Developing a Framework for Evaluating Nuclear Risks in South Asia

A new framework is essential for evaluating nuclear risks in South Asia. This region is marked by perennial disputes, emerging rivalries and long-standing extra-regional interferences, suggesting that it must be considered as a complex geostrategic frame of reference, rather than as a mere geographic construct. As key variables, postures such as no first use and escalate to de-escalate, as well as technological advances may either mitigate or exacerbate nuclear risks. Due to this complexity, causes of instability, risks of conflict, escalation to nuclear use and prospects of restraints and risk reduction will need to engage key players. This must occur not simply in dyadic, but also in multilateral contexts, due to the cascading effects of interactions among them. Within this framework, this essay will explore the erosion of no first use, the potential pitfalls of escalate to de-escalate and technological advances pose significant and worrying challenges for nuclear risk reduction.

Oil Price Shocks and Conflict Escalation: Onshore versus Offshore

We reconsider the relationship between oil and conflict, focusing on the location of oil resources. In a panel of 132 countries over the period 1962-2009, we show that oil windfalls escalate conflict in onshore-rich countries, while they de-escalate conflict in offshore-rich countries. We use a model to illustrate how these opposite effects can be explained by a fighting capacity mechanism, whereby the government can use offshore oil income to increase its fighting capacity, while onshore oil may be looted by oppositional groups to finance a rebellion. We provide empirical evidence supporting this interpretation: we find that oil price windfalls increase both the number and strength of active rebel groups in onshore-rich countries, while they strengthen the government in offshore-rich ones.

Deconstructing ahimsa at the workplace: its relevance and significance

PurposeThis paper aims to conceptualize ahimsa at the workplace as an alternate coping response to negative workplace behaviours. The response strategy aims to impede conflict escalation and transform a hostile situation into a collaborative one.Design/methodology/approachThe conceptualization of the indigenous construct bases upon Bhawuk's methodological suggestion on building psychological models from the scriptures (Bhawuk, 2010, 2017, 2019). The construct ahimsa explicates by synthesizing the micro-world (Bhagawad Gita, BG and Patanjali Yoga Sutras, PYS) and through the lifeworld of Gandhiji.FindingsThe conceptual analysis illustrates the efficacy of ahimsa as an alternate response to negative workplace behaviours. The definition delineates its three core characteristics, i.e. conscious non-violent action, self-empowerment and rehumanizing the perpetrator. Besides, it proposes to enhance metacognition, creativity and individual learning at the workplace.Originality/valueThe conceptual paper gives a new direction to management researchers on coping and responding to stress.

Explaining India’s Approach to Responsibility to Protect

India has been alleged for adopting a reluctant approach to the doctrine of responsibility to protect (R2P). In light of this allegation, this article explains India’s approach to R2P and attempts to answer why India has adopted a cautious and reluctant approach. To give a comprehensive picture and provide a compelling account of India’s cautiousness and reluctance, this article uses an eclectic approach. The systemic and domestic variables, along with normative and materialistic factors, have been taken simultaneously into account. It points out that India’s approach to R2P is shaped by a set of six variables—historical legacies, especially India’s colonial experience and its applications for its attitude towards the principles of non-intervention and state sovereignty; domestic compulsions such as failure of India to deliver inclusive and equitable development and ensuring human rights and citizen’s dignity in remote areas; the intentions of the great powers; security concerns like insurgency in various parts, including Kashmir; its approach to the doctrine per se; and unintended consequences of conflict escalation and its implication for India—have been a linchpin in shaping India’s approach. It demonstrates how these factors have cumulatively shaped India to neither vote in favor of intervention nor stand up with the governments that fail to protect their citizens, and thus fall in fulfilling their obligations under the first principle of the doctrine of R2P.

Fatal remedies. How dealing with policy conflict can backfire in a context of trust-erosion

This article investigates the relationship between policy conflict and trust-erosion. It concludes that in a context of trust-erosion, practices to deal with conflict may backfire and lead to further conflict escalation. The article draws on an in-depth analysis of 32 interviews with key actors in the conflict over a contested multibillion-euro highway project in Antwerp (Belgium). It concludes that while all actors draw on the policy repertoire of “managing public support” to explain the conflict, their perspectives of what it means for a policy to have public support differ. Practices to “manage public support” that made sense from one perspective, contributed to the erosion of trust from those holding a different perspective, thus further escalating the conflict. Practices intended to end conflict proved to be fatal remedies.

Is Theory Useful for Conflict Prediction? A Response to Beger, Morgan, and Ward

Beger, Morgan, and Ward (BM&W) call into question the results of our article on forecasting civil wars. They claim that our theoretically-informed model of conflict escalation under-performs more mechanical, inductive alternatives. This claim is false. BM&W’s critiques are misguided or inconsequential, and their conclusions hinge on a minor technical question regarding receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves: should the curves be smoothed, or should empirical curves be used? BM&W assert that empirical curves should be used and all of their conclusions depend on this subjective modeling choice. We extend our original analysis to show that our theoretically-informed model performs as well as or better than more atheoretical alternatives across a range of performance metrics and robustness specifications. As in our original article, we conclude by encouraging conflict forecasters to treat the value added of theory not as an assumption, but rather as a hypothesis to test.