scholarly journals Party Building as Institutional Bricolage: Asserting Authority at the Business Frontier

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-22
Author(s):  
Daniel Koss
Keyword(s):  
Private Sector ◽  
Institutional Change ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Second Life ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Adaptive Governance ◽  
Organizational Infrastructure ◽  
Party Building ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Institutional Bricolage

Abstract The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is expanding its organizational infrastructure in the private sector, revealing the dynamics of CCP-style institutional change. Party building follows a distinct version of adaptive governance. Hesitant to rely on innovative tools alone, organizers productively tinker with traditional and disparate elements. Grassroots Party organs, sanctified by their venerable history, are redeployed – initially for modest purposes that fall short of their original revolutionary potential. The Party's surge in private-sector firms was triggered by technocrats overhauling Leninist systems to reconnect to Party members; the search for a broader mission came later. To empower CCP organs in companies, organizers use tactical precedents ranging from incentives to negotiations around Party financing, and membership discipline. Combining tactics from different eras, overseas Party building deploys old organizational arrangements to new ends, whereas digitization gives time-worn procedures a second life. The inclination for institutional bricolage is a deeply rooted hallmark of innovation in Chinese statecraft.

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China

1983 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 108-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Daily Activities ◽  
New Members ◽  
National Congress ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
General Effort ◽  
Typical Gesture

On 1 September 1982, 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates convened the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The meeting was announced in advance (at the seventh plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in Beijing 4–10 August) and proceeded with well-rehearsed smoothness to its scheduled adjournment 15 days later. The meeting agenda conformed closely to established protocol, consisting of speeches and work reports, discussion and adoption of a new Party constitution, culminating in the election of new members to the Central Committee and other “standing” (i.e. permanently tenured) positions and convention of the first plenary meetings of these organs. The meeting began on 1 September with a relatively brief opening speech by Deng Xiaoping, the presiding chairman (though in a typical gesture to collective leadership there were no less than nine other presiding chairmen), and was followed by Hu Yaobang's comprehensive report and by speeches or reports by Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others. These documents were all published as part of a general effort at greater publicity that included prior announcement of the dates of convention and adjournment, invitation of more than 70 responsible persons from democratic parties, non-Party patriots and other well-known personages from various circles to attend as observers (as had been done previously during the Eighth Congress), fairly detailed reporting of the election of deputies, their assembly and daily activities, arrangements and so forth, and even a sort of press conference that Zhu Muzhi, spokesman of the conference, held for Chinese and foreign reporters – although no foreign Communist Party members or foreign journalists were permitted to attend the Congress itself.

Writers' Criticism of the Party in 1942

1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 205-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Lower Rank ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Intellectuals ◽  
Party Power

The angry outbursts of Chinese intellectuals against the Chinese Communist Party at the time of the Hundred Flowers in 1956–57 revealed that China's intellectuals, even those who were oriented towards the left, were in conflict with many of the Party's practices. Actually, this tension between the Party and the intellectuals had been smouldering for a long time. It had come to the surface many years earlier during the Cheng Feng movement in Yenan in the early 1940s. At that time the Party, as it did later in the Hundred Flowers period, embarked on a drive “to rectify the style of work” of both Party members and intellectuals. One aspect of this drive was that the Party encouraged intellectuals and lower-rank cadres to speak out on the misuses of Party power.

Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
State Administration ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.

Revamping the Chinese Communist Party

2015 ◽  
Vol 07 (01) ◽  
pp. 16-26
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Market Economy ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Action Plan ◽  
Institutional Reforms ◽  
Party Building ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

The 2014 Party reform aimed to modernise the CCP. The Politburo passed the “Action Plan for Deepening Party-building Institutional Reforms”, outlining 26 concrete reforms in four key areas to be completed by 2017. Notable departures include the re-emphasis on ideological unity, the rollback on intra-party democracy, the renewed emphasis on intra-party legislation and the control on the growth of the Party's size. However there are inherent dilemmas in building a Leninist party in a globalised market economy.

Enlightened One-Party Rule? Ideological Differences between Chinese Communist Party Members and the Mass Public

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 651-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengyuan Ji ◽  
Junyan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
International Exchange ◽  
Political Pluralism ◽  
The Public ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Mind Set

A popular view of nondemocratic regimes is that they draw followers mainly from those with an illiberal, authoritarian mind-set. We challenge this view by arguing that there exist a different class of autocracies that rule with a relatively enlightened base. Leveraging multiple nationally representative surveys from China over the past decade, we substantiate this claim by estimating and comparing the ideological preferences of Chinese Communist Party members and ordinary citizens. We find that party members on average hold substantially more modern and progressive views than the public on issues such as gender equality, political pluralism, and openness to international exchange. We also explore two mechanisms that may account for this party–public value gap—selection and socialization. We find that while education-based selection is the most dominant mechanism overall, socialization also plays a role, especially among older and less educated party members. Our findings caution against the simple, dichotomous characterization of political regimes and underscore an important tension between modernization and democratization in developing societies.

Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams

2013 ◽  
Vol 214 ◽  
pp. 394-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Peng-Hsiang Kao
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Political Propaganda ◽  
Secret Code ◽  
Unknown System ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

AbstractWithin the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Party units have established a largely unknown network of writing teams which propagate the policies or perspectives of a particular unit by publishing feature articles in Party journals. These writing teams often make use of a pseudonym in the form of a person's name, leading outsiders to believe that the work is written by a journalist. In fact, the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams function as a form of secret code. Through this code, inner Party members can recognize which unit's views an article reflects. In order to reveal exactly which units the codes represent, we have collated the names of over 20 writing teams. In addition, we provide an introduction to the functioning of the writing teams and the manner in which articles are produced. Finally, we propose that the CCP's mechanism of “propaganda codes” is gradually undergoing the process of institutionalization.

Surveillance and the Industrial Purge

2020 ◽  
pp. 305-342
Author(s):  
Ewing Mahoney
Keyword(s):  
Cold War ◽  
Private Sector ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Civil Service ◽  
Legal Issues ◽  
Private Industry ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Cold War ◽  
Underlying Theme ◽  
Security Procedures

This chapter examines the vetting and purging of workers in the private sector. It was the ‘longstanding practice’ even before the Cold War that the purge and other security procedures extended well beyond the civil service into private industry. This ‘longstanding practice’ could operate only because of the surveillance work undertaken by MI5, in both compiling and maintaining the blacklist of Communist Party members. In the case of the private-sector exclusion of Communists, it was left to MI5 to secure the removal of workers to whom the Service objected: MI5 may have had no authority, but it had power. One question for this chapter is thus the legal issues surrounding such intervention and the potential legal liabilities to which it could give rise, while another is the scope of the authority and the manner and circumstances in which intervention might take place. However, the underlying theme is the question of accountability.

Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP

1971 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 677-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Bing
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mass Movement ◽  
Early Years ◽  
The Other ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
The One

The formative years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long remained one of the most obscure periods in the recent past of China. There remain many puzzles about why and how the alliances, between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, came about in the early 1920s.For the last four years I have been studying the establishment and first years of the CCP, at the same time paying attention to the foundation and first years of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV), which was later to become the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI). In this connexion I have been specially interested in outlining the origins of that strategy whereby Communist Party members entered a nationalist mass movement and tried to capture it from within.

scholarly journals Interest Representation and the Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 57-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Yongnian
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
80Th Anniversary ◽  
Interest Representation ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Private Entrepreneurs

At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to admit into its ranks of 'outstanding social elements' of private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial personnel from non-state firms and MNCs. Party ideologues, however, have raised a great hue and cry. In order to establish his political legacy, the CCP leadership has intensified the campaign to educate its cadres and members. Reform and development have bourgeoisified and benefited many party members and cadres. Jiang's public support of the capitalists is not going against the tide but is a recognition of reality instead. In fact, to continue to grow and expand, the party must embrace the better educated and the most enterprising in society. The capitalists within the party will certainly be catalysts to quicken the transformation of the party. In its attempt to admit capitalists, has the CCP unknowingly let in the Trojan horse? Jiang Zemin's original aim may have been to strengthen the party-state by broadening its social base. And as the party metamorphoses, perhaps into a kind of social democratic party, Jiang will be favourably judged for paving the way for such a metamorphosis. Nevertheless, it is not an easy transition: insurmountable difficulties lie ahead for the party leadership.

scholarly journals Of Constitutions, Campaigns and Commissions: A Century of Democratic Centralism under the CCP

2021 ◽  
pp. 1-21
Author(s):  
Patricia M. Thornton
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Adaptive Governance ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Contemporary China ◽  
Party Organizations ◽  
Democratic Centralism ◽  
Organizational Principle ◽  
History Of ◽  
Party Congress

Abstract Democratic centralism, a hallmark of Leninist party organizations, has played a formative role in the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet despite being hailed as an “inviolable” and “unchanging” Party principle, understandings of democratic centralism have shifted dramatically over the century of its existence. This study traces the long arc of the concept's evolution across successive Party Constitutions, focusing on three critical historical junctures: the Sixth Party Congress, which formally adopted democratic centralism into its Constitution as an organizational principle; the Seventh Party Congress, which adopted rectification as the Party's practice of democratic centralism; and the 19th Party Congress, which set a new milestone in codifying the system as a disciplinary tool. I argue that while democratic centralism exemplifies the CCP's institutional plasticity and adaptive governance and is critical to understanding Party-driven constitutionalism in contemporary China, it also highlights an irresolvable paradox inherent in Party rule. Adaptability does not necessarily impart resilience. I conclude that the CCP's normatively unconstrained extra-constitutional leadership under Xi Jinping highlights the essentially and increasingly irrationalist aspects of its illiberal governance project.

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