground over which battle ensued is the so-called third party beneficiary issue. And, more specifically still, descending into the trees, a particular problem within the foregoing third party beneficiary debate centred on what I shall dub Gopal’s Granny, a case wielded by Gopal Sreenivasan, particularly against one of the foremost defenders of the interest theory, Matthew Kramer.

Grotius’s Impact on the Scandinavian Theory of Contract Law

This article discusses to what extent the widely accepted hypotheses of Hugo Grotius’s crucial impact on the theory of contract law – also in Scandinavia – may be maintained or even positively confirmed. Although few direct references to the works of Grotius can be found in Scandinavian legal literature of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, it would be premature to draw a negative conclusion. An impact of Grotius’s thoughts may rather be demonstrated by thoroughly analysing patterns of argumentation concerning specific contractual topics both in legal literature and case law. The article provides the reader with necessary information on the institutional and intellectual preconditions for the reception of Grotius in the Scandinavian legal orders before discussing the impact of the ‘will-theory’ on the requirements of a legally binding contractual agreement in the works of selected influential legal scholars and in case law in more detail. The analysis confirms that Grotius’s work contributed substantially to shaping the intellectual framework in which the first contract law doctrines in Scandinavia evolved.

Right to be Punished?

It appears at least intuitively appropriate to claim that we owe it to victims to punish those who have wronged them. It also seems plausible to state that we owe it to society to punish those who have violated its norms. However, do we also owe punishment to perpetrators themselves? In other words, do those who commit crimes have a moral right to be punished? This work examines the sustainability of the right to be punished from the standpoint of the two main theories of rights—the will and the interest conceptions. The right to be punished is shown to be largely indefensible on both accounts: on the will theory, the right to be punished conflicts with autonomy, and it can neither be claimed nor waived by a perpetrator; on the interest theory, a perpetrator’s interest in punishment, inasmuch as it exists, is not sufficient to ground a duty on the part of the state.

Beyond Normative Control: Against the Will Theory of Rights

The Will Theory of Rights says that having control over another’s duties grounds rights. The Will Theory has commonly been objected to on the grounds that it undergenerates right-ascriptions along three fronts. This paper systematically examines a range of positions open to the Will Theory in response to these counterexamples, while being faithful to the Will Theory’s focus on normative control. It argues that of the seemingly plausible ways the defender of the Will Theory can proceed, one cannot both be faithful to the theory’s focus on normative control as the grounds of rights and achieve extensional adequacy.