The Roots of America's China Policy

1962 ◽  
Vol 10 ◽  
pp. 45-50
Author(s):  
Hans J. Morgenthau

In order to understand the policy of the United States towards China it is necessary to go back to die Chinese civil war. It is at this point that the confusion over ‘the real issue obscured the thinking and frustrated the policies of the United States. When it became obvious that the Nationalist régime was unable to cope with the revolutionary situation even if supported by American arms and advice, only two courses, which General Wedemeyer's report of 1947 clearly envisaged, were logically open to American policy. One was military intervention on such a scale as to be sufficient not only to crush the Communist armies but also to keep discontent permanently in check. Military intervention of this kind would have entailed military and political commitments of incalculable magnitude. This course of action was rejected by the framers of the United States' foreign policy on the advice, among others, of the then-Secretary of State, George Marshall.

2010 ◽  
Vol 8 (1) ◽  
pp. 305-306
Author(s):  
Graciana del Castillo

This is a highly readable book that provides strong and rigorous arguments to prove a thesis that is intuitive to many but still denied by some—that the United States foreign policy of using military intervention, occupation, and reconstruction to establish liberal democracies across the world is more likely to fail than to succeed.


2017 ◽  
Vol 31 (2) ◽  
pp. 170-192 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin O. Fordham

Between 1890 and 1914, the United States acquired overseas colonies, built a battleship fleet, and intervened increasingly often in Latin America and East Asia. This activism is often seen as the precursor to the country's role as a superpower after 1945 but actually served very different goals. In contrast to its pursuit of a relatively liberal international economic order after 1945, the United States remained committed to trade protection before 1914. Protectionism had several important consequences for American foreign policy on both economic and security issues. It led to a focus on less developed areas of the world that would not export manufactured goods to the United States instead of on wealthier European markets. It limited the tactics available for promoting American exports, forcing policymakers to seek exclusive bilateral agreements or unilateral concessions from trading partners instead of multilateral arrangements. It inhibited political cooperation with other major powers and implied an aggressive posture toward these states. The differences between this foreign policy and the one the United States adopted after 1945 underscore the critical importance not just of the search for overseas markets but also of efforts to protect the domestic market.


2021 ◽  
Vol 23 (1) ◽  
pp. 1
Author(s):  
Sigit S. Nugroho

Assessing the output of past foreign policy is instrumental for any country to learn policy-relevant insights, to appreciate its experience, and to improve its future conduct. To glean such insights, this article borrows Baldwin’s framework in assessing the success and failure in foreign policy. Using a case study analysis, it assesses the United States’ (U.S.) influence attempt towards Indonesia to resolve the 1999 East Timor humanitarian crisis. President Clinton’s decision to undergo an influence attempt primarily aimed to change Indonesia’s policy while gaining support from U.S. allies in the process. The article finds that Clinton’s decision was a highly successful attempt. This finding is based on several factors: (1) the attempt effectively attained the intended primary and secondary goals at a considerably high degree; (2) it was conducted at a considerably low cost for the U.S.; (3) it inflicted a high cost towards Indonesia; (4) the increase in Clinton’s stake strengthened the U.S. resolve to pursue the influence attempt; and (5) Clinton had successfully overcome the difficult undertaking as Indonesia possessed higher stake over East Timor. These findings provide some lessons for both U.S. and Indonesian foreign policymakers to chart future relations for the two nations.


2019 ◽  
pp. 197-214
Author(s):  
C. Christine Fair

Given Pakistan's strategic commitments and the risk aversion of policy-makers in the United States and India, what options exist for these states to deal with LeT specifically, or more generally, the problem of Pakistan's reliance upon terrorism as a key foreign policy tool? Admittedly, the options are few and not without risk. In this chapter, I lay out three broad sets of options: maintain the status quo; manage the narrow problem of LeT through enhanced counter-terrorism efforts and leadership decapitation; and develop a new complement of compellent policies to undermine Pakistan's heretofore successful nuclear coercion strategy. India cannot compel Pakistan to cease and desist from using terrorism as a tool of policy on its own; rather, the United States will have to assume the heaviest burden in this effort. However, there is important--if limited--space for Indian action even if the United States, per its historical record, declines to pursue this course of action


1940 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 531
Author(s):  
Herbert von Beckerath ◽  
James W. Gantenbein

1951 ◽  
Vol 5 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-281 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin V. Cohen

During the last five years the United States has been an active participant in the work of the United Nations. During this period the most vital international issues have come before various organs of the United Nations, have been discussed, and in various ways have been acted upon. The question naturally arises what has been the impact of the United Nations on the foreign policy of the United States?


Significance It is as yet unclear whether the police officer in question acted alone, although he apparently once worked for former Interior and Justice Minister Miguel Rodriguez Torres, who, the government claims, is linked to the CIA and whose arrest has reportedly been ordered. The death toll in ongoing anti-government protests continues to rise, now totalling an estimated 75 since April. The failure of the Organization of American States (OAS) to agree a resolution on Venezuela at its General Assembly has emboldened Caracas while demonstrating the inability of the regional body to determine a course of action that can help to resolve the country’s political crisis. Impacts Violence will continue as the opposition relies on protests to weaken the government and erode participation in the assembly elections. Each protest-related death is serving to entrench a paralysing cycle of demonstration and repression. As the OAS flounders, the United States will likely move unilaterally to impose new sanctions on Venezuelan officials. Changes to military figures in the government will deepen political rifts between different elements and factions in the security sector. Yesterday's attack suggests that, in the event of a serious military intervention, this would be violent and bloody.


2020 ◽  
pp. 1-15
Author(s):  
Sebastián Hurtado-Torres

This introductory chapter provides an overview of the relationship between Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty and the United States. For the United States foreign policy apparatus, the Christian Democratic Party of Chile appeared to be a model partner in the realization of the goals of the Alliance for Progress, the Latin American policy conceived by President John F. Kennedy and continued, though without the same level of enthusiasm and hope, by his successor, Lyndon B. Johnson. In its original conception, Kennedy's Latin American policy had ambitious economic, social, and political goals. The channeling of aid from the United States to Latin American countries in the 1960s sought to reflect the interplay between those aims, even if the implementation of the Alliance for Progress sorely lacked in consistency and constancy. In the case of Chile and Eduardo Frei's Revolution in Liberty, the exceptionally generous provision of aid by the United States went hand in hand with a deep involvement of agents of U.S. foreign policy, especially the political staff of the embassy in Santiago, in the day-to-day functioning of Chilean politics—welcomed and, in many cases, invited by local actors.


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