Enlightened One-Party Rule? Ideological Differences between Chinese Communist Party Members and the Mass Public

2019 ◽  
Vol 73 (3) ◽  
pp. 651-666 ◽  
Author(s):  
Chengyuan Ji ◽  
Junyan Jiang
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
International Exchange ◽  
Political Pluralism ◽  
The Public ◽  
Popular View ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Nationally Representative ◽  
Mind Set

A popular view of nondemocratic regimes is that they draw followers mainly from those with an illiberal, authoritarian mind-set. We challenge this view by arguing that there exist a different class of autocracies that rule with a relatively enlightened base. Leveraging multiple nationally representative surveys from China over the past decade, we substantiate this claim by estimating and comparing the ideological preferences of Chinese Communist Party members and ordinary citizens. We find that party members on average hold substantially more modern and progressive views than the public on issues such as gender equality, political pluralism, and openness to international exchange. We also explore two mechanisms that may account for this party–public value gap—selection and socialization. We find that while education-based selection is the most dominant mechanism overall, socialization also plays a role, especially among older and less educated party members. Our findings caution against the simple, dichotomous characterization of political regimes and underscore an important tension between modernization and democratization in developing societies.

The Chinese Communist Party to 1949

2013 ◽  
Author(s):  
Tony Saich ◽  
Nancy Hearst
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Early Years ◽  
Chinese Revolution ◽  
The Public ◽  
Fine Grained ◽  
The Social ◽  
Economic Transformations ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Historical Periods

There is a vast array of materials available to assist in the study of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) before 1949. In China this is aided by the presence of a large number of officially employed researchers at party research centers and related archives. To earn their keep, these researchers have to put out publications. Availability of materials was boosted by the start of reforms in 1978 and preparations for the 1981 official party history. Given that, especially in the early years of reform, when expression of personal opinions could be dangerous, many of the released publications were documentary collections or chronologies. These came in several different varieties, based on either historical periods, particular events, or the lives of key individuals. These materials were complemented by memoirs of key figures who wanted to ensure that their version of history was in the public eye. This makes selection very difficult. Some of the works that follow are a must for students and scholars; others are personal favorites of the compilers and should be treated as exemplary of the types and varieties of sources that are available for the study of the CCP before 1949. More recently, materials from China have allowed researchers to conduct more detailed research on the social and economic transformations wrought by CCP presence and the difficulties the party had in maintaining local support. This has meant that, in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, we have seen fewer monographs that attempt to paint the broader picture of the sweep of the CCP revolution. Instead, there are many fine-grained analyses of particular events or CCP activities in specific locales that reveal the extremely complex and multifaceted nature of the Chinese revolution.

The 12th Congress of the Communist Party of China

1983 ◽  
Vol 93 ◽  
pp. 108-124 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lowell Dittmer
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Central Committee ◽  
Daily Activities ◽  
New Members ◽  
National Congress ◽  
Party Members ◽  
Democratic Parties ◽  
General Effort ◽  
Typical Gesture

On 1 September 1982, 1,545 delegates and 145 alternates convened the 12th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party. The meeting was announced in advance (at the seventh plenum of the 11th Central Committee, held in Beijing 4–10 August) and proceeded with well-rehearsed smoothness to its scheduled adjournment 15 days later. The meeting agenda conformed closely to established protocol, consisting of speeches and work reports, discussion and adoption of a new Party constitution, culminating in the election of new members to the Central Committee and other “standing” (i.e. permanently tenured) positions and convention of the first plenary meetings of these organs. The meeting began on 1 September with a relatively brief opening speech by Deng Xiaoping, the presiding chairman (though in a typical gesture to collective leadership there were no less than nine other presiding chairmen), and was followed by Hu Yaobang's comprehensive report and by speeches or reports by Ye Jianying, Chen Yun, Li Xiannian and others. These documents were all published as part of a general effort at greater publicity that included prior announcement of the dates of convention and adjournment, invitation of more than 70 responsible persons from democratic parties, non-Party patriots and other well-known personages from various circles to attend as observers (as had been done previously during the Eighth Congress), fairly detailed reporting of the election of deputies, their assembly and daily activities, arrangements and so forth, and even a sort of press conference that Zhu Muzhi, spokesman of the conference, held for Chinese and foreign reporters – although no foreign Communist Party members or foreign journalists were permitted to attend the Congress itself.

Writers' Criticism of the Party in 1942

1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 205-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Lower Rank ◽  
Long Time ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Intellectuals ◽  
Party Power

The angry outbursts of Chinese intellectuals against the Chinese Communist Party at the time of the Hundred Flowers in 1956–57 revealed that China's intellectuals, even those who were oriented towards the left, were in conflict with many of the Party's practices. Actually, this tension between the Party and the intellectuals had been smouldering for a long time. It had come to the surface many years earlier during the Cheng Feng movement in Yenan in the early 1940s. At that time the Party, as it did later in the Hundred Flowers period, embarked on a drive “to rectify the style of work” of both Party members and intellectuals. One aspect of this drive was that the Party encouraged intellectuals and lower-rank cadres to speak out on the misuses of Party power.

Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
Non Profit ◽  
State Administration ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.

A Mechanism of Coded Communication: Xinwen Lianbo and CCP Politics

Modern China ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 009770042092020
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Xingmiu Liao
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Communication Model ◽  
Xi Jinping ◽  
The Public ◽  
Political Propaganda ◽  
Secret Code ◽  
Coded Communication ◽  
China Central Television ◽  
Insight Into

Studies of the official media of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long focused on interpretations of political propaganda. In this article, we propose another model—the “secret code communication” model. We find that the main audience for some of the official media consists not of members of the public but rather cadres. The China Central Television (CCTV) program Xinwen Lianbo is a typical example. The program operates according to a very obscure political code. By watching and decoding Xinwen Lianbo, cadres can see that Xi Jinping is firmly in power. They can also gain insight into the policy directions favored by the CCP. Xinwen Lianbo thus acts as a mechanism for communication within the party using a code that can only be deciphered by insiders.

scholarly journals Proscribing the “Spiritually Japanese”: Nationalist Indignation, Authoritarian Responsiveness and Regime Legitimation in China Today

2020 ◽  
pp. 1-20
Author(s):  
Peter Gries ◽  
Yi Wang
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
The Public ◽  
Chinese Nationalism ◽  
Mediating Role ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
China Today ◽  
Sensitive Issues ◽  
People's Congress

Abstract In spring 2018 China, indignant popular nationalists demanded that the “spiritually Japanese” activities of a fringe group of young Chinese who figure themselves as Japanese be proscribed. The National People's Congress quickly complied, passing legislation that made it illegal to “beautify the war of invasion.” Exploring how and why the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) responded to the demands of popular nationalists, we suggest that authoritarian representation occurs in China even beyond the bounds of everyday apolitical issues like education and healthcare. Indeed, because the CCP relies upon a nationalist claim to legitimate rule, authoritarian legislators may respond to the public on politically sensitive issues like nationalism as well. Journalists and lawyers, furthermore, can play a vital mediating role between elites and masses, facilitating the transmission of the information and expertise needed for authoritarian responsiveness. Implications for our understanding of Chinese nationalism, authoritarian responsiveness and state legitimation in China today are discussed.

Secret Codes of Political Propaganda: The Unknown System of Writing Teams

2013 ◽  
Vol 214 ◽  
pp. 394-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Peng-Hsiang Kao
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Political Propaganda ◽  
Secret Code ◽  
Unknown System ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party

AbstractWithin the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Party units have established a largely unknown network of writing teams which propagate the policies or perspectives of a particular unit by publishing feature articles in Party journals. These writing teams often make use of a pseudonym in the form of a person's name, leading outsiders to believe that the work is written by a journalist. In fact, the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams function as a form of secret code. Through this code, inner Party members can recognize which unit's views an article reflects. In order to reveal exactly which units the codes represent, we have collated the names of over 20 writing teams. In addition, we provide an introduction to the functioning of the writing teams and the manner in which articles are produced. Finally, we propose that the CCP's mechanism of “propaganda codes” is gradually undergoing the process of institutionalization.

scholarly journals Ideology and Political Mobilization: The Soviet Home Front during World War II

1994 ◽  
pp. 24
Author(s):  
Richard J. Brody
Keyword(s):  
World War Ii ◽  
Communist Party ◽  
Political Mobilization ◽  
Home Front ◽  
Soviet Society ◽  
World War ◽  
Party Leaders ◽  
The Public ◽  
Stalin Era ◽  
Party Members

World War II was a defining experience for the identity of the Stalin-era Soviet Communist Party. The war accentuated fundamental problems in the identity of the civilian party as an instrument of political mobilization. The war also highlighted a deeper disjuncture between popular political mentalities within Soviet society and the official ideology of the Stalin-era party. This essay will examine efforts by party political organs to propagate the official ideological line among party members during World War II and the problems party leaders encountered in training political workers to transmit the party's propaganda message to the public.

Sneevliet and the Early Years of the CCP

1971 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 677-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Bing
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Mass Movement ◽  
Early Years ◽  
The Other ◽  
Recent Past ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Soviet Russia ◽  
The One

The formative years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long remained one of the most obscure periods in the recent past of China. There remain many puzzles about why and how the alliances, between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, came about in the early 1920s.For the last four years I have been studying the establishment and first years of the CCP, at the same time paying attention to the foundation and first years of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV), which was later to become the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI). In this connexion I have been specially interested in outlining the origins of that strategy whereby Communist Party members entered a nationalist mass movement and tried to capture it from within.

scholarly journals Interest Representation and the Transformation of the Chinese Communist Party

2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 57-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Yongnian
Keyword(s):  
Communist Party ◽  
Democratic Party ◽  
Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Public Support ◽  
Social Democratic Party ◽  
80Th Anniversary ◽  
Interest Representation ◽  
Party Members ◽  
The Chinese Communist Party ◽  
Private Entrepreneurs

At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to admit into its ranks of 'outstanding social elements' of private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial personnel from non-state firms and MNCs. Party ideologues, however, have raised a great hue and cry. In order to establish his political legacy, the CCP leadership has intensified the campaign to educate its cadres and members. Reform and development have bourgeoisified and benefited many party members and cadres. Jiang's public support of the capitalists is not going against the tide but is a recognition of reality instead. In fact, to continue to grow and expand, the party must embrace the better educated and the most enterprising in society. The capitalists within the party will certainly be catalysts to quicken the transformation of the party. In its attempt to admit capitalists, has the CCP unknowingly let in the Trojan horse? Jiang Zemin's original aim may have been to strengthen the party-state by broadening its social base. And as the party metamorphoses, perhaps into a kind of social democratic party, Jiang will be favourably judged for paving the way for such a metamorphosis. Nevertheless, it is not an easy transition: insurmountable difficulties lie ahead for the party leadership.

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