The World Bank and Regional Development Banks

2016 ◽  
Vol 110 ◽  
pp. 273-277
Author(s):  
Vikram Raghavan

Significance Whereas developed economies and China have benefited from USD9tn in fiscal stimulus and USD5tn in liquidity, EMs have less scope because they cannot issue local-currency debt internationally. Many rely on remittances and tourism, which have collapsed, and have suffered capital flight. Impacts Accelerating the approval of IMF membership quota increases before the end-2023 target could ease investor nerves and boost lending. The World Bank and regional development banks are likely to be called upon to lend more. Vulnerable EMs, especially islands, will turn to regional hegemons to keep their economies afloat.


2018 ◽  
Vol 17 (2) ◽  
pp. 83-99
Author(s):  
Stephanie De Moerloose ◽  
Makane Moïse Mbengue

While judicial bodies have proliferated in the last fifty years in a process that has been deemed “quasi-anarchic” (Guillaume, G., 2000) creating a risk of inconsistency in their decisions which would endanger the international law system, quasi-judicial bodies such as Multilateral Development Banks' accountability mechanisms are not spared by this legal phenomenon. They have diverse proceedings and jurisdictions, operate with different sets of environmental and social safeguards, but may confront similar factual scenarios, especially in the case of co-financing. The recent Kenya Electricity Expansion Project presented before the World Bank and the European Investment Bank’s accountability mechanisms illustrates that, through a managerial approach, potentially conflicting findings can be avoided. This paper aims to show that quasi-judicial bodies can constitute a source of inspiration for the integrated development of international law.


Author(s):  
Lichtenstein Natalie

Chapter 2, Highlights, offers a survey of the key features of the AIIB Charter that define AIIB, in close comparison with the Charters of other multilateral development banks (AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IADB and the World Bank). The highlights of the coming Chapters are summarized, offering answers to the basic questions about AIIB: Why establish AIIB? (Mandate, Chapter 3) What will AIIB do? (Investment Operations, Chapter 4) Who will join AIIB? (Membership, Chapter 5) How will AIIB be funded? (Capital and Finance, Chapter 6) How will AIIB be run? (Governance, Chapter 7) How was AIIB first set up? (Transitions, Chapter 8) How will the organization work? (Institutional Matters, Chapter 9). The Chapter concludes with some observations about heritage and innovation in the AIIB Charter, outlining principal similarities and differences with the other Charters.


Subject Encouraging more private sector participation in infrastructure development. Significance In April 2017 World Bank President Jim Yong Kim announced that the institution would increasingly focus on catalysing commercial capital for infrastructure development. This should provide impetus for public funds to be redeployed to leverage private investments, including in the poorest, riskiest countries. Aiming to be a ‘facilitator of capital’ as well as its historic function as a ‘provider of capital’, the World Bank will deploy new facilities and instruments for private sector participation, and increase its support for institutional, policy and regulatory reforms in developing countries. Impacts Scaled-up MDB operations in frontier economies will catalyse more private investment, particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states. New World Bank facilities and instruments will channel more capital from institutional investors towards emerging markets infrastructure. If World Bank repositioning is emulated by regional development banks, the entire landscape of development finance will be transformed.


Author(s):  
Mark Pieth

This chapter discusses administrative sanctions and preventive measures that go beyond criminal law to fight corruption such as states and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs). They have developed a set of regulatory sanctions more directly aiming at the prevention of abuses by companies and individuals and protecting the interests of their respective institutions. Domestic procurement rules as well as the regulations developed by MDBs foresee cancellation of loans in the face of concrete misbehavior. Domestic agencies would also be able to stay subsidies or export insurance. Furthermore, domestic agencies and MDBs have introduced detailed sanctions procedures allowing debarment of corporations and individuals from future participation in procurement or from eligibility for export insurance. The debarment procedures established by MDBs may be regarded as a worldwide example of such administrative sanctioning, and one of the largest is the World Bank.


2017 ◽  
Vol 12 (2) ◽  
pp. 90-93
Author(s):  
Luca Bussotti ◽  
Rui da Maia

The purpose of this reflection is understanding what approaches towards human rights are applied in the case of industrial resettlement programs, and, to investigate what policy could be employed to better protect rights of people who experienced un-voluntary relocation event caused by industrial pressure in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa. From the 1980s, international organizations as the World Bank and almost all the continental development banks (as the Asian, the Inter-American and African ones) have formally established and implemented guidelines to effectively and efficiently manage resettlements.


2014 ◽  
Vol 14 (1) ◽  
pp. 62-95 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lorenzo Nesti

A remarkable example of coordination between IGOs to deal with corruption and fraud in public procurement is the “Agreement for the Mutual Enforcement of Debarment Decisions” signed by the World Bank and the main regional Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in 2010. This article will try to examine the characteristics of the MDBsʼ cross debarment agreement and its significance for the MDBs that adhered to it in terms of the process of harmonization that resulted from it. Secondly, the article discusses the potential benefits and challenges connected to the extension of this agreement to other MDBs or to other initiatives that have been initiated in parallel to, or in imitation of, the MDBsʼ cross debarment agreement.


2008 ◽  
Vol 10 (2) ◽  
pp. 199-226 ◽  
Author(s):  
Suresh Nanwani

AbstractThis article offers an examination of the development and operation of accountability mechanisms in multilateral development banks. These mechanisms are gateways for citizens, as non-state actors, to file their grievances in projects that adversely affect them against these international organisations at the international level. The study focuses on the accountability mechanisms established at the World Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development and International Development Association) and the Asian Development Bank, and other initiatives and avenues provided by these institutions addressing accountability issues. The article offers an analysis of barriers encountered by claimants in accessing these mechanisms based on insights generated by way of claims filed and participation in accountability procedures. It suggests ways in which civil society's demands for accountability in multilateral development banks and other financial institutions can move forward.


1996 ◽  
Vol 90 (2) ◽  
pp. 214-234 ◽  
Author(s):  
John W. Head

What is the governing law for loan agreements entered into by the World Bank and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) in carrying out their public sector lending? That question was first definitively addressed about thirty-five years ago. This article examines the question anew, against the backdrop of recent developments in practice, especially at the newest of the MDBs, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).


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