The Campaign for Agricultural Development in the Great Leap Forward: A Study of Policy-Making and Implementation in Liaoning

1992 ◽  
Vol 129 ◽  
pp. 52-71 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alfred L. Chan

As is well known, the Great Leap Forward (GLF) of 1958–59 was the most intense mobilizational phase in the history of the People's Republic of China and the most concentrated expression of the Utopian Maoist developmental model. Yet the adoption of an alternative development strategy to the Stalinist model by decentralization did not bring about material abundance; it led directly to an economic depression from which the country did not recover until 1965. Therefore, the “leap” is worthy of more scholarly attention than it has received. Of particular interest is the role played by the provinces in the policy-making process, the bureaucratic behaviour of the provincial authorities, the way policies were implemented, and the environmental constraints and how they affected policy-making.

Author(s):  
Arunabh Ghosh

In 1949, at the end of a long period of wars, one of the biggest challenges facing leaders of the new People's Republic of China was how much they did not know. The government of one of the world's largest nations was committed to fundamentally reengineering its society and economy via socialist planning while having almost no reliable statistical data about their own country. This book is the history of efforts to resolve this “crisis in counting.” The book explores the choices made by political leaders, statisticians, academics, statistical workers, and even literary figures in attempts to know the nation through numbers. It shows that early reliance on Soviet-inspired methods of exhaustive enumeration became increasingly untenable in China by the mid-1950s. Unprecedented and unexpected exchanges with Indian statisticians followed, as the Chinese sought to learn about the then-exciting new technology of random sampling. These developments were overtaken by the tumult of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1961), when probabilistic and exhaustive methods were rejected and statistics was refashioned into an ethnographic enterprise. By acknowledging Soviet and Indian influences, the book not only revises existing models of Cold War science but also globalizes wider developments in the history of statistics and data. Anchored in debates about statistics and its relationship to state building, the book offers fresh perspectives on China's transition to socialism.


2009 ◽  
pp. 5-26
Author(s):  
Stephen A. Smith

- Reflects on how political changes that have taken place in the People's Republic of China (Prc) during the era of economic reform, together with changes that have taken place in the world at large since 1989, especially those following the collapse of Communism in Europe, have shaped the way in which historians inside and outside the Prc have written the history of the Mao era (1949 to 1976). The article examines both Chinese and western historiography of four key issues relating to the Mao era: the idea of the 1950s as a "golden age"; the Great Leap Forward (1958-61); the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) and the view of Mao himself. The more negative representation of these issues derives, in part, from the fact that scholars now have much greater access to sources than was true prior to the 1980s. At the same time, the more negative representation it is bound up with political changes that have occurred inside and outside the Prc. For that reason, the historiography of the Mao may be said to represent an almost textbook example of the way in which historical writing is implicated in the politics of the present. Keywords: China, Communism, Mao, Economy, Historiography, History. Parole chiave: Cina, Comunismo, Mao, Economia, Storiografia, Storia.


2018 ◽  
Vol 61 (1) ◽  
pp. 23-49 ◽  
Author(s):  
Laurence Coderre

AbstractThis article traces the conceptual lineage of a statement, made by Mao Zedong and published in 1975, describing the contemporary economic system in the People's Republic of China as a commodity economy. Any surprise we might feel in the face of this verdict says more about our own narrow understanding of the (capitalist) commodity than it does about the political economy of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976). As I detail in this study, the continued existence and necessity of commodities under socialism had long been an important topic of conversation in Communist circles, with important ramifications for economic planning and political movements. This article focuses on the impact of Stalin's theory of the socialist commodity, as articulated in 1952, on Chinese political economy in the 1950s; Mao's particular engagement with Stalin's work in the context of the Great Leap Forward (1958–1960); and the emergence of a new, less benign view of the socialist commodity in the 1970s. I argue that political economic theory and its study were in fact critical to the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution as mass mobilization campaigns, calling into question much of what we think we know about modern Chinese history and Chinese socialism. The essay is intended to unsettle enduring and uncritical associations between the commodity-form and capitalism. How might we, following on the heels of the theorists I discuss, imagine the commodity otherwise?


2010 ◽  
Vol 201 ◽  
pp. 176-194 ◽  
Author(s):  
Felix Wemheuer

AbstractIn the aftermath of the famine in 1962, Mao Zedong took formal responsibility for the failure of the Great Leap Forward in the name of the central government. Thousands of local cadres were made scapegoats and were legally punished. This article focuses on the question of how the different levels of the Chinese state, such as the central government, the province and the county, have dealt with the question of responsibility for the famine. The official explanation for the failure of the Great Leap will be compared to unofficial memories of intellectuals, local cadres and villagers. The case study of Henan province shows that local cadres are highly dissatisfied with the official evaluation of responsibility. Villagers bring suffering, starvation and terror into the discourse, but these memories are constructed in a way to preserve village harmony. This article explains why these different discourses about responsibility of the famine are unlinked against the background of the “dual society”; the separation between urban and rural China. Finally, it will be shown that the Communist Party was unable to convince parts of society and the Party to accept the official interpretation.


Author(s):  
A. James Gregor ◽  
Susan Xue

Throughout the history of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), disagreement has existed concerning the extent to which Chinese Communism might be considered authentically Marxist. In general, most of the available literature tends to simply accept the Chinese Communist self-identification as Marxist. No binding consensus among independent Sinologists, however, is found and resistance has taken on a variety of forms throughout the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)—some partisan and some genuinely analytic. The academic literature produced during the entire period of CCP rule in China has been characterized by wide differences in the acceptance of its Marxist authenticity. It has always been tacitly or explicitly accepted that the Marxism of the CCP at its founding in 1920–1921 was in a form acceptable to the Bolshevik rulers of revolutionary Russia. Having been founded directly through the influence of the Third (or Leninist) International, the CCP had to conform to the Bolshevik interpretation of Marxism. Since Lenin had taken “creative” liberties with the original doctrine, some have maintained that the Marxism of the CCP had never been truly Marxist. To add further difficulty to any analysis of the Marxism of the CCP, it is generally understood that Mao Zedong, who gradually assumed the leadership of the CCP, was not particularly well versed in any variant of Marxism. Over the years and under the pressure of circumstances, Mao delivered varied formulations of his revolutionary ideology. How much those formulations accorded with any variant of Marxism became a matter of interpretation. Some scholars hold that by the time of the “Great Leap Forward,” Mao had devised his own ideology. All of this speculation generated controversy within the CCP leadership. By the time of Mao’s demise in 1976, the doctrine of a “second revolution” animated Deng Xiaoping and his followers. It is still a matter of considerable controversy whether that post-Maoist doctrine, in any sense, is Marxist in content or aspiration.


2019 ◽  
Vol 30 (4) ◽  
pp. 443-456 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Ji Wang

The present study looks into the much-neglected history of neurasthenia in Maoist China in relation to the development of psy sciences. It begins with an examination of the various factors that transformed neurasthenia into a major health issue from the late 1950s to mid-1960s. It then investigates a distinctive culture of therapeutic experiment of neurasthenia during this period, with emphasis on the ways in which psy scientists and medical practitioners manoeuvred in a highly politicized environment. The study concludes with a discussion of the legacy of these neurasthenia studies – in particular, the experiment with the famous ‘speedy and synthetic therapy’ – and of the implications the present study may have for future historical study of psychiatry and science.


1983 ◽  
Vol 96 ◽  
pp. 703-719 ◽  
Author(s):  
Shiao-Ling Yu

Poetry in the People's Republic of China during the past 30 years has been dominated by works intensely political in nature – a kind of poetry known by the name zhengzhi shuqing shi (political lyric). The function of this poetry was to eulogize current political movements and to generate public support for them. This phenomenon reached its height during the xin minge yundong (New Folksong Movement) of 1958 when millions of peasants were mobilized to write poetry to praise the Great Leap Forward and the people's commune. Even when the Great Leap backfired and a widespread famine ensued, poetry was still boasting of “commune members piling rice all the way to the sky.” The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966–76) proved a greater disaster than the Great Leap Forward, hence, the greater need for poetry to supply optimism. It was also a time of personality cult and xiandai mixin (modern superstition); poetry was therefore obliged to provide eulogies. To meet these demands, large quantities of what poet Gong Liu called “huanhu shi” (hail-to-the-chief poems) flooded the market. Many of them were considered to be little more than “rhymed lies.”


1974 ◽  
Vol 60 ◽  
pp. 668-698 ◽  
Author(s):  
David M. Lampton

Heretofore, analysts have argued that one characteristic of mobilization in China is to provide uniformity in policy direction. This paper sets out to demonstrate that, in at least the public health area, a diverse set of public policies was pursued even in a period as apparently “radical” as the Great Leap Forward (1958–60). The reason for this policy diversity is that different segments of health policy were made in different political arenas, or institutional settings; the pressures, perceptions and resources which characterized one of these political arenas did not necessarily characterize another. The “failures” of the Leap did not simply arise from a ubiquitous “radical” assertion of power but, on the contrary, resulted from the inconsistencies in leadership and programme characteristic of diverse policy-making arenas. Because policy-making responsibility is divided among political arenas, political bargaining and conflict have characterized the allocation to them of different health issues; elaborate strategies have been devised by organizations in order to acquire and /or hold certain areas of policy and unburden themselves of others.


Early China ◽  
2013 ◽  
Vol 35 ◽  
pp. 1-35 ◽  

When Li Xueqin was born in Beijing on 28 March, 1933, the Republic of China was in power, with its capital in Nanjing, and the Japanese occupied Manchuria. On 29 July 1937 Japanese troops invaded Beijing and brought it under control in little more than a week. The occupation of Beijing lasted until the Japanese surrender in August 1945. The People's Liberation Army entered Beijing in the end of January of 1949 and on 1 October 1949, when Li Xueqin was sixteen, Mao Zedong proclaimed the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This period of warfare was followed by periods of political turmoil which often centered around intellectuals—thought reform in the early fifties, the anti-rightest campaigns and the Great Leap Forward of the late fifties and early sixties, the Cultural Revolution from the mid-sixties to the mid-seventies.


2019 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 58
Author(s):  
Hsiung-Shen Jung ◽  
Jui-Lung Chen

The founding of the People’s Republic of China did not put an end to the political struggle of the Communist Party of China (CPC), whose policies on economic development still featured political motivation. China launched the Great Leap Forward Movement from the late 1950s to the early 1960s, in hope of modernizing its economy. Why this movement was initiated and how it evolved subsequently were affected by manifold reasons, such as the aspiration to rapid revolutionary victory, the mistakes caused by highly centralized decision-making, and the impact exerted by the Soviet Union. However, the movement was plagued by the nationwide famine that claimed tens of millions of lives. Thus, fueled by the Forging Ahead Strategy advocated by Mao Zedong, the Great Leap Forward that was influenced by political factors not only ended up with utter failure, but also deteriorated the previously sluggish economy to such an extent that the future economic, political and social development was severely damaged. This study will explore the causes, consequences and impact of the Great Leap Forward in China.


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