Church Autonomy in the European Court of Human Rights—Recent Developments in Germany

2010 ◽  
Vol 26 (1) ◽  
pp. 281-320
Author(s):  
Gerhard Robbers

The European Court of Human Rights is currently considering several German cases on the autonomy of religious organizations or churches within secular German labor law and resulting conflict resolution issues that arise within religious communities. In the past, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently underlined the importance of church autonomy, relying on the European Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 9 guarantees of freedom of thought, conscience and religion:Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.Implementing these provisions in the context of religious autonomy, the Court has critically noted:[T]he autonomous existence of religious communities is indispensable for pluralism in a democratic society and is, thus, an issue at the very heart of the protection which Article 9 affords.… The right [of religious communities] to an autonomous existence is at the very heart of the guarantees in Article 9.

1998 ◽  
Vol 47 (3) ◽  
pp. 680-687 ◽  
Author(s):  
Peter W. Edge

Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides:1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.


2019 ◽  
Vol 21 (2) ◽  
pp. 203-212
Author(s):  
Russell Sandberg ◽  
Frank Cranmer

On 22 January 2019, the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe agreed the text of Resolution 2253: Sharia, the Cairo Declaration and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Resolution begins – on an uncontroversial note – by reiterating ‘the obligation on member States to protect the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion as enshrined in Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights … which represents one of the foundations of a democratic society’. It then goes on, however, to recall that the Assembly ‘has on several occasions underlined its support for the principle of the separation of State and religion, as one of the pillars of a democratic society’. This statement is not entirely non-contentious: it ignores the situation in several Member States of the Council of Europe and is based more on notions of laÿcitÕ than on the observable facts in countries such as England, Denmark, Finland and Norway that have state Churches. Unfortunately, this simplification and confusion set the tone for what is to follow.


Author(s):  
Patrick O’Callaghan ◽  
Bethany Shiner

Abstract This paper examines the right to freedom of thought in the European Convention on Human Rights against the background of technological developments in neuroscience and algorithmic processes. Article 9 echr provides an absolute right to freedom of thought when the integrity of our inner life or forum internum is at stake. In all other cases, where thoughts have been manifested in some way in the forum externum, the right to freedom of thought is treated as a qualified right. While Article 9 echr is a core focus of this paper, we argue that freedom of thought is further supported by Articles 8, 10 and 11 echr. This complex of rights carves out breathing space for the individual’s personal development and therefore supports the enjoyment of freedom of thought in its fullest sense. Charged with ‘maintaining and promoting the ideals and values of a democratic society’ as well as ensuring that individual human rights are given ‘practical and effective protection’, this paper predicts that the ECtHR will make greater use of the right to freedom of thought in the face of the emerging challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution.


2021 ◽  
Vol 9 (2-3) ◽  
pp. 244-269
Author(s):  
Christine Carpenter

Abstract Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of religion and conscience. The language of Article 9(1) has been interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights as including protections for acts of proselytism, when properly committed and respectful of the rights and freedoms of others. This was the view taken in the foundational Article 9 case of the Court, Kokkinakis v. Greece. In the decades since Kokkinakis, however, the view of the Court on proselytism appears to have shifted, in particular in Article 9 cases involving religious garments. This article seeks to determine whether the Court is consistent in its views on proselytism between these religious garment cases and earlier examples of Article 9 case law.


2006 ◽  
Vol 2 (2) ◽  
pp. 268-292 ◽  
Author(s):  
Kerem Altiparmak ◽  
Onur Karahanogullari

On 10 November 2005 the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (‘Court’) decided the long-running headscarf battle between Muslim students and Turkish universities in the Şahin judgment. On appeal, it held that the prohibition against wearing headscarves on university premises did not violate Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘Convention’) on freedom of thought, conscience and religion. It thereby confirmed the decision of the Fourth Section of the Court of 29 June 2004.


2009 ◽  
Vol 4 (1) ◽  
pp. 7-24 ◽  
Author(s):  
Erica Howard

AbstractThis article examines school bans on the wearing of religious symbols and starts with a discussion of the arguments for the imposition of a ban and the counter arguments against these. The question whether a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in schools is a violation of the right to manifest one's religion as guaranteed by Article 9 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) is analyzed using the case law of the European Court of Human Rights and of the English courts in relation to such bans in education. The cases appear to suggest that such bans can be considered an interference with the right to manifest one's religion under Article 9(1), but that these bans can be justified under Article 9(2) in certain circumstances. Two important considerations in the decision of the courts are the way decisions to ban certain forms of religious dress are made and whether alternative ways of manifesting the religion are available.


2021 ◽  
Vol 191 ◽  
pp. 443-475

Human rights — Freedom of thought, conscience and religion — Article 9 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950 — Compulsory mixed gender swimming lessons in primary schools — Refusal by competent authorities to grant applicants’ daughters exemption from mixed swimming lessons — Whether contested measure interfering with exercise of applicants’ right to freedom of religion — Whether interference justified — Whether having legal basis — Whether pursuing legitimate aim — Whether necessary in a democratic society — Whether proportionate to aims pursued by national authorities — Article 2 of Protocol No 1 lex specialis in relation to Article 9 of Convention — Inapplicability of Article 2 of Protocol No 2 — Reading of Convention as a whole — Whether Switzerland violating Article 9 of European Convention on Human Rights, 1950


2020 ◽  
Vol 23 ◽  
pp. 73-99
Author(s):  
Mark Hill

The manifestation of religious beliefs under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights is not absolute but may be subject to prescribed limitations. This article discusses the nature and extent of those limitations, as interpreted in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights from its decision in Kokkinakis v. Greece up to the present. It contrasts the prescriptive text of the Article with its loose and inconsistent interpretation by the Court in Strasbourg. Particular attention is given to the criteria of ‘prescribed by law’, ‘necessary in a democratic society’, ‘public safety’, ‘public order, health or morals’ and ‘the rights and freedoms of others’. This article seeks to extract clear principles from the contradictory and confusing jurisprudence, particularly at its intersection with the Court’s illusory doctrine of margin of appreciation.


2021 ◽  
pp. 402-419
Author(s):  
Peter Cumper ◽  
Tom Lewis

This chapter examines the interpretation of the right to freedom of religion or belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) by the European Court of Human Rights. The topic is examined with reference to legal bans on items of Islamic dress such as headscarves and face-veils. It is argued that both the structure of Article 9, and the way in which it has been interpreted, has resulted in weak levels of protection for applicants bringing such claims, and that the reasons for this lie deep in European history and politics. The Court’s approach may, arguably, be justifiable in that the protection it offers is subsidiary to that offered by states. Nevertheless, the scant hope that such applicants have raises questions as to the effectiveness of the Convention and threatens to undermine much of the laudable work that has been undertaken elsewhere by the Court.


Author(s):  
Sergio Alejandro Fernández Parra

Resumen: En el presente escrito se estudiará la figura del margen nacional de apreciación y su aplicación por parte del Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Este estudio tiene como objeto demostrar que la utilización frecuente de esta figura impide que exista una interpretación uniforme del derecho a la libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión en el Sistema Europeo de Derechos Humanos. Para probar la hipótesis planteada, la figura aludida será comparada con el control de convencionalidad y la forma en que se ha aplicado esta última figura por parte de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos. Esto último se realizará con el fin de evidenciar las falencias interpretativas y de protección de los derechos que genera la utilización del margen nacional de apreciación. Palabras clave: margen nacional de apreciación, control de convencionalidad, Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos, Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, libertad de pensamiento, conciencia y religión, Estado laico. Abstract: This paper will study the figure of the national margin of appreciation and its application by the European Court of Human Rights. The purpose of this study is to show that the frequent use of this figure prevents a uniform interpretation of the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion in the European System of Human Rights. To test this hypothesis, the aforementioned figure will be compared with the control of conventionality and the way in which the latter figure has been applied by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. The latter in order to highlight the interpretative and protection flaws of the rights generated by the use of the national margin of appreciation. Keywords: National appreciation margin, control of conventionality, European Court of Human Rights, Inter-American Court of Human Rights, freedom of thought, conscience and religion, secular State.


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