scholarly journals Surveillance Hegemony

2015 ◽  
Vol 13 (2) ◽  
pp. 168-181 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jason Keiber

The National Security Agency activity disclosed by Edward Snowden plugs into a larger information ecology made possible by U.S. surveillance hegemony. While the revelations of the NSA’s international spying ambitions have astonished, there is more to U.S. surveillance than secretive programs carried out by its intelligence community. The U.S. also assiduously conducts surveillance on individuals abroad through public programs negotiated with other states. These more public efforts are made possible by institutions and hortatory norms that support international surveillance. This triad of capabilities, norms, and institutions reflect U.S. surveillance hegemony. Hegemony greases the wheels of U.S.-led international surveillance and fosters an information ecology that feeds, and is fed by, secretive programs like those of the NSA and more public surveillance alike. This article unpacks elements of U.S. surveillance hegemony and, using two other public surveillance programs, situates the NSA activity within the resulting information ecology.

Author(s):  
Matthew M. Aid

This article discusses the National Security Agency under the Obama Administration. Upon his inauguration on January 20, 2009, Obama inherited from the Bush administration an intelligence community embroiled in political controversies. Of the sixteen agencies of the intelligence community, the National Security Agency (NSA) faced the greatest scrutiny from the new Obama administration and the Congress. NSA was the largest and the most powerful member of the U.S. intelligence community. Since its formation in 1952, NSA has managed and directed all U.S. government signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection. It is the collector and processor of communications intelligence (COMINT) and the primary processor of foreign instrumentation signals intelligence (FISINT). And since 1958, NSA has been the coordinator of the U.S. government's national electronics intelligence (ELINT) program. It has also the task of overseeing the security of the U.S. government's communications and data processing systems, and since the 1980s, NSA has managed the U.S. government's national operation security (OPSEC) program. In this article, the focus is on the challenges faced by the NSA during the Bush administration; the role played by the NSA during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; and the challenges faced by the Obama administration in confronting a series of thorny legal and policy issues relating to NSA's eavesdropping program.


2011 ◽  
Vol 13 (3) ◽  
pp. 149-184 ◽  
Author(s):  
Austin Long

The contribution of the U.S. intelligence community (IC) to counterinsurgency operations past and present has gone largely underappreciated, in part because of the pervasive secrecy surrounding most of the IC's activities. A review of two recently declassified histories of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Agency (NSA) involvement in Vietnam in the 1960s provides insight into the historical contributions of these agencies to counterinsurgency efforts. This analysis provides a context for understanding available evidence relating to the two agencies' contributions to current counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The review concludes with intelligence policy recommendations.


Subject The US intelligence community in a year after purported reforms. Significance On December 29, an agreement between the United States, Japan and South Korea to share intelligence on North Korea went into effect. This ended a year in which the US intelligence community was the subject of broad domestic public scrutiny in the light of continued fallout from former National Security Agency (NSA) contractor Edward Snowden's leaks to a Senate report on the CIA's use of torture. The White House's support for reforms has been watched by tech and telecoms businesses that have lost considerable revenue from reputational damage as a result of the growing awareness of requirements on them of US intelligence activities. Impacts The Obama administration will rely on the US intelligence community as its main counterterrorist instrument. A Republican Congress will be less likely to support intelligence reforms, though only marginally so. There is no indication that the balance of power on intelligence issues between the executive and legislative branches has shifted.


2016 ◽  
Author(s):  
Jennifer Urban

*Abstract: *This case presents pressing questions regarding the executive's power to collect, store, and use Americans' telephony and other personal data for the purposes of conducting surveillance operations.In the wake of recent disclosures revealing National Security Agency data collection programs, the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles and 21 other membership and political advocacy organizations filed this lawsuit to challenge the NSA's collection of telephony data as an infringement of their members' First and Fourth Amendment rights.In this amicus brief, experts in the history of American surveillance -- James Bamford, author of The Puzzle Palace; Peter Fenn, who served as Washington Chief of Staff for Senator Frank Church and as a staff member to the Senate Intelligence Committee; and Dr. Loch Johnson, who served as special assistant to the Church Committee chair and as staff director of the House Subcommittee on Intelligence Oversight -- explain the historical parallels between the executive surveillance programs that are presently coming to light and the development of abusive surveillance practices from the 1940s to the 1970s.All amici were directly involved in the comprehensive review of twentieth-century American intelligence operations completed by the Church Committee in the 1970s, giving them a uniquely thorough understanding of these parallels.Drawing from the experts’ extensive knowledge, the brief explains the clear parallels between the development and growth of the abusive practices of the mid-twentieth century -- when American intelligence agencies helped conduct politically motivated surveillance of Americans ranging from ordinary teachers, journalists and peace activists to civil rights leaders, members of Congress, and a Supreme Court justice -- and today’s vast surveillance programs. History shows that abusive surveillance does not require bad actors to grow and flourish: instead, it is the natural outgrowth of too much secrecy and too little oversight by other branches of government.In light of this clear historical pattern, the brief argues that the court should carefully apply existing legal limits on the government’s surveillance powers to address the risks posed by the executive branch and the intelligence agencies’ claims to expansive power to determine the limits of their own activities.Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2353719


1989 ◽  
Vol 2 (1) ◽  
pp. 11-12
Author(s):  
Glenn Hastedt

Courses on international relations, U.S. foreign policy, Soviet foreign policy, and national security policy spend a great deal of time exploring the question of the Soviet or U.S. strategic threat. For all of its centrality to these courses, students often have, difficulty dealing with the issue in anything other than a gut feeling manner. In part, this is due to the highly technical and complex nature of the subject matter, but it is also due to the passive manner in which students are exposed to the subject. This essay presents one way of actively engaging students in the learning process, forcing them to formulate and defend their own view in the form of an individually or collectively produced intelligence estimate.Understanding why U.S. (Soviet) policy makers see a Soviet (U.S.) threat requires an understanding of the process by which threats are established. The most formal and authoritative U.S. government statements on the dimensions of the Soviet strategic threat are found in national intelligence estimates (NIE's). Typically, the intelligence estimating process is broken down into six functional steps: 1) requirement setting, 2) collection, 3) processing, 4) analysis, 5) reporting, and 6) receipt and evaluation by the consumer (Ransom 1970). NIE's are only one kind of finished intelligence produced by the intelligence community. There is no fixed length or format for an intelligence estimate to follow. The Senator Mike Gravel edition of the Pentagon Papers (1971) presents a number of estimates on Vietnam that can be used by students as models. Ransom (1970) presents a handy checklist of questions that students as consumers can use to evaluate estimates.


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