The Cycle of Clandestinity

Prospects ◽  
1979 ◽  
Vol 4 ◽  
pp. 559-576
Author(s):  
John Cawelti

We live in a time and a culture that have become deeply obsessed with clandestinity and conspiracy. The extent to which “the torment of secrecy”—as Edward Shils called it—has pervaded our national life was recently dramatized by the revelations of the Watergate investigations; but this was, of course, only the climax of a series of developments in American culture, which had their roots in the aftermath of World War II. That conflict thrust America into a new global position where our power over other countries and our potential vulnerability to their economic and military strengths and weaknesses came to seem more important than ever. Intensified by the fear of atomic weapons and the cold war, both our political leaders and the man on the street became deeply concerned about the threat of secret conspiracies at home and abroad. While such obsessions have often appeared in the aftermath of wars—both the Civil War and World War I left a deep legacy of suspicion and suspension of due process in the attempt to counter secret conspiracies—it was only after World War II that Americans institutionalized clandestinity on a large and permanent scale. Our generation has harvested the first fruits of that major cultural change.

Author(s):  
James Mark ◽  
Quinn Slobodian

This chapter places Eastern Europe into a broader history of decolonization. It shows how the region’s own experience of the end of Empire after the World War I led its new states to consider their relationships with both European colonialism and those were struggling for their future liberation outside their continent. Following World War II, as Communist regimes took power in Eastern Europe, and overseas European Empires dissolved in Africa and Asia, newly powerful relationships developed. Analogies between the end of empire in Eastern Europe and the Global South, though sometimes tortured and riddled with their own blind spots, were nonetheless potent rhetorical idioms, enabling imagined solidarities and facilitating material connections in the era of the Cold War and non-alignment. After the demise of the so-called “evil empire” of the Soviet Union, analogies between the postcolonial and the postcommunist condition allowed for further novel equivalencies between these regions to develop.


Art History ◽  
2017 ◽  
Author(s):  
Evonne Levy

The rise of the propaganda production in World War I coincided with art history’s consolidation as a discipline. Immediately, the modern category “propaganda” was taken up to describe the relations between art, politics (sacred and secular), and power. After World War II, and in the Cold War, the use of the word “propaganda” shifted and many North American and European art historians resisted the categorization of “art” (associated with freedom) and propaganda (associated with fascist instrumentalization), although historians were less troubled by its use for “images.” The end of the Cold War loosened the prohibition on the term, though many art historians still prefer cognate terms, “persuasion” or “rhetorical,” when pointing to the key element of audience and effectiveness; similarly, many speak of “power,” “politics,” or “ideology” when pointing to institutions and their messages. Because there are alternatives for “propaganda,” the emphasis here is on the literature that have engaged the term itself and the problems it poses to art history, including its ongoing toxicity. Because propaganda arts are so closely associated with the modern regimes that perfected their use (communist Russia, fascist Italy, Nazi Germany), one of the major questions in the art historical literature is the appropriateness of the concept before the 20th century and for nonautocratic regimes. While some periods have attracted the term more than others, since Foucault and post–Cold War, there has been at once an understanding of all institutions, sacred and secular, as imbricated in power relations and on the other, a relaxation of rigid definitions of propaganda as “deceptive” or “manipulative.” These factors have opened scholars in art history considerably to a use of the term, although a reductive understanding of propaganda as inherently deceptive still persists. Three main criteria were used in compiling this article: periods of political upheaval or change in government that have attracted the term in particularly dense ways and generated dialogue over these issues; works that explicitly frame the study of objects as propaganda or substitute terms, rhetoric, persuasion, and ideology; and works by historians of images that explicitly engage with the category of propaganda (excluding, with a few exceptions, popular forms like posters as well as film, television, and digital media). Whenever possible, propaganda’s specificity is insisted on here in relation to art, for art poses special problems to the use of the word propaganda, and its invocation in art history often makes an explicit point.


2016 ◽  
Vol 48 (2) ◽  
pp. 382-386 ◽  
Author(s):  
Nell Gabiam

The term humanitarianism finds its roots in 19th-century Europe and is generally defined as the “impartial, neutral, and independent provision of relief to victims of conflict and natural disasters.” Behind this definition lies a dynamic history. According to political scientists Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, this history can be divided into three phases. From the 19th century to World War II, humanitarianism was a reaction to the perceived breakdown of society and the emergence of moral ills caused by rapid industrialization within Europe. The era between World War II and the 1990s saw the emergence of many of today's nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations. These organizations sought to address the suffering caused by World War I and World War II, but also turned their gaze toward the non-Western world, which was in the process of decolonization. The third phase began in the 1990s, after the end of the Cold War, and witnessed an expansion of humanitarianism. One characteristic of this expansion is the increasing prominence of states, regional organizations, and the United Nations in the field of humanitarian action. Their increased prominence has been paralleled by a growing linkage between humanitarian concerns and the issue of state, regional, and global security. Is it possible that, in the 21st century, humanitarianism is entering a new (fourth) phase? And, if so, what role have events in the Middle East played in ushering it in? I seek to answer these questions by focusing on regional consultations that took place between June 2014 and July 2015 in preparation for the first ever World Humanitarian Summit (WHS), scheduled to take place in Istanbul in May 2016.


1993 ◽  
Vol 6 (2) ◽  
pp. 279-287 ◽  
Author(s):  
Edward McWhinney

The institutionalization of international conflict-resolution on a third-party basis, with the creation of a Permanent Court of Arbitration, was one of the high hopes of the political leaders at the First Hague Peace Conference in 1899. In the early phase, from creation of the Court in 1902 until the outbreak of World War I in 1914, 17 cases were initiated before the Court. There was a quite understandable gap, through the War years, until 1921; and then, in the decade until 1931,7 further cases were brought before the Court. This was followed by another awkward hiatus as to cases throughout the 1930s, apparently because of the renewed international tensions in Europe that culminated in World War II. There were no cases before the Court during the War years, the seat of the Court being under belligerent occupation for most of that time. The fact remains, however, that since World War II and, indeed, since 1931, there have been only two cases (both minor ones) brought before the Court, (or three, if we accept the Court Registry's retroactive classification, in its 1990 Annual Report, of the continuing Iran-US Claims Tribunal, which had begun its work in 1981, as one of its own cases).


2018 ◽  
Vol 1 (1) ◽  
pp. 32 ◽  
Author(s):  
Alex Golub

How can we create a more inclusive Pacific anthropology? This article argues that contemporary anthropology’s disciplinary norms are based in the Cold War period. These norms are inappropriate given anthropology’s current situation. This article argues that interwar anthropology (the anthropology practiced between World War I and World War II) provides us a better set of imaginative resources to create a more common ethnography. Interwar anthropology was more welcoming of amateur scholars and less concerned with rigid norms of professionalism. Reframing a common ethnography in terms of ‘amateurs’ and ‘professionals’ may give us new ways of imagining a discipline that is increasingly moving outside the academy.


2005 ◽  
Vol 47 (1) ◽  
pp. 226-227
Author(s):  
Maura Hametz

Using anthropological, historical, and political science approaches, Pamela Ballinger demonstrates how memory shapes Istrian understandings of Italian identity. World War II and the events of 1945, specifically the creation of the Free Territory of Trieste and the division of the upper Adriatic territory into Allied and Yugoslav administered zones, form the backdrop for the study that concentrates on the crystallization of collective memory for Istrian esuli (exiles who settled in Trieste) and rimasti (those who remained in Yugoslavia). Grounded in the literature re-evaluating the impact of the Cold War, her work skillfully weaves a narrative that uncovers competing visions as well as common tropes in Istrian visions of ‘Italianness’ constructed in the climate of state formation and dissolution since World War I. Ballinger's major contribution is her analysis of the “multi-directionality” of identity formation (p. 45) that has implications far beyond the Istrian case.


2021 ◽  
pp. 073112142199750
Author(s):  
Baptiste Brossard ◽  
Gary Alan Fine

How do governments commemorate salient national figures with contested reputations? The case of Marshal Philippe Pétain, whose fame followed World War I (WWI), but was later stigmatized for having led the Nazi-affiliated Vichy regime during World War II (WWII), suggests that political leaders consider the interests of competing groups. In the case of Pétain, these include veterans’ organizations, Jewish heritage groups, leftists, and, eventually, the rightist National Front. State leaders attempt to reconcile these pressures in the hope of avoiding politically damaging conflicts. Successful commemorations reinforce the legitimacy of the State as the guardian of symbolic compatibility between visions of history and morality. Recognizing memorialization as political process, we describe how Presidents of France attempt to distinguish an honorable Pétain from a dishonorable one. We describe four strategies by which states address difficult reputations: erasing, selecting, reconciling, and differentiating. Competing groups may create ambiguous meanings, attacking the State, while keeping distant from those with difficult reputations.


Unwanted ◽  
2020 ◽  
pp. 98-124
Author(s):  
Maddalena Marinari

Chapter 4 chronicles how Italian and Jewish immigration reform advocates appealed to internationalism, humanitarianism, and civil rights rhetoric to fight for refugee legislation first and comprehensive immigration reform later. Unlike World War I, World War II represented an opportunity for reform for many groups who had long fought for less discriminatory immigration laws because of the new geopolitical position of the United States. The Cold War also provided an opening for a broad coalition of ethnic, religious, and civic organizations to come together during the debate over the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952. Although the most diverse interethnic alliance fighting for immigration reform to date fell apart over ideological disagreements and under pressure from entrenched restrictionist politicians, the experience of the early 1950s left a mark for the rest of the decade and shaped their approach to immigration reform until the early 1960s.


Author(s):  
Gregory F. Domber

American policy makers have rarely elevated Eastern Europe to the pinnacle of American grand strategy. The United States’ and Eastern Europe’s histories, however, are intertwined through the exchange of people and shared experiences. In the Age of Revolution, Eastern Europeans traveled to the United States to fight for the same causes they championed at home: to break from imperial control and expand the rights of man. At the end of the 19th century, “New Immigrants” from Eastern Europe streamed into America’s expanding cities. When countries in the region have moved to the forefront of American concerns during specific crises, Eastern European interests were regularly deemed secondary to larger American geopolitical interests. This holds true for the settlement of World War I, the conclusion of World War II, and the entirety of the Cold War. Overall, including Eastern Europeans and Eastern Europe in the history of the United States provides essential nuance and texture to broader patterns in American relations and more often than not provides evidence of the limitations of American power as it is altered by competing powers and local conditions.


Author(s):  
David J. Bodenhamer

Armed conflict poses an imminent threat to the nation’s existence, but so does suspension of the nation’s fundamental laws. The framers wrestled with how to grant government the power to defend the nation without providing it the means to threaten liberty. The question it raises—does war suspend the Constitution or does the Constitution control the conduct of the war—has rarely been absent from American history. ‘Security’ describes the impact of the Civil War, World War I, World War II, the Cold War, the Vietnam War, as well as the recent ‘war on terror’ on the nation’s laws, the executive presidential power, and the roles of the Supreme Court and Congress.


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