The Great-Power Triangle and Chinese Foreign Policy

1969 ◽  
Vol 39 ◽  
pp. 41-54 ◽  
Author(s):  
John Gittings

“Oppose the strategy of striking with two ‘fists’ in two directions at the same time, and uphold the strategy of striking with one ‘fist’ in one direction at one time.” This is a good year for looking back at the triangular relationship between China, the Soviet Union and the United States—and not only because it is the twentieth anniversary of the People's Republic. For it is also a year which has seen the contradictions in this relationship sharpened to an extreme and almost satirical degree.

Author(s):  
Thomas J. Christensen

This chapter examines the Sino-Soviet split and its implications for the United States' policies in Asia, Europe, and the Americas during the period 1956–1964. Coordination and comity in the communist camp peaked between 1953 and 1957, but alliance between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC) was relatively short-lived. This was caused by ideological differences, distrust, and jealous rivalries for international leadership between Nikita Khrushchev and Mao Zedong. The chapter explains what caused the strain in Sino-Soviet relations, and especially the collapse of Sino-Soviet military and economic cooperation. It also considers the effects of the Sino-Soviet disputes on third-party communists in Asia, China's foreign policy activism, and the catalytic effect of the Sino-Soviet split on Soviet foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson

Chapters 2 and 3 helped confirm that rising states support declining great powers when decliners can help rising states against other great power threats. In contrast, Chapters 4 and 5 assess the logic of rising state predation by examining the United States’ response to the Soviet Union’s decline in the 1980s and early 1990s. Chapter 4 first provides an overview of the Soviet Union’s waning relative position and discusses U.S. efforts to monitor the trend. Next, it reviews existing research on the course of U.S. strategy and relates this work to alternative accounts of rising state policy. The bulk of the chapter then uses extensive archival research to evaluate the factors central to predation theory and predict U.S. strategy given the argument. These predictions are analyzed in Chapter 5.


2021 ◽  
pp. 80-126
Author(s):  
Derek Chollet

This chapter examines how Eisenhower, H. W. Bush, and Obama reacted when their foreign policy strategies were tested by crises and unexpected events. This chapter revisits Eisenhower’s aid to besieged French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in 1954. It also discusses his handling of two crises in October 1956 over Suez and the Soviet invasion in Hungary, just days before his reelection. It examines how Bush led the United States during the critical period of 1991—with the aftermath of the first Persian Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union after a failed coup in August 1991. Finally, the chapter also analyzes how Obama approached the Arab Spring, which started in 2011, specifically focusing on his response to conflicts in Libya and Syria.


Proxy War ◽  
2019 ◽  
pp. 182-200
Author(s):  
Tyrone L. Groh

This chapter presents a case study for how India initially supported the LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) covertly to protect ethnic Tamils in Sri Lanka and then later had to overtly intervene to stop LTTE’s operations during efforts to broker peace. For the duration of the conflict, India’s support remained covert and plausibly deniable. Inside Sri Lanka, the character of the conflict was almost exclusively ethnic and involved the government in Colombo trying to prevent the emergence of an independent Tamil state. Internationally, the United States, the Soviet Union, and most other global powers, for the most part, remained sidelined. Domestically, India’s government had to balance its foreign policy with concerns about its sympathetic Tamil population and the threat of several different secessionist movements inside its own borders. The India-LTTE case reflects history’s most costly proxy war policy.


2019 ◽  
Vol 95 (6) ◽  
pp. 1423-1441
Author(s):  
Dong Jung Kim

Abstract Economic containment has garnered repeated attention in the discourse about the United States' response to China. Yet, the attributes of economic containment as a distinct strategy of Great Power competition remain unclear. Moreover, the conditions under which a leading power can employ economic containment against a challenging power remain theoretically unelaborated. This article first suggests that economic containment refers to the use of economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material capacity to start military aggression, rather than to influence the competitor's behaviour over a specific issue. Then, this article suggests that economic containment becomes a viable option when the leading power has the ability to inflict more losses on the challenging power through economic restrictions, and this ability is largely determined by the availability of alternative economic partners. When the leading power cannot effectively inflict more losses on the challenging power due to the presence of alternative economic partners, it is better off avoiding economic containment. The author substantiates these arguments through case-studies of the United States' responses to the Soviet Union during the Cold War. The article concludes by examining the nature of the United States' recent economic restrictions against China.


Author(s):  
Damion L. Thomas

This chapter highlights the formalization of U.S. Cold War sport foreign policy. As the Soviet Union reentered the Olympic movement in 1952, sport took on heightened meaning, and became a proxy for combat in the atomic age. Thus, this chapter highlights how the two superpowers fought for athletic supremacy, as well as how the United States developed a program of international athletic goodwill tours as a means to counteract the Soviet Union's successful implementation of its own athletic foreign policy program. Sports became a crucial Cold War weapon that deployed the notions of strength and cultural, political, and economic superiority over the Soviet Union.


1985 ◽  
Vol 64 (2) ◽  
pp. 366
Author(s):  
William Diebold ◽  
Robert L. Paarlberg

1946 ◽  
Vol 8 (4) ◽  
pp. 456-474
Author(s):  
N. S. Timasheff

On the two victory days, military action on the fronts stopped. But peace did not return, nor does anyone know when it will. Peace is not simply absence of military .ction. It is a state of international relations corresponding to “periods of normalcy” in the internal affairs of a nation. Peace exists, when these relations are dominated by good will, mutual understanding and friendly cooperation.The post-war world longs for peace. But there is no peace because, among the sovereign states, there is one which acts against peace. This is the Soviet Union. Is it, however, certain that the foreign policy of the Soviets is aggressive? Is it not true that, in Moscow, aggressiveness is ascribed to the United States and to the alleged Western bloc headed by it?In March, 1946, Professor E. Tarle, an authoritative spokesman of the Soviet government, placed in opposition “the old imperialistic concept of international relations” practiced by London and Washington and “the Soviet conception which is based on respect for the rights of the peoples and their real independence.”


Author(s):  
Dar'ya Viktorovna Yakupova ◽  
Roman Aleksandrovich Yakupov

The relevance of this research is defined by the need for analyzing the historical experience of adaptation of foreign economic activity of the Soviet State to the challenges of Western policy deterrence, the imperatives of which are being applied to Russia in the current context. The subject of this research is the Soviet grain procurement crisis and foreign policy ways for its overcoming. The object of this research is trade and diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. The scientific novelty lies in elaboration of the concept of “commercial diplomacy” – the foreign economic activity of the USSR government aimed at solution of the domestic problems and tasks of modernization. Leaning on the newly introduced sources, the conclusion is made that the policy of commercial diplomacy implemented by the Soviet Union suggested the use of international dialogue within the framework of cooperation between the governments and public-private business circles on achieving the economic goals associated with the national interests of the Soviet Union. The critical need for grain procurement, discovery of the oil resources potential, and détente in the international relations between the two superpowers led to a new round in the Soviet Union – United States relations. It is underlined that grain and oil manifested as the factor of maintaining domestic political stability and the object of foreign policy exchange. The article answers the question: how the grain procurement problem has transformed from the economic into social issue, and the grain import has become the vulnerable spot of the Soviet Union in the ideological confrontation with the United States, and the object of international relations.


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