scholarly journals Against Moral Absolutism: Surveillance and Disclosure After Snowden

2015 ◽  
Vol 29 (2) ◽  
pp. 145-159 ◽  
Author(s):  
Rahul Sagar
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Surveillance Programs ◽  
Moral Absolutism

Now that the uproar provoked by the disclosure of the National Security Agency's (NSA) surveillance programs has lessened, and the main protagonists, Edward Snowden and Glenn Greenwald, have had a chance to make the case for their actions, we are in a position to evaluate whether their disclosure and publication of communications intelligence was justified. To this end, this essay starts by clarifying the history, rationale, and efficacy of communications surveillance. Following this I weigh the arguments against surveillance, focusing in particular on the countervailing value of privacy. Next I explain why state secrecy makes it difficult for citizens and lawmakers to assess the balance that officials are striking between security and privacy. Finally, I turn to consider whether the confounding nature of state secrecy justifies Snowden's and Greenwald's actions. I conclude that their actions are unjustified because they treat privacy and transparency as trumps. Consequently, their actions embody a moral absolutism that disrespects the norms and procedures central to a constitutional democracy.

scholarly journals Furtive Encryption: Power, Trust, and the Constitutional Cost of Collective Surveillance

2018 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jeffrey Vagle
Keyword(s):  
Civil Liberties ◽  
The United States ◽  
Search And Seizure ◽  
Constitutional Democracy ◽  
Electronic Communications ◽  
Government Power ◽  
Surveillance Programs ◽  
Power Trust ◽  
Government Surveillance ◽  
The Right

Recent revelations of heretofore secret U.S. government surveillance programs have sparked national conversations about their constitutionality and the delicate balance between security and civil liberties in a constitutional democracy. Among the revealed policies asserted by the National Security Agency (NSA) is a provision found in the “minimization procedures” required under section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978. This provision allows the NSA to collect and keep indefinitely any encrypted information collected from domestic communications — including the communications of U.S. citizens. That is, according to the U.S. government, the mere fact that a U.S. citizen has encrypted her electronic communications is enough to give the NSA the right to store that data until it is able to decrypt or decode it.Through this provision, the NSA is automatically treating all electronic communications from U.S. citizens that are hidden or obscured through encryption — for whatever reason — as suspicious, a direct descendant of the “nothing-to-hide” family of privacy minimization arguments. The ubiquity of electronic communication in the United States and elsewhere has led to the widespread use of encryption, the vast majority of it for innocuous purposes. This Article argues that the mere encryption by individuals of their electronic communications is not alone a basis for individualized suspicion. Moreover, this Article asserts that the NSA’s policy amounts to a suspicionless search and seizure. This program is therefore in direct conflict with the fundamental principles underlying the Fourth Amendment, specifically the protection of individuals from unwarranted government power and the establishment of the reciprocal trust between citizen and government that is necessary for a healthy democracy.

scholarly journals Metadata Laws, Journalism and Resistance in Australia

2017 ◽  
Vol 5 (1) ◽  
pp. 76-83 ◽  
Author(s):  
Benedetta Brevini
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
The United States ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Communication Studies ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Surveillance Studies ◽  
Bulk Data ◽  
Data Collections ◽  
Telecommunications Companies

The intelligence leaks from Edward Snowden in 2013 unveiled the sophistication and extent of data collection by the United States’ National Security Agency and major global digital firms prompting domestic and international debates about the balance between security and privacy, openness and enclosure, accountability and secrecy. It is difficult not to see a clear connection with the Snowden leaks in the sharp acceleration of new national security legislations in Australia, a long term member of the Five Eyes Alliance. In October 2015, the Australian federal government passed controversial laws that require telecommunications companies to retain the metadata of their customers for a period of two years. The new acts pose serious threats for the profession of journalism as they enable government agencies to easily identify and pursue journalists’ sources. Bulk data collections of this type of information deter future whistleblowers from approaching journalists, making the performance of the latter’s democratic role a challenge. After situating this debate within the scholarly literature at the intersection between surveillance studies and communication studies, this article discusses the political context in which journalists are operating and working in Australia; assesses how metadata laws have affected journalism practices and addresses the possibility for resistance.

scholarly journals Surveillance Hegemony

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Keiber
Keyword(s):  
National Security ◽  
Intelligence Community ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Public Programs ◽  
Information Ecology ◽  
Public Surveillance ◽  
Surveillance Programs ◽  
The U.S

The National Security Agency activity disclosed by Edward Snowden plugs into a larger information ecology made possible by U.S. surveillance hegemony. While the revelations of the NSA’s international spying ambitions have astonished, there is more to U.S. surveillance than secretive programs carried out by its intelligence community. The U.S. also assiduously conducts surveillance on individuals abroad through public programs negotiated with other states. These more public efforts are made possible by institutions and hortatory norms that support international surveillance. This triad of capabilities, norms, and institutions reflect U.S. surveillance hegemony. Hegemony greases the wheels of U.S.-led international surveillance and fosters an information ecology that feeds, and is fed by, secretive programs like those of the NSA and more public surveillance alike. This article unpacks elements of U.S. surveillance hegemony and, using two other public surveillance programs, situates the NSA activity within the resulting information ecology.

Culture Clashes

2012 ◽  
pp. 200-278
Author(s):  
Pauline C. Reich
Keyword(s):  
United States ◽  
National Security ◽  
Constitutional Law ◽  
The United States ◽  
Difficult Problem ◽  
Security And Privacy ◽  
Privacy Laws ◽  
Private Citizens ◽  
Government Surveillance ◽  
Constitutional Protections

This chapter reviews fundamental U.S. constitutional law in relation to privacy; the various United States federal privacy laws in relation to government surveillance of online communications by private citizens; cases related to these issues, recent amendments and proposed amendments to U.S. law; comparisons to law in other countries. It concludes that this particular area of law, at least in the United States, United Kingdom, India, Australia and Canada, which continues to be hotly debated, has no resolution in sight, and the difficult problem of balancing national security and privacy while maintaining constitutional protections in democracies is still a problem in search of a solution.

scholarly journals Brief Amici Curiae of Experts in the History of Executive Surveillance: James Bamford, Loch Johnson, and Peter Fenn in First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles v. National Security Agency

2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Urban
Keyword(s):  
Twentieth Century ◽  
Los Angeles ◽  
National Security ◽  
Executive Branch ◽  
National Security Agency ◽  
Intelligence Agencies ◽  
Surveillance Programs ◽  
History Of ◽  
First Unitarian Church ◽  
The Church

*Abstract: *This case presents pressing questions regarding the executive's power to collect, store, and use Americans' telephony and other personal data for the purposes of conducting surveillance operations.In the wake of recent disclosures revealing National Security Agency data collection programs, the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles and 21 other membership and political advocacy organizations filed this lawsuit to challenge the NSA's collection of telephony data as an infringement of their members' First and Fourth Amendment rights.In this amicus brief, experts in the history of American surveillance -- James Bamford, author of The Puzzle Palace; Peter Fenn, who served as Washington Chief of Staff for Senator Frank Church and as a staff member to the Senate Intelligence Committee; and Dr. Loch Johnson, who served as special assistant to the Church Committee chair and as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight -- explain the historical parallels between the executive surveillance programs that are presently coming to light and the development of abusive surveillance practices from the 1940s to the 1970s.All amici were directly involved in the comprehensive review of twentieth-century American intelligence operations completed by the Church Committee in the 1970s, giving them a uniquely thorough understanding of these parallels.Drawing from the experts’ extensive knowledge, the brief explains the clear parallels between the development and growth of the abusive practices of the mid-twentieth century -- when American intelligence agencies helped conduct politically motivated surveillance of Americans ranging from ordinary teachers, journalists and peace activists to civil rights leaders, members of Congress, and a Supreme Court justice -- and today’s vast surveillance programs. History shows that abusive surveillance does not require bad actors to grow and flourish: instead, it is the natural outgrowth of too much secrecy and too little oversight by other branches of government.In light of this clear historical pattern, the brief argues that the court should carefully apply existing legal limits on the government’s surveillance powers to address the risks posed by the executive branch and the intelligence agencies’ claims to expansive power to determine the limits of their own activities.Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353719

scholarly journals Telecom Responsibilization: Internet Governance, Surveillance, and New Roles for Intermediaries

2016 ◽  
Vol 41 (1) ◽  
Author(s):  
Mike Zajko
Keyword(s):  
Law Enforcement ◽  
National Security ◽  
Service Providers ◽  
Private Institutions ◽  
Internet Governance ◽  
Roles And Responsibilities ◽  
Political Processes ◽  
Surveillance Programs ◽  
Telecom Service ◽  
Société Civile

This article foregrounds internet intermediaries as a class of actors central to many governance and surveillance strategies, and provides an overview of their emerging roles and responsibilities. While the growth of the internet has created challenges for state actors, state priorities have been unfolded onto the private institutions that provide many of the internet’s services. This article elaborates responsibilization strategies implicating internet intermediaries, and the goals that these actors can be aligned toward. These include enrolling telecom service providers in law enforcement and national security-oriented surveillance programs, as well as strategies to responsibilize service providers as copyright enforcers. But state interests are also responsive to pressures from civil society, so that “internet values” are increasingly channelled through the formal political processes shaping internet governance.Cet article met l’accent sur les intermédiaires d’internet en tant que classe d’acteurs qui est centrale pour de nombreuses stratégies de gouvernance et de surveillance, puis il passe en revue leurs rôles et responsabilités naissants. L’expansion d’internet posant des défis pour les acteurs d’État, ces derniers ont confié des priorités d’État aux organismes privés mêmes qui fournissent plusieurs des services d’internet. Cet article élabore ainsi des stratégies de responsabilisation impliquant les intermédiaires d’internet, et les buts qu’on peut fixer pour ceux-ci. Ces buts comprennent l’inscription de fournisseurs de services de télécommunication à des programmes d’application de la loi et de surveillance pour assurer la sécurité nationale, ainsi que des stratégies pour responsabiliser les fournisseurs de services en tant que protecteurs de droit d’auteur. Mais, l’État répondant aussi aux pressions de la société civile, les « valeurs d’internet » passent de plus en plus par les processus politiques formels qui sous-tendent la gouvernance d’internet.

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