International Order and the Access Problem of the Defeated Hegemon: the Case of Russia in the Post-Cold War Era

It has been evident that Russia as the heir of Soviet foreign policy, could neither achieve to integrate herself into the international order, nor could the international order achieve to find a solution to Russian foreign policy identity quest. As long as Russia cannot find a stable and permanent status for herself in the world politics, her foreign policy will signify a permanent instability on the behalf of the international order. The current hegemonic international order is far from residing technical capabilities in terms of satisfying Russia’s foreign policy expectations, because it is unprecedentedly rigid in terms of allowing or refusing the incorporation of hegemonic power like Russia. While it cannot return to multipolarity, it could not set a community based international order either. Since the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, it entered into a lightness of exposing Russia to make clear-cut choices in her foreign policy. As much as the current international order was founded upon liberal anti-Soviet values, its demands from the new members would much higher that especially Russia would not easily adapt herself to.

Soviet Entrance to the Middle East and Manoeuvring between Superpowers—the Case of Israel and Egypt

This article focuses on the strategies that Moscow chose during the first decade after World War II to overcome the obstacles created by the West to its entrance into the Middle East. The cases of Israel in 1948 and Egypt in 1955 show two different entry strategies used by Moscow and reflect significant changes in Soviet foreign policy that occurred between Stalin and Khrushchev toward developing countries. In 1948 Stalin chose an indirect and often tacit support of Israel, while in 1955 Khrushchev opted for a more direct approach with Egypt. Khrushchev’s confident tactics presented Moscow with new opportunities in the Middle East and the developing nations but also created long term challenges for the Soviet regime. At the same time, Israel and Egypt successfully maneuvered between Moscow and the West to gain maximum benefits for their national security needs by using both camps of the Cold War.

Suomi Moskovasta nähtynä: Suurvaltapolitiikan, sisällissodan ja vallankumouksen leikkauspisteessä 1920–1930

The focus of this research is on Finland’s role in Soviet Union’s calculation of its foreign policy between 1920 and 1930. This was the first decade of both Finnish independence and of Soviet power in Russia. This book answers questions about the objectives of Soviet foreign policy in Finland, on the contacts used by the Soviet legation to obtain information, and on how well the Soviets understood Finland’s objectives. People interested in Finland and in Russian perspectives with regards to foreign policy and neighbouring countries will find much new in this book because it relies on formerly unpublished Russian archival material to form the basis for charting Soviet objectives in Finland. The book shows that the Soviets primarily observed Finland in a larger regional context along with other states on its borders in the Baltic Sea region. The global objectives of the revolution and the Soviet Union, but also the domestic political situation in both countries, are reflected on this framework. The period was characterized by forced collectivization in the Soviet Union and, in Finland, by the rise of the right-wing Lapua Movement that emerged at the onset of the Great Depression, laying the foundations for the most severe crisis in the relations during 1929–1930 when the issues surrounding these events destabilized simultaneously the society and political decision-making in both countries.

Czechoslovakia and Soviet Foreign Policy

Although not addressed in his study of Soviet foreign policy in postwar Europe, Norman Naimark believes the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948 would make an ideal subject for a future monograph.

Problems of the formation of Soviet-Iranian relations in the interwar period (1918 – 1939)

The article examines the complex process of the formation of bilateral relations between the RSFSR / USSR and Iran in the period between the two World Wars. The desire of the parties to establish bilateral relations on an equal, mutually beneficial basis-in accordance with the spirit and letter of the Moscow Treaty of 1921 – is revealed. There are permanent difficulties on the way of rapprochement between the two countries, caused, among other things, by the undisguised interference of England in the internal affairs of Iran. The article reveals the colonial essence of the British policy in Iran, reflected in the Anglo-Iranian treaty of 1921. The Iranian people showed growing dissatisfaction with the British dominance, demanded that the authorities put an end to it, and at the same time called on them to strengthen good-neighborly relations with the RSFSR. The paper traces the main milestones in the development of Soviet-Iranian relations after the state transition in Iran in 1921, and states positive results in bilateral cooperation in political, trade, economic and other spheres. Separately, the anti-Soviet foreign policy of the Shah’s regime at the turn of the 20-30s is traced, which caused great damage to the relations of the RSFSR with Iran. When analyzing the process of Iran’s rapprochement with Nazi Germany, it is emphasized that the pro-German course of Reza Shah Pahlavi not only created problems for the safe existence of Iran, but also, in general, threatened peace and stability in the Middle East.

Political and administrative support of the American Exhibition of 1959 in Moscow

The topic of decision-making in the sphere of foreign policy propaganda and counter-propaganda in the USSR of the mid XX century is poorly studied within the Russian historiography. The object of this research is the administrative decision-making process by political and administrative authorities in the context of reversal of directions and development of the new techniques in the Soviet foreign policy. The subject of this research is the organization of work on counter-propaganda in the process of preparing and hosting the American Exhibition in Moscow in 1959. The goal consists in determination of specificity of administrative activity in the sphere of propaganda and counter-propaganda. The author set the following tasks: identification of the organizational-administrative forms of ideological activity on the organization of exhibition; determination of the algorithm for making administrative decisions in this sphere; description of the tasks solved by the administrative authorities at different stages of this process depending on the implemented techniques. Research methodology is based on the documentary analysis (informative and textological) using the materials from the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History. The main conclusion lies in revealing the specificity of decision-making at different stages conducting such activity. The first stage is the analysis of actions of the American side and the forecast of possible response of the Soviet citizens to the information acquired during exhibition. This resulted in the development of preliminary proposals on adopting the measures to reduce the propaganda effect of the exhibition. The second stage is the political decision-making on holding the counter-propaganda events, development and approval of the particular action plan at the session of the Municipal Committee of CPSU. This stages mars the establishment of the two blocks of measures were formed: distraction of the Soviet citizens from exhibition, and measures on reduction of the propaganda effect (counter-propaganda). The third stage indicates positive perception of the exhibition by the Soviet citizens, which did not fully resolved the set tasks, and thus, required additional measures that would give the appearance of the critical attitude of Soviet people towards the exhibition.