Punishment and Inclusion: The Presuppositions of Corrective Justice in Aristotle and What They Imply

1995 ◽  
Vol 8 (2) ◽  
pp. 259-274
Author(s):  
Randall R. Curren

There is a view of Aristotle’s conception of corrective justice which has enjoyed some following among tort theorists in recent years, according to which corrective justice is distinct from distributive justice and entirely independent of it. The distinctness of the two is, of course, asserted by Aristotle in a well-known passage in the Nicomachean Ethics, and no one could seriously doubt that he does take the forms of these two kinds of justice to be distinct:What is just in distributions of common assets will always fit the [geometrical] proportion mentioned above,... On the other hand, what is just in transactions is certainly equal in a way, and what is unjust is unequal; but still it fits numerical proportion, not the [geometrical] proportion of the other species.

2019 ◽  
Vol 32 (1) ◽  
pp. 59-82
Author(s):  
Helen Eenmaa-Dimitrieva

Several legal philosophers have argued that the principle of corrective justice provides the best explanation of various areas of the law—especially the law of torts. On the other hand, some philosophers of law and many economists of law have argued that the principle of corrective justice is not an independent principle of justice. I call this the problem of dependency. If the critics are right, the principle of corrective justice cannot be an explanation of a large area of our law as it claims to be.I argue that the increasingly complex forms of the problem of dependency that the critics have proposed lose their force once we have a better understanding of the principle of corrective justice and its relationships with other principles. The principle of corrective justice does not serve a conception of distributive justice or efficiency and can provide an explanation of a large area of our law despite the criticism. It does so independently as a principle of justice that is reflected in our legal practice.


2019 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 109-145
Author(s):  
André Luiz Cruz Sousa

The aim of this paper is to study a set of three issues related to the understanding of partial justice and partial injustice as character dispositions, namely the distinctive circumstance of action, the emotion involved therein and the pleasure or pain following it. Those points are treated in a relatively obscure way by Aristotle, especially in comparison with their treatment in the expositions of other character virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics. Building on the expression ‘capacity towards the other’ (δύναμις ἐν τῷ πρὸς ἕτερον), the paper highlights the interpersonal nature of the circumstances of just and unjust actions, and points how such nature is directly related to notions such as ‘profit’ (κέρδος) or ‘getting more’(πλεονεκτεῖν) as well as to the unusual conception of excess, defect and intermediacy in Nicomachean Ethics Book V. The interpersonal nature of just and unjust actions works also as the starting-point for the interpretation both of the pleasure briefly mentioned in 1130b4 as characterizing the greedy person and of the emotion involved in acting justly or greedy, which is mentioned in an extremely elliptical way in 1130b1-2: the paper argues, on the one hand, that the pleasure felt in acting justly or unjustly concerns not only the goods that are the object of just or unjust interactions, but also the way such interactions affect the people involved; on the other hand, it argues that the emotion actuated in just or unjust interactions relates to the agent’s concern or lack of concern with the good of those people.


1981 ◽  
Vol 7 ◽  
pp. 221-250
Author(s):  
Derek P.H. Allen

A difference of opinion exists among some philosophers who have recently inquired whether Marx thinks that capitalism is distributively unjust. What has to be determined is whether in Marx's view the wage worker suffers an injustice in not receiving most or all of the surplus value he creates. Allen Wood argues that this is not Marx's view, and George Brenkert agrees, for quite similar reasons; but Ziyad Husami and Gary Young, on the other hand, argue in reply to Wood, and on overlapping grounds, for the opposite interpretation; Wood, in turn, has defended himself against Husami.


Elenchos ◽  
2016 ◽  
Vol 37 (1-2) ◽  
pp. 119-146

Abstract Solon’s extraordinary claim, that we should call “no one happy who is still living” (τέλος ὁρᾶν), presents a fascinating and distinctive argument about happiness and the length of a human life. The issues Solon raises are important, and even if we think his pessimistic conclusion is an exaggeration we can still appreciate his central concern how conceptions of happiness and the length of a human life are connected. The purpose of this paper is to explore a few of these problems, in particular the reason why Aristotle’s reply to Solon in the Nicomachean Ethics is somewhat ambiguous. We find Aristotle addressing Solon’s claim at the outset of Eth. Nic. A 10, troubled in one sense by its conclusion, yet struck by its partial truth. On the one hand, he thinks that εὐδαιμονία requires a “complete life” (βίος τέλειος), or at the very least, a sufficient and “complete span of time” (τέλειος χρόνος), both of which are compatible with Solon’s advice that we should postpone calling someone happy until a later point in life. But on the other hand Aristotle defines εὐδαιμονία in such a way that raises the question whether he needs to accept Solon’s claim in any form. In particular, if happiness is defined in terms of excellent activity (ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετήν), as Aristotle repeatedly claims, why should we wait until a person dies to call him or her happy? Why shouldn’t excellent actions, at the very time they are performed, count someone as happy? The puzzle, in short, is the fact that Aristotle defines happiness in terms of ἐνέργειαι, activities that are complete without developing over time, and yet also claims that happiness requires a “complete lifetime”, a βίος τέλειος.


Author(s):  
Manuel Cruz Ortiz de Landázuri ◽  

Aristotle says in the Nicomachean Ethics that pleasure accompanies the perfect activity, doing it more desirable, and that the activity of contemplation is the most divine and pleasurable. On the other hand, he says in the Metaphysics that God’s activity is the most pleasurable, because his activity is perfect. In this article I try to study the relation between pleasure and activity in contemplation and its relation with God’s activity, in order to understand intellectual pleasure: is it possible to speak about a “spiritual” pleasure? Are there sensations which do not depend on material organs?


1998 ◽  
Vol 11 (2) ◽  
pp. 311-328 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason W. Neyers

Nearly twenty-five hundred years ago, Aristotle first elucidated his theory of morality in the Nicomachean Ethics by systematically examining and analyzing the virtues which he felt were necessary for the attainment of the Good in the here and now. One of the most controversial and perhaps least understood portions of this magnum opus are those that pertain to the now famous building blocks of legal philosophy: corrective and distributive justice. These terms remain as relevant today as when they were first “discovered” in large part due to modern legal theory’s increasing tendency to rely on Aristotle’s corrective and distributive ideas as the organizing and distinguishing principles of the private and public law, respectively. If corrective justice is to define the limits and form of the private law, however, a blind reliance on Aristotle’s interpretation is mistaken. An examination of Aristotle’s corrective justice shows that his legal philosophy is incomplete and often paradoxical—asserting premises that are irreconcilable on a plain reading of Aristotelian texts. In order to demonstrate these inconsistencies, this paper will first distinguish between corrective and distributive justice. It will then examine three of the most difficult and least understood aspects of corrective justice: namely, Aristotle’s conception of equality, reciprocity, and correlativity in gain and loss.


wisdom ◽  
2017 ◽  
Vol 9 (2) ◽  
pp. 67-73
Author(s):  
Linos G. BENAKIS

This paper argues that research in the primary sources must precede the investigation of Byzantine philosophy. Two points are to be considered, on the one hand, the gathering of texts, and, on the other hand, the study of texts in relation to their sources. Thus the external evidence as well as the internal evidence of texts should be examined. In this double regard, the manuscripts containing Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are considered. Their authors are Michael of Ephesos, Eustratios of Nicaea, “Anonymus”, Heliodoros of Prussa, Georgios Pachymeres, Michael Psellos, John Italos, Nikephoros Blemmydes, George Gemistos Plethon.


Author(s):  
Maria Domingas Vale da Silva

AN ANALYSIS OF THE THEORY OF JUSTICE IN ARISTÓTELES PRESENT IN THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (BOOK V)EL ANÁLISIS DE LA TEORÍA DE LA JUSTICIA EN ARISTÓTELES PRESENTE EN LA ÉTICA LA NICÓMACO (LIBRO V)O presente artigo faz uma análise do tema da justiça presente no Livro V da obra “Ética a Nicômaco” do filósofo grego Aristóteles. Nesta, leva em conta os diversos temas atinentes ao termo conforme apresenta o próprio filósofo. Por conta disso, inicia alocando a justiça enquanto virtude por excelência. Posteriormente, passa a analisar a significação e posterior distinção entre justiça total e justiça particular (nesta última, distingue justiça distributiva de justiça corretiva), justiça política e justiça doméstica, justiça natural e justiça legal, a designação de justiça como equidade, a relação entre amizade e justiça e, por fim, a consideração do juiz como justiça animada.Palavras-chave: Aristóteles; Justiça; Virtude.ABSTRACTThis article is a justice theme this analysis in Book V of the “Nicomachean Ethics” work of the Greek philosopher Aristotle. This takes into account the various issues pertaining to the term as presents the philosopher himself. Because of this, start by allocating justice as a virtue par excellence. Later proceeds to analyze the meaning and later distinction between full justice and particular justice (the latter distinguishes distributive justice corrective justice), political justice and domestic justice, natural justice and legal justice, the designation of justice as fairness, the relationship between friendship and justice and, finally, a judge as lively justice.Keywords: Aristotle; Justice; Virtue.RESUMENEste artículo es un tema de justicia este análisis en el Libro V de la obra “Ética a Nicómaco” del filósofo griego Aristóteles. Esto toma en cuenta las diversas cuestiones relacionadas con el término como se presenta el propio filósofo. Debido a esto, comenzar mediante la asignación de la justicia como una virtud por excelencia. Posteriormente se procede a analizar el significado y más tarde completa distinción entre la justicia y la justicia particular (este último distingue la justicia distributiva justicia correctiva), la justicia política y la justicia doméstica, la justicia natural y la justicia legal, la designación de la justicia como equidad, la relación entre la amistad y la justicia y, por último, una justicia tan viva la justicia.Palabras clave: Aristóteles; Justicia; Virtud.


1999 ◽  
Vol 173 ◽  
pp. 249-254
Author(s):  
A.M. Silva ◽  
R.D. Miró

AbstractWe have developed a model for theH2OandOHevolution in a comet outburst, assuming that together with the gas, a distribution of icy grains is ejected. With an initial mass of icy grains of 108kg released, theH2OandOHproductions are increased up to a factor two, and the growth curves change drastically in the first two days. The model is applied to eruptions detected in theOHradio monitorings and fits well with the slow variations in the flux. On the other hand, several events of short duration appear, consisting of a sudden rise ofOHflux, followed by a sudden decay on the second day. These apparent short bursts are frequently found as precursors of a more durable eruption. We suggest that both of them are part of a unique eruption, and that the sudden decay is due to collisions that de-excite theOHmaser, when it reaches the Cometopause region located at 1.35 × 105kmfrom the nucleus.


Author(s):  
A. V. Crewe

We have become accustomed to differentiating between the scanning microscope and the conventional transmission microscope according to the resolving power which the two instruments offer. The conventional microscope is capable of a point resolution of a few angstroms and line resolutions of periodic objects of about 1Å. On the other hand, the scanning microscope, in its normal form, is not ordinarily capable of a point resolution better than 100Å. Upon examining reasons for the 100Å limitation, it becomes clear that this is based more on tradition than reason, and in particular, it is a condition imposed upon the microscope by adherence to thermal sources of electrons.


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