Thomas Aquinas' Eco-Theological Ethics of Anthropocentric Conservation

Horizons ◽  
2012 ◽  
Vol 39 (1) ◽  
pp. 69-97 ◽  
Author(s):  
Ryan Patrick McLaughlin

This essay explores the much-debated question regarding the extent and viability of Thomas Aquinas as a theological source for expanding Christian ethical concern for the nonhuman creation, particularly nonhuman animals. This exploration focuses on the intersection of two foundational issues in Aquinas' theological framework, nature and teleology, as well as the effects of this intersection in Aquinas' work concerning nonhuman creation. From these examinations, I suggest that Aquinas can provide significant contributions for augmenting concern for the welfare of nonhuman animals because his theological framework demands that humans preserve the natural order through conservation. However, Aquinas' ecotheological ethics of conservation is foundationally anthropocentric and only permits indirect moral concern for the nonhuman world.

Author(s):  
David VanDrunen

This chapter considers key themes from Thomas Aquinas’ view of the natural knowledge of God, or natural theology, from the opening of his Summa theologiae. It is written from the perspective of Reformed theology, which has traditionally supported natural theology of a certain kind, despite its recent reputation as an opponent of natural theology. According to Thomas, natural theology is insufficient for salvation and is inevitably laden with errors apart from the help of supernatural revelation. But human reason, operating properly, can demonstrate the existence and certain attributes of God from the natural order, and this natural knowledge constitutes preambles to the articles of the Christian faith. The chapter thus engages in a critically sympathetic analysis of these themes and suggests how a contemporary reception of Thomas might appropriate them effectively.


2016 ◽  
Vol 24 (5) ◽  
pp. 445-466 ◽  
Author(s):  
Saara Kupsala ◽  
Markus Vinnari ◽  
Pekka Jokinen ◽  
Pekka Räsänen

Mental capacities are an essential basis on which people give moral concern to nonhuman animals. Hence, it is important to investigate public perceptions of animal mind and the factors underlying these perceptions. Although research into citizen beliefs in animal mind has been increasing, population-based studies utilizing multivariate methods have been scarce. In this article, public perceptions of animal mind are investigated with a nationwide survey in Finland (n = 1,824). Eight animal species positioned differently in cultural categorizations are included in the analysis. Dogs were ascribed the most capacities, followed by cows, pigs, wolves, and elk. Citizens expressed a low belief in the mental capacities of chicken, salmon, and shrimp. Classifying animals as companions, food, and threat influences the perceptions of animal mind. Young age, having a companion animal, valuing societal equality, and concern for animal welfare and for animal utilization are connected to a greater belief in animal mind.


2010 ◽  
Vol 18 (2) ◽  
pp. 205-218 ◽  
Author(s):  
Emilie Dardenne

AbstractPeter Singer’s views on the status of nonhuman animals have attracted both attention and intense controversy in many Western countries, including the United States, Canada, and Germany. The reactions to his theories in France are less well known. The purpose of this paper is to present an overview of critical responses to Singer by French academics and thinkers. How have they received Singer’s contention that we must bring nonhuman animals within the sphere of moral concern? Do French scholars agree with his utilitarian argument on marginal cases, his definition of the term “person,” his defense of the Great Ape Project? Finally, is he considered in France a brilliant and groundbreaking ethicist, a dangerous extremist, or somewhere in between?


Author(s):  
Celia E. Deane-Drummond

Why do humans who seem to be exemplars of virtue also have the capacity to act in atrocious ways? What are the roots of tendencies for sin and evil? A popular assumption is that it is our animalistic natures that are responsible for human immorality and sin, while our moral nature curtails and contains such tendencies through human powers of freedom and higher reason. This book challenges such assumptions as being far too simplistic. Through a careful engagement with evolutionary and psychological literature, it argues that tendencies towards vice are, more often than not, distortions of the very virtues that are capable of making us good. After beginning with Augustine’s classic theory of original sin, the book probes the philosophical implications of sin’s origins in dialogue with the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Different vices are treated in both individual and collective settings in keeping with a multispecies approach. Areas covered include selfishness, pride, violence, anger, injustice, greed, envy, gluttony, deception, lying, lust, despair, anxiety, and sloth. The work of Thomas Aquinas helps to illuminate and clarify much of this discussion on vice, including those vices which are more distinctive for human persons in community with other beings. Such an approach amounts to a search for the shadow side of human nature, shadow sophia. Facing that shadow is part of a fuller understanding of what makes us human and thus this book is a contribution to both theological anthropology and theological ethics.


2013 ◽  
Vol 66 (3) ◽  
pp. 338-356 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benjamin J. Burkholder

AbstractIn an age where the church needs to foster moral concern for the environment, some are suggesting that Christian theology itself must be changed to produce this result. This article argues that such emendations are unnecessary because Dietrich Bonhoeffer, working a couple of decades before ecological concern was even seen as necessary, manages to craft a theological and ethical approach which is sensitive to ecological concern while retaining large portions of the Christian tradition. Bonhoeffer's anthropology robustly affirms humanity's connection with the natural environment and does not separate humans from the natural order. In fact, his novel approach to the image of God emphasises the necessity of human physicality and the ethical responsibility for the other, which seems to be extendable to the natural order as well. In addition, Bonhoeffer's interpretation of the command to have dominion sees the injunction as a call to be ‘bound’ to nature as a servant, not as a lord free to exploit the earth for wanton pleasure. Consequently, Bonhoeffer interprets the industrial revolution as the failure of humans to rule and serve creation well. Finally, his anthropology, unlike many in the tradition, does not extradite humans from the world, but rather situates them entirely within the matrix of interlocking relationships in the natural world. While Christian soteriology has been criticised for shifting Christian concern away from the environment and life in this world, Bonhoeffer's soteriology overcomes this criticism. Bonhoeffer vociferously repudiates two kingdoms theology in favour of a single unified reality of Christ, which unites God's work of creation and redemption into a unified whole. Furthermore, he interprets the incarnation as a robust affirmation of God's creation and thereby life in this present world. Finally, Bonhoeffer posits redemption encompassing the entire world order, rather than seeing humans as its unique constituents. Bonhoeffer's ethics of responsible action shows that humans need to evaluate not just their immediate actions, but also the long-term consequences of their actions, especially when it comes to use of the environment, both for the sake of other humans and for the sake of following Christ. Since disciples of Christ are supposed to be working towards the reality of Christ, one can conclude that Bonhoeffer's thought encourages humans to work towards the harmony that is to typify creation in the eschaton. Thus, Bonhoeffer's ethics encourages a moral concern for the environment both as a means of neighbourly love and as a means of following Christ.


Author(s):  
David Degrazia

Although sometimes identified with pain, suffering is better understood as a highly unpleasant emotional state associated with considerable pain or distress. Whether and how much one suffers can vary in accordance with any meaning attached to the associated pain or distress, or with expectations regarding the future. Because suffering can be affected by thoughts of meaning or of the future, some have focused on this dimension of suffering and asserted that only humans can suffer. But there is a very strong empirical case that many nonhuman animals suffer. The fact of suffering provokes moral concern, especially when suffering is caused unnecessarily, and raises ethical questions, mainly regarding the nature and extent of our obligations to those who suffer. Suffering is also an important source of personal or religious meaning in many people’s lives.


Author(s):  
Gerald M. Mara

Chapter 2 examines how Thomas Aquinas and Niccolo Machiavelli relate war to political order. Both offer different substantive judgments and divergent methodological commitments. Aquinas’s political order is set within a comprehensive natural order that human beings should recognize and respect. Machiavelli’s is constructed by an aggressive praxis that seeks to harness human passions, always unsuccessfully. Philosophically, Aquinas depends on a theological teleology that Machiavelli rejects. If we read these texts comparatively we find that each author identifies dimensions of politics that the other overlooks. Further, their individual political narratives show the limitations of their theoretical frameworks. Comparing Aquinas with Machiavelli helps not only to reveal tensions between political philosophy’s two partners, but also to show why such tensions cannot be addressed by giving either one of these pre-eminence. These readings underscore questions about the relationship between political order and war that are muted in more contemporary analyses.


2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
Author(s):  
Angie Pepper

All cosmopolitan approaches to global distributive justice are premised on the idea that humans are the primary units of moral concern. In this paper, I argue that neither relational nor non-relational cosmopolitans can unquestioningly assume the moral primacy of humans. Furthermore, I argue that, by their own lights, cosmopolitans must extend the scope of justice to most, if not all, nonhuman animals. To demonstrate that cosmopolitans cannot simply ‘add nonhuman animals and stir,’ I examine the cosmopolitan position developed by Martha Nussbaum in Frontiers of Justice. I argue that while Nussbaum explicitly includes nonhuman animals within the scope of justice, her account is marked by an unjustifiable anthropocentric bias. I ultimately conclude that we must radically reconceptualise the primary unit of cosmopolitan moral concern to encompass most, if not all, sentient animals. 


2019 ◽  
Vol 42 ◽  
Author(s):  
Amanda R. Ridley ◽  
Melanie O. Mirville

Abstract There is a large body of research on conflict in nonhuman animal groups that measures the costs and benefits of intergroup conflict, and we suggest that much of this evidence is missing from De Dreu and Gross's interesting article. It is a shame this work has been missed, because it provides evidence for interesting ideas put forward in the article.


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