Rebuilding the Leninist Party Rule: Chinese Communist Party under Xi Jinping's Stewardship

2016 ◽  
Vol 08 (01) ◽  
pp. 5-15 ◽  
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

In 2015, Xi Jinping tried to restore many Leninist features to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). He took measures to rebuild the ideological faith, entrench Party organisations with state administration and run the CCP as a meritocracy. “Party groups” (dangzu) are extended to non-governmental, non-profit and other societal organisations. He insisted that party members must observe both formal disciplines and informal norms of the Party, and show loyalty to the leadership.

Author(s):  
Christian P. Sorace

This chapter examines how the Chinese Communist Party engineered “glory” in the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake by mobilizing the discourse of “Party spirit” (dangxing). In addition to being responsible for state administration and economic growth, the cadre is also an embodiment and conduit of Party legitimacy. Antithetical to Max Weber's definition of institutions as that which remove embodiment from governance, in China, cadres are Party legitimacy made flesh. As flesh, they must be prepared to suffer. This chapter argues that the Party revitalizes its legitimacy by showing benevolence and glory, which depend on the willingness of cadres to suffer and sacrifice themselves on behalf of the people. In the aftermath of the Sichuan earthquake, these norms and expectations were implemented in concrete policy directives and work pressures.


Subject China's 19th Communist Party Congress. Significance Preparations are underway for the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party, which is likely to be scheduled for October or November. Much political groundwork has been laid in support of President Xi Jinping and for progress on his vision for China. The Congress will set a direction towards the 100th anniversary in 2021 of the founding of the Party and the handover of power to a sixth generation of leaders shortly after. Impacts Beijing will probably be cautious in its foreign policy during the months running up to the Congress. Consolidating his position at the Congress should increase Xi's ability to press his economically reformist, politically illiberal agenda. Bar any serious reversal, Xi will be in a position to dominate Chinese politics after he retires from formal offices.


1964 ◽  
Vol 17 ◽  
pp. 205-228 ◽  
Author(s):  
Merle Goldman

The angry outbursts of Chinese intellectuals against the Chinese Communist Party at the time of the Hundred Flowers in 1956–57 revealed that China's intellectuals, even those who were oriented towards the left, were in conflict with many of the Party's practices. Actually, this tension between the Party and the intellectuals had been smouldering for a long time. It had come to the surface many years earlier during the Cheng Feng movement in Yenan in the early 1940s. At that time the Party, as it did later in the Hundred Flowers period, embarked on a drive “to rectify the style of work” of both Party members and intellectuals. One aspect of this drive was that the Party encouraged intellectuals and lower-rank cadres to speak out on the misuses of Party power.


2019 ◽  
Vol 243 ◽  
pp. 780-800
Author(s):  
Jérôme Doyon

AbstractHow can a weak organization be a path to power? The Chinese Communist Youth League (CYL) lacks autonomy and coherence yet it is seen as the cradle for one of the main factions within the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). To understand this tension, I provide a novel account of the role played by the CYL in the recruitment of leading cadres since the 1980s. Against explanations based on factional struggles, I argue that the rise of CYL-affiliated cadres is a by-product of the organization's weakness. As the Party appoints CYL heads, CCP leaders, at various levels and at different points in time, have used the League to accelerate the promotion of their protégés. For years, there has been little incentive for Party bosses to dismantle this promotion path. However, in his bid to consolidate his power, Xi Jinping has weakened this channel so that it may not be used by potential rivals.


2018 ◽  
Vol 6 (4) ◽  
pp. 429-448
Author(s):  
Erik Durneika

The People’s Republic of China remains a multinational unitary state, where the prc Constitution expressly guarantees freedom of religion and fair treatment of ethnic minorities. The Chinese Communist Party (ccp) retains ultimate authority regarding internal and external affairs, including the selective enforcement of constitutional rights. Various ethnic groups, such as the Turkic Uighurs, have long been perceived as rebellious, while the Muslim Hui have often been treated favorably, with laxer enforcement of laws and more religious autonomy. Many attribute this “model minority” perception of the Hui to cultural similarities shared with the Han. Although the ccp continues to allow religious freedoms to the Hui, the trajectory of persecution has slightly increased due to threats of global Islamist insurgencies. Leadership under President Xi Jinping seeks to maintain its power by combating “foreign infiltration” of Islam. Party officials allow Hui to interact with Muslim countries internationally under one circumstance—beneficial business transactions.


2017 ◽  
Vol 09 (03) ◽  
pp. 50-57
Author(s):  
Lance L P GORE

Xi Jinping and Li Zhanshu share many similarities and formed a bond as rooky party secretaries in counties in Hebei province in the 1980s. Xi brought Li to Beijing in 2012 and Li played a key role in drumming up support for Xi to become the “core” of the Chinese Communist Party leadership. Li is expected to join the next Politburo Standing Committee and play a more prominent role in Xi’s second term.


2013 ◽  
Vol 214 ◽  
pp. 394-410 ◽  
Author(s):  
Wen-Hsuan Tsai ◽  
Peng-Hsiang Kao

AbstractWithin the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), some Party units have established a largely unknown network of writing teams which propagate the policies or perspectives of a particular unit by publishing feature articles in Party journals. These writing teams often make use of a pseudonym in the form of a person's name, leading outsiders to believe that the work is written by a journalist. In fact, the pseudonyms of the Party unit writing teams function as a form of secret code. Through this code, inner Party members can recognize which unit's views an article reflects. In order to reveal exactly which units the codes represent, we have collated the names of over 20 writing teams. In addition, we provide an introduction to the functioning of the writing teams and the manner in which articles are produced. Finally, we propose that the CCP's mechanism of “propaganda codes” is gradually undergoing the process of institutionalization.


1971 ◽  
Vol 48 ◽  
pp. 677-697 ◽  
Author(s):  
Dov Bing

The formative years of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have long remained one of the most obscure periods in the recent past of China. There remain many puzzles about why and how the alliances, between the CCP and the Kuomintang (KMT) on the one hand and Soviet Russia on the other, came about in the early 1920s.For the last four years I have been studying the establishment and first years of the CCP, at the same time paying attention to the foundation and first years of the Indische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging (ISDV), which was later to become the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI). In this connexion I have been specially interested in outlining the origins of that strategy whereby Communist Party members entered a nationalist mass movement and tried to capture it from within.


2012 ◽  
Vol 04 (01) ◽  
pp. 96-103
Author(s):  
Zhiyue BO

China's Central Military Commission (CMC) will witness another round of generational change at the forthcoming Eighteenth National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2012. Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping would remain top leaders of the CMC and seven members are likely to be replaced. Although the new military leadership is unlikely to alter civil-military relationship, the emergence of princeling generals would tip the balance in favour of the gun.


2002 ◽  
Vol 16 ◽  
pp. 57-85 ◽  
Author(s):  
Zheng Yongnian

At the 80th anniversary celebration of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on 1 July 2001, Jiang Zemin called on the party to admit into its ranks of 'outstanding social elements' of private entrepreneurs, professionals, technical and managerial personnel from non-state firms and MNCs. Party ideologues, however, have raised a great hue and cry. In order to establish his political legacy, the CCP leadership has intensified the campaign to educate its cadres and members. Reform and development have bourgeoisified and benefited many party members and cadres. Jiang's public support of the capitalists is not going against the tide but is a recognition of reality instead. In fact, to continue to grow and expand, the party must embrace the better educated and the most enterprising in society. The capitalists within the party will certainly be catalysts to quicken the transformation of the party. In its attempt to admit capitalists, has the CCP unknowingly let in the Trojan horse? Jiang Zemin's original aim may have been to strengthen the party-state by broadening its social base. And as the party metamorphoses, perhaps into a kind of social democratic party, Jiang will be favourably judged for paving the way for such a metamorphosis. Nevertheless, it is not an easy transition: insurmountable difficulties lie ahead for the party leadership.


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