The Reputational Costs and Ethical Implications of Coercive Limited Air Strikes: The Fallacy of the Middle-Ground Approach

2020 ◽  
Vol 34 (2) ◽  
pp. 217-228
Author(s):  
Danielle L. Lupton

AbstractLimited air strikes present an attractive “middle-ground approach” for policymakers, as they are less costly to coercers than deploying troops on the ground. Policymakers believe that threatening and employing limited air strikes signal their resolve to targets. In this essay, as part of the roundtable on “The Ethics of Limited Strikes,” I debunk this fallacy and explain how the same factors that make limited air strikes attractive to coercers are also those that undermine their efficacy as a coercive tool of foreign policy. The limited nature of these air strikes undermines the ability of coercers to effectively signal their resolve. In turn, coercive threats of limited air strikes are less likely to be credible, creating a vicious cycle: policymakers threaten to employ air strikes because they are less costly but then often need to follow through on those threats as target states fail to acquiesce to their demands, precisely because limited air strikes are less costly for the coercer. Limited air strikes, therefore, can actually be a source of conflict escalation and lead policymakers to engage in military action that they would prefer to avoid. I further explain why failing to follow through on such coercive threats can undermine a leader's reputation for resolve and lead to future crisis escalation. Finally, I discuss what this quagmire means for the ethics of the threat and the use of air strikes, particularly for the principles of right intention, likelihood of success, and probability of escalation.

2003 ◽  
Vol 17 (1) ◽  
pp. 25-29 ◽  
Author(s):  
Thomas M. Nichols

The debate over going to war in Iraq has in many quarters become a debate about the ethical implications of preemption and prevention rather than about the war itself. But neither prevention nor preemption can have any moral standing in the abstract, since it is the circumstances, not the concepts, that inform their qualities as strategies. The question, rather, is whether the decision to engage in a new war against the Iraqi regime is just.Indeed, it is surprising to find that so much less has been said about basic principles of just war—that is, a just cause, a right intention, proportionality, and so on—than about the largely legal questions of preemption and prevention. But concepts like preemption and prevention are really about the timing and method of war; they say nothing about the moral content of the conflict itself, and in the end an emphasis on them obscures the fundamental question of justice. Put another way, if a particular military action, including launching war, is just and proper, then the means and scheduling are subject, like anything else, to scrutiny under the guidance of the principles of just war. But they are not separate questions in and of themselves.


1973 ◽  
Vol 25 (3) ◽  
pp. 387-413 ◽  
Author(s):  
Anna P. Schreiber

The application of economic sanctions against Rhodesia and the results of that effort raise the question of the effectiveness of economic coercion as an instrument of foreign policy. A review of U.S. economic coercion against Cuba, in effect since June 1960, and against the Dominican Republic during the period 1960–1962 may be timely and instructive. By exploring the steps leading to the application of U.S. economic coercion, its objectives, and its concrete impact on the target states it may be possible to develop some useful generalizations about the role of economic weapons as tools of foreign policy.


Author(s):  
Kevin Narizny

Nearly everything a state does has distributional consequences, including grand strategy. Societal groups with different stakes in the international economy and defense spending often have conflicting strategic priorities, and these groups pursue their parochial interests by supporting the nomination and election of like-minded politicians. Thus, grand strategy is a product of political economy. An overview of American foreign policy over the last several decades illustrates this logic. In the 1980s, the Democratic and Republican coalitions had conflicting interests over the international economy, so the two parties diverged on grand strategy. The recovery of the Rust Belt in the 1990s and 2000s, however, brought increasing convergence. Political discourse over foreign policy was fiercely partisan, but, with the notable exception of George W. Bush’s decision to go to war in Iraq in 2003, the two parties shared essentially the same view of America’s role in the world. The disastrous outcome in Iraq led the Bush administration back to the middle ground in its second term, and Obama followed the same course. In contrast, the election of Donald Trump augurs change. Trump’s electoral coalition consists of a different balance of interests in the international economy than that of past Republican presidents, so he is likely to pursue different strategic priorities.


2016 ◽  
Vol 43 (1) ◽  
pp. 130-151 ◽  
Author(s):  
Deepa Prakash ◽  
Asli Ilgit

AbstractExtant studies suggest that criticism of state practices may create ontological crises in states, thus prompting emotional responses. This article examines what happens when target states reject external criticism, and the failure of outside attempts to shame and criticise. We show that recipients can view international criticism as opportunities to consolidate state identity rather than ontological crises. Using Turkey’s foreign policy towards Israel, we focus on the agency of weak states by expanding the range of emotions stemming from non-acceptance of criticism and by emphasising the role of leaders when crafting emotional responses to negative representations.


Author(s):  
أ.د.احمد نوري النعيمي

That the diplomatic work and its importance in foreign policy planning assumes the following points: 1. Choosing the tool in the sense of choosing the most correct tool that reflects the reality of the situation on the one hand and the disposal of strong energy to reach the implementation of the political decision. The declaration of war and entering into a resolution that uses force merely to face insulting ambassadors does not mean Power of the State concerned. But an imbalance in its foreign policy. 2. The coordination of the tools, that the foreign policy scheme must be such a role, and on the external style, diplomatic work, military action and propaganda must complement each other, to the extent that each of them is the first attack and the last line of defense.


2016 ◽  
Vol 4 (2) ◽  
pp. 274-296
Author(s):  
Can Küçükali

This paper delves into the problem of aggression in Turkish foreign-policy discourse on Syria which tries to legitimize a military operation. In order to understand how the policymaking preferences of a military operation are legitimized and promoted in governmental discourse, 166 governmental texts, from 2011 to 2013, are investigated in terms of the implementation of strategies proposed by several scholars (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999; Reisigl and Wodak 2001, 2009; van Leeuwen 2007, 2008; Reyes 2011). The results show that the increasing willingness of the Turkish government to take military action in Syria is systematically operationalized in several stages within each type of legitimation strategy (van Leeuwen and Wodak 1999) to overcome international reluctance and provide support for a prospective conflict. At the end of the paper, the results are evaluated in light of recent political developments for a comprehensive understanding of the meaning and limits of the strategies implemented.


2020 ◽  
pp. 46-63
Author(s):  
Melissa M. Lee

This chapter presents the core theoretical argument of this book: states with incompatible policy interests subvert state authority in the pursuit of foreign policy objectives against their adversaries. This conflictual behavior weakens state authority and impedes state consolidation. The chapter then describes the use of subversion as an instrument of statecraft and the political benefits of delegating disruption to local proxies in the target state. It explores the strategic and operational advantages of subversion, and considers how this foreign policy lever can help states increase the probability that they will prevail in their disputes with adversaries. Because subversion is not costless, the chapter also examines the constraints that would-be sponsors face when considering this tool of statecraft. Finally, it introduces three mechanisms through which subversion undermines state authority, showing how foreign support plays a pivotal role in these processes. Target states are hardly passive victims of subversion, yet their efforts to respond to foreign subversion rarely recapture the authority losses imposed on them by the sponsor state.


1987 ◽  
Vol 1 ◽  
pp. 97-112
Author(s):  
Alberto R. Coll

A statesman's responsibility to act morally while remaining politically fastidious is a primary difficulty in international relations. Theories that provide definitive guidance for political morality are often viewed with suspicion and considered unrealistic. Coll, in opposition to this dismissive approach, sees in the Christian worldview three core values that can be used to discern moral political actions: the importance of history, the ubiquity of tragedy, and practical wisdom. Coll explicates the Christian tradition that informs each of these values and considers their pertinence in international relations today. He goes on to extract some general prescriptions for foreign policy, showing that these core values speak to military action, immigration, foreign aid, and the environment.


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