scholarly journals China and the US Alliance System

2017 ◽  
Vol 233 ◽  
pp. 137-165 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam P. Liff

AbstractIn recent years, scholarship examining US and security allies’ responses to China's rapidly growing power and “assertive” policies towards its neighbours has proliferated. The English-language literature remains relatively one-sided, however. Crucial to understanding the complex forces driving strategic competition in the contemporary Asia-Pacific are comprehensive surveys of how Chinese views are evolving. This study draws extensively on Chinese sources to update existing scholarship, much of it two decades old, with a particular focus on recent Chinese reactions to major developments concerning the US-centred alliance system – a foundational element of the 65-year-old regional order. Beijing expresses deepening frustration towards, and even open opposition to, recent alliance strengthening, and instead champions alternative security architectures free of what it alleges to be “exclusive,” “zero-sum,” “Cold-war relic” US-centred alliances. Proposals for concrete pathways to operationalizing these abstract visions that take into account contemporary political and security realities (for example, North Korea), however, appear less forthcoming.

Author(s):  
Andrew Yeo

Something remarkable has occurred in Asia with little fanfare over the past twenty-five years. Considered severely underinstitutionalized at the end of the Cold War, Asia’s regional architecture is now characterized by a complex patchwork of overlapping alliances and multilateral institutions. How did this happen? Why should we care? And what does this mean for the future of regional order and Asian security? Adopting a new framework grounded in historical institutionalism, this book examines the transformation of Asia’s regional architecture from 1945 to the present. The book traces institutional and political developments in Asia beginning with the emergence of the postwar US bilateral alliance system and covers the debate and contention behind the rise of several post–Cold War multilateral initiatives. These include the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, ASEAN Regional Forum, East Asian Summit, Trans-Pacific Partnership, China-Japan-Korea Trilateral Summit, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and the Belt and Road Initiative, among others. Asian policy makers have endeavored to create a set of rules, norms, and institutions to build confidence, facilitate cooperation, improve governance, and ultimately bring peace and order to a region fraught with underlying historical and political tensions. Although Asia’s complex patchwork of institutions may exacerbate regional rivalries, the book demonstrates how overlapping institutions may ultimately bring greater stability to the region.


2020 ◽  
Vol 96 (1) ◽  
pp. 1-7 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kai He ◽  
Mingjiang Li

Abstract As a geographical concept, ‘Indo-Pacific’ has existed for decades. As a political and strategic concept, it has since 2010 gradually become established in the foreign policy lexicon of some countries, especially Australia, India, Japan and the United States. However, China seems to be reluctant to identify itself as part of the Indo-Pacific; Chinese leaders believe that the US-led Indo-Pacific strategy aims to contain China's rise. While the battle between the two geographical concepts ‘Indo-Pacific’ and ‘Asia–Pacific’ may be fairly easily settled in the future, US–China strategic competition has just begun. Will the Indo-Pacific become a battlefield for US–China rivalry? How will China cope with the US ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ (FOIP) strategy? How will other regional actors respond to the US–China strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific? What are the strategic implications of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ concept for regional order transformation? How will the Indo-Pacific be institutionalized, economically, politically and strategically? This article introduces the January 2020 special issue of International Affairs, which aims to address those questions, using both country-specific and regional perspectives. Seven articles focus on the policy responses of major players (Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan and ASEAN) to the US FOIP strategy and related US–China rivalry in the region. A further three articles examine the profound implications of Indo-Pacific dynamics for regional institution-building and for geopolitical and geo-economic architecture.


Author(s):  
Bhubhindar Singh

Northeast Asia is usually associated with conflict and war. Out of the five regional order transitions from the Sinocentric order to the present post–Cold War period, only one was peaceful, the Cold War to post–Cold War transition. In fact, the peaceful transition led to a state of minimal peace in post–Cold War Northeast Asia. As the chapter discusses, this was due to three realist-liberal factors: America’s hegemonic role, strong economic interdependence, and a stable institutional structure. These factors not only ensured development and prosperity but also mitigated the negative effects of political and strategic tensions between states. However, this minimal peace is in danger of unraveling. Since 2010, the region is arguably in the early stages of another transition fueled by the worsening Sino-US competition. While the organizing ideas of liberal internationalism—economic interdependence and institutional building—will remain resilient, whether or not minimal peace is sustainable will be determined by the outcome of the US-China competition.


Author(s):  
Tatheer Zahra Sherazi ◽  
Amna Mahmood

Asia Pacific, which is extended Eastward to the states of Oceania, Westward to Pakistan, Southward to New Zealand, and Northward to Mongolia, is currently a pivot of the globe due to its economic growth. Since last two decades, it has got status of ‘growth center’ owing to its high economic growth rate. The United States (US) had been very active in Asia Pacific throughout the Cold War period, but in post-Cold War era, it was disengaged due to its pre-occupation in Middle East. However, the rise of China attracted US again with multiple arrangements at political, economic and social fronts. There are two world views about the US presence in Asia Pacific. The first one asserts that the Asia Pacific is more secure without the presence of US, while others takes the US presence as a patron for stability and solidarity within the region. The US policy of ‘Pivot to Asia’, ‘Asia Pacific’ commonly known as ‘Rebalancing’ ensured its new commitment of deep engagement in Southeast Asia. Policy shift under Trump administration from ‘Pivot to Asia’ to ‘Free Indo-Pacific’ has direct as well indirect implications for Pakistan. The study analyses the US strategies and polices under the theory of ‘Offensive Realism,’ where ‘rational powers uncertain of intentions and capable of military offensive strive to survive’. Analytical, descriptive approaches are adopted in order to analyse US ongoing strategies.


Author(s):  
Andrew Yeo

This chapter demonstrates elements of change and continuity in Asia’s regional architecture between the waning years of the Cold War and the Asian financial crisis. Despite the external shock of the Cold War, I argue that the path to change is best captured by endogenous processes of change where mechanisms of change and continuity intersect. The first part of the chapter chronicles the development of two multilateral institutions: the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and the ASEAN Regional Forum. The second part demonstrates the continuity of bilateral alliances, focusing on the US-Japan and US-Philippines alliance.


2020 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 163-186
Author(s):  
Deborah Welch Larson

Abstract Yan Xuetong’s Leadership and the Rise of Great Powers argues that China should follow moral values in its foreign policy in order to attain international leadership. Drawing on ancient Chinese thought, Yan makes the case that China should strive for humane authority, influencing other states by leading through moral example and attracting supporters through providing benefits rather than using coercion. This essay evaluates the feasibility of China’s attainment of humane authority, which is related to status. Humane authority follows norms consistently toward rivals as well as friendly states whereas a hegemon uses a double standard. But double standards may not be so easily avoided because they derive from inherent psychological bias. The option of acquiring followers by providing them with security guarantees is not available to China in East Asia because of the prior existence of the US alliance system. Yan predicts that China’s growth will lead to a bipolar structure but points out that the conditions for a Cold War are absent. Nevertheless, technological competition between the US and China could lead to a ‘new Cold War’, which would hamper China’s efforts to widen its circle of followers. To be a humane authority, China should also avoid a war with the USA. There is a risk that naval competition could lead to local conflicts as a result of security dilemma dynamics. The two states should control status rivalry through a division of labour, by accepting the other’s pre-eminence in different areas through social cooperation.


2019 ◽  
Vol 74 (2) ◽  
pp. 225-239 ◽  
Author(s):  
Adam Lajeunesse ◽  
Rob Huebert

Dating to the early Cold War, Canada and the US have disagreed on the status of the Northwest Passage. For Canada, the waters of the Arctic Archipelago are internal, historic waters. For the US, the sea route is an international strait. Despite this fundamental disagreement, cooperation between the two states in the Arctic has long been effective and friendly. In part, this can be attributed to decades of careful diplomacy, which has strategically set aside the intractable legal questions in favour of a comfortable “agree-to-disagree” arrangement. In the age of MAGA diplomacy under President Donald Trump, this successful system appears at risk. With discussion of Arctic freedom of navigation voyages for the US Navy becoming commonplace, and the old diplomatic safeguards breaking down in favour a new zero-sum foreign policy approach, Canada may soon face a new challenge to its Arctic sovereignty.


2021 ◽  
Vol 58 (2) ◽  
pp. 46-61
Author(s):  
Rob Wilson

As an ethical and aesthetic mandate for the new millenium, the Cold War repression of Hiroshima within the American political imaginaryneeds to be symbolically confronted and undoneat national as well as global levels.As Americans and as Japanese citizens of the liberal global order, we must mutually move beyond the Cold War situation of historical repression that had obtained in 1965, when novelist Kenzaburo Ōelamented, “To put the matter plainly and bluntly, people everywhere on this earth are trying to forget Hiroshima and the unspeakable tragedy perpetrated there.” However traumatic, Americans and their allies must try to remember this Hiroshima sublimeas a trauma of geopolitical dominationand racialized hegemony across the Pacific Ocean. By thinking through and re-imagining the techno-euphoric grandeur of this Hiroshima sublime, as well as representing the ideological complicity of ordinary Americans in their own sublime (rapturedby these technological forces of sublimity as manifesting and globally installingPatriot missilesas signs of theirglobal supremacy) and ordinary Japanese (citizens of the Empire of the Sun fascinatedby self-sublation into zeros of solar force) in the production of this nuclear sublime, we can begin to mutually recognize that a ‘post-nuclear’era offers new possibilities and symbolic ties between America and Japan as Pacific powers. This post-nuclear era emerges out of World War II freighted with terror and wonder as a double possibility:at once urging the globe towards annihilation andyet also towards transactional and dialogical unityat the transnational border of national self-imagining. The phobic masochism of the sublime can no longer operate in a transnational world of global/local linkages, although the technological sublimity of the Persian Gulf War had suggested otherwise, withits “sublime Patriot”missiles and quasi-nuclear landscapes lingering in the world deserts from Iraq and Afganistan to Nevada and North Korea.


2015 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 3-20
Author(s):  
Tsuneo Akaha

How stable is the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era? Have the “end of history”, the “end of the Cold War”, the end of a “hegemonic world”, and the “end of geography” (or the beginning of a borderless world economy) so altered the national security needs and priorities of the United States and Japan that they no longer need or desire the security alliance they have maintained since 1952? Will the alliance remain the anchor of Japanese and US policies in the Asia-Pacific region? In the age of multilateralism, will the two countries seek multilateral alternatives that will replace the bilateral alliance? In this brief analysis, I will review the ongoing debate in Japan and in the United States concerning the future of the US-Japan security alliance in the post-Cold War era.DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v4i0.415 Mongolian Journal of International Affairs Vol.4 2007: 3-20


Author(s):  
Alice Garner ◽  
Diane Kirkby

During the Cold War the Fulbright program was considered an effective arm of US ‘soft power’ and cultural diplomacy. The US saw Australia as strategically valuable in the Asia-Pacific region of the world and under the Menzies Liberal Party government, Australia shared the US military and defence agenda. How could the Fulbright program maintain its independence from government interference in the powerful force of Cold War geopolitics? Australia’s Fulbright Board held strongly to the importance of independence and the role of academics to ensure that.


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